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the members of 
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course of the and ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: Mr. Robinson. 
ASSEMBLYMAN RICHARD ROBINSON: How are you 
It's wonderful to see 

















CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Larry Kapiloff 
interested in the subject. (Laughter) 
't understand 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: May I then make just a few 
remarks? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
you're 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: We consider the Imbrecht bill to be the 
major step forward in this area. We are real not to amend the 
Imbrecht bill; we are trying to fine tune it. One of the 
finding is that there apparently, at least in some of the 
in this state, is a great reluctance to go with the major thrust 
of the Imbrecht bill, representing the col wisdom f Legis-
lature. We find too often a willingness the thrust of that bill 
because really what the Imbrecht bill was say is "We favor jo custody 
in principle. We favor joint custody, and we would therefore, in so many 
words, recommend that judges look with favor upon joint cus of children." 
We're finding that's just not occurring the that we expected. 
We're finding a great reluctance on the part universal 
but to a large degree, to accept that the 
Legislature, and we feel that that's wrong what the 
judiciary is doing is ignoring the mandates of islature, as they 
are wont to do on occasion. That would be the thrust of our testi-
mony. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Kapiloff, how much of that do you 
think is due to the fact that the judicial form was not after 
the Imbrecht bill? 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: Well, see that's one of the 
You're dea 1 is a bureaucracy 
lems. 
judiciary, 
and they have just refused to even amend their s 
in the law that we've mandated. We think that,bec not 
been changed, when you get down the l 
recognize or even to sometimes know that 
changed and it's there. But that is a 
trying to get at. 
Now, may I ask the indulgence of 
Mrs. Jan Gleason, who represents the 
San Diego, has not had an opportunity to prepare 
She is here today, and I'm informed that her tes 
than two minutes and I'd consider it a favor if she could 
of turn. 




l take less 
taken out 
MS. JANICE M. GLEASON: 
this, I think, in 45 seconds. I'm 
National Organization for Women. 
to present for consideration. 
Thank you, Mr. loff, and I can do 
The gist of my testimony is that 
either parent from birth to age of reason, 
western cultures is between six or seven 
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the l,ocal of the 
po I would i 
to 
to 
the other provisions that the attorneys are deal with among the 
parties; (2) from the age of reason to puberty, from the age of seven to 
twelve or fourteen, joint custody, all things being equal; (3) from pu-
berty to the age of majority, joint or sole custody, the emphasis being 
given on the preparation for adulthood, particularly the responsibility 
of getting a job and getting started on one's career. 
that? 
Thank you very much. Thank you again, Larry. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Wow, that's a record! Anybody want to beat 
(Laughter) 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: By the way, that wasn't-- Jan really 
is a neutral witness because her organization is ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, T underst.and. 
MS. IRIS JEAN HICKS: My name is Iris Hicks, commonly referred 
to in your li tera-fure as the proponent of AB 1706. I need for you to 
know that parenting for me is really a very private and a very personal 
matter. It's not comfortable to come before the public and have to re-
veal your private parenting issues. But when you have been confronted 
with something like a custody battle and look at the laws and view the 
legislation and you realize the trauma that battle is causing an indi-
vidual family, if you are any type of a conscientious citizen, you can-
not stand back and not make a statement about what needs to be changed. 
So, the presentation that I will give you is legally researched, but it's 
inspired from the heart. 
First of all, the Legislature has been very terrific (I'll use 
the word "terrific") in their public policy statement. Publ policy 
says that the Legislature finds and declares that it is the lie policy 
of this state to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact 
with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their 
marriage and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities 
of child rearing in order to effect this policy. 
The policy sounds terrific, so why are we problems? 
First of all, we're having problems because of the concept called pre-
sumptions. Now presumptions aren't very sexy, but they're very important. 
In the joint custody area, the presumption does not follow the policy. 
In other words, the policy encourages continuing contact. The burden of 
proof currently is on the person who wants to have the continuing con-
tact to prove why that is beneficial. We feel that the presumption should 
be changed and be coordinated with the public policy of the state. 
Secondly, historically presumptions concerning custody have 
changed as society has changed. There was a paternal presumption in 
agrarian common law England, when children were considered to be the 
property of the father. Then we had the Industrial Revolution,when the 
father was the absentee breadwinneri the mother was the stay-at-home 
nurturer, and the mother became the presumptive custodian. 
In California today, however, we don't live that way. Both 
mothers and fathers are breadwinners and both mothers and fathers are 
nurturers, so it would seem that joint custody would be a very logical 
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because you happen to be a normal human being and sometimes as a par-
ent in a crisis you don't get along with your spouse or ex-spouse. 
Also, by saying that "if parents can't get along" you're en-
couraging disagreement on the part of those parents. You are in es-
sence saying that at the time of the divorce you are angry with your 
spouse. The way you get that is refuse to agree to joint custody. You 
create the whole cycle of arguments. The judges and people say, "You 
can't get along." Therefore, we're back to sole custody. It's a Catch-22 
problem. 
Also, many of the problems with the argument that "when the 
parents can't get along" really are problems that children have in di-
vorce, period. It's not a joint custody problem. It's a problem of 
children in divorce, and we've accepted reasonable visitation forever. 
Parents can't get along with reasonable visitation, and we've never 
challenged a person's right to reasonable visitation because 
they can't get along with their spouse. It sounds good; it's not really 
how it works. I've listed some other "what ifs." I won't go into de-
tail; other speakers will. What if there's a geographical distance? 
What if the parents cannot share equal time? What if one parent is on 
welfare? The last one I will touch on: What if one parent is not cus-
todially competent? There's been some fear that a presumption of joint 
custody will force children to be in the hands of battering parents, 
perhaps drug addicts, alcoholics. It sounds very scary. We're still 
functioning from the test of what would be in the best interests of the 
child, and we do have a code section that protects children in these 
cases. It's Civil Code Section 4509. In essence it says that evidence 
of misconduct shall be improper and inadmissible except where child 
custody is an issue and such evidence is relevent to that issue. The 
codes protect us from incompetent parents in joint custody situations. 
The next reason we're still struggling is really the major 
reason. Larry already commented on it, and that has to do with professiona. 
concerns about implementation. The petition forms for dissolution have 
already been mentioned. I think we're all aware of them. We also have 
some problems sort of like the judicial guidelines for the domestic 
relations cases. Judge King in San Francisco in his guidelines to the 
public states such things as "Joint custody, i.e., alternating periods 
such as one month with each parent,will not be ordered." If you think 
a parent is going to read that and have the nerve to ask for joint cus-
tody, you should give that a second thought. We also have judicial text-
books on family law such as the California Basic Practice Guide, where jn 
comments to lawyers it says such things as "It seldom makes good sense 
to award joint custody if one parent disagrees, because the order would 
be unworkable." The legislative law does not say that. It says you can 
still consider sole custody or joint custody. In fact, if one parent 
disagrees, we do not have a choice of joint custody in the State of 
California. I'm talking about 1980-1981 publications, publications since 
the law was enacted. 
Another speaker will address the issue of statistics of 
how we are still preferring mothers overwhelmingly in discretionary 
judicial decisions. Also, you must know the impact of judicial de-
cisions. A difficult sole custody decision then is related down to 
attorneys who anticipate that judges still believe in sole custody. They 
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in turn advise helpless divorcing parents, 1, the j 
will move on full custody. Let's cons that from the 
The trickle down effect of all of this when it reaches the average pub-
lic is really overwhelming. I think ... 
Excuse me one second Hicks. Mr. 
Robinson s a ques 
MS. HICKS: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Ms. Hicks, I 
but the opponents ask one question that I would 
before your time runs out, and that's the issue 
bill will focus litigation, child cus 1 
Mr ff's bill, 
the parents, and to that extent it's 
domestic relations law in this state 
appreciate it if you'd address that. 
, on the fitness of 
in the growth of the 
ten years. I would 
MS. HICKS: Okay. The fitness issue is a dif t issue, and 
I take the full responsibility that "fitness" is a poor choice of words. 
The code addresses visitation in the terms of "the judge retains his 
discretion to deny visitation if it detr to the child," and 
we would request that your Committee to the language "detrimental 
to the child" as opposed to the issue of f ss of the 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: No, but what I'm say 
MS. HICKS: I understand ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: ••. is way the Kapi-
be focused on loff measure's going to work, is the 1 
the fitness of the parents rather than on ts of the child? 
MS. HICKS: The only evidence that l should be ible 
on the fitness issue relates to the code section that I just 
and that has to do with whether or not the is custodial 
to care for the child. That is the only on the f s issue 
that is permitted. In fact, when we have now that says that if 
the parents disagree they can go into a full battle -- cus , you know, 
battle over sole custody versus sole cus two different parents --
we get into many, many more fitness issues sole cus than 
we do if you limit it to the evidence of the custodial as it's 
related to being able to care for the child when you start out with the 
presumption that each parent has an r to joint cus We 
actually feel that ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You're say all 
currently be brought up under the sole cus law 
whether it's the living arrangements of either 
roommates or what have you. All those issues can 
up,and this in no way exacerbates t. 
MS. HICKS: That's right, yes, and 
joint custody you're narrowing the fitness 
todial competence, which is where it shou 
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tual y say with 
mere cus-
This whole idea "if the parents can't agree" opens up a bailiwick 
to more fitness problems than you can imagine, because ¥OU spend your 
time trying to prove sole custody versus sole custody and ... 
I do want to read just one quote as you look at the proponents 
versus the opponents on this issue. You see,the proponents are primarily 
parents who are divorced themselves, who have had personal experience 
with the system that is very different than the professionals, and I 
don't mean to degrade their expertise, but experience does give you a 
different insight. 
I'd like to read from Persia Wooley. She said, "The difference 
between the professional reaction to shared custody and that of the 
people who are practicing some form of it is often amazing ... Not infre-
quently, I spend the day listening to learned arguments as to why such 
arrangements can't possibly work, and then have dinner with people, who, no1 
knowing that it was impossible,found it to be an eminently sensible way 
of doing things." That has been exactly my personal experience. 
On page seven, I talk and show graphically a chart on what I 
call "What's in a Name --Attitudes and Status." If you look at the 
incredible ways we consider custody versus visitation, it's awesome. We 
have winner, loser, fit parents, unfit parents, custodian, noncustodian, 
good parents, bad parents, sole parent, nonparent, primary right, sec-
ondary right, authoritarian, visitor as an entertainer. The custody 
person has it all; the visitation person has nothing. We have better 
parent, worse parent, nurturing parent, Disneyland Dad, psychological 
parent, and we have the visitation person who's usually the victim of 
"Mother, may I" games. 
You can see why people don't want to be stuck with visitation. 
It doesn't sound very nice; it doesn't look very good; it doesn t feel 
very good. In joint custody, you can see the difference in attitude. 
It's described in terms of shared rights and responsibilities; it's 
called no-fault custody. The child has two fit parents. They continue 
as parents though they're divorced as spouses, and we have Mom's house, 
Dad's house. These words have come from an enormous amount of reading 
where I have answered descriptions of how we view custody and visitations 
and how we view joint custody. The words make a difference, they really 
do. 
The incredible thing too is that in both of these cases, cus-
tody and visitation or joint custody, the child could actually be spendinq 
the same amount of time in both cases. How we do it makes the differ-
ence as to how we feel about it. 
Also, we like the idea of equality of joint custody. Every-
one agrees that joint custody or that custody should be considered in 
the best interests of the child. Proponents feel that really the child 
is part of the total system which also includes parents and society and 
that the goal is to best preserve stability, continuity and security, 
both emotionally and environmentally, for all involved. 
To conclude, I would like to refer to another quote from the 
book, Divided Children, by Michael Wheeler. He says, "We must accept 
less than perfection, but we most certainly can improve the way in which 
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custody issues are now decided. Even a modest reform is worth great 
effort; multiplied by so many cases, the overall social benefits 
would be immense." 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Are there any other questions from members 
of the Committee? Okay. 
Thank you very much. 
The next witness is Steven Belzer, 
former counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on 
Justice at the California State Legislature. 
doing, Steve? Good to see you. Mr. Belzer's 
an attorney at law and the 
Administration of 
Mr. Belzer. How are you 
a great s. He 
went to the same law school as I did. ( ) 
MR. STEVEN P. BELZER: Mr. Chairman, and members, I'm in 
the happy position of representing nobody but myself today. I believe 
staff invited me here today because I was a s f son in the Senate 
who was responsible for the Senate's version of jo custody legisla-
tion, which was SB 477 by Senator Smith. Ultimately AB 1480, Mr. Im-
brecht's bill, was enacted and became effective. Actually both bills were 
enacted and became effective. They were substantially similar with the 
exception of a few additions that were made to AB 1480 after SB 477 
had been chaptered. 
I am now employed by the Sacramento Superior Court as a super-
visor with a research attorney, and I have a unique opportunity in that, 
having drafted much of the language of AB 1480, I'm now in a position 
of being asked by judges to help them interpret and 1 them what 
it means and how to apply it. In this pos I have an oppor-
tunity to listen to the concerns and complaints attorneys and judges 
alike although I don't have any contact with li at all. And 
from that standpoint,! can only tell you what and judges 
have told me about the law. 
I'd like to begin by say 
AB 1480 and SB 477 was to assure the 
contact with both parents after divorce. 
this policy was to be carried out was joint 
me that what we did was, basically, to create 
joint custody presumptively is in the best 
certain circumstances when what we 
should have said, was that when it 
of the child, it's for that child or 
of both 
vehicle 
, and seems to 
a legal fiction that 
s of the child under 
to say, and probably 
the best interests 
tact with both parents after divorce, and that's 
legislation should have said in the first place and stuck to 
Joint custody as a vehicle has basica swallowed up the 
policy, and it's really the policy that's important here and not 
necessarily the vehicle that we formulated to carry out that icy. 
I see this as having been treated as a panacea and a pariah. 
Many attorneys have told me that joint cus and the way that the 
law is written have become a sort of a Catch-22 s . It's a 
tactical problem for attorneys and clients who 't want jo cus-
tody. It's a tactical em for and cl who do want 
joint custody. If you don't want joint then the law says that 
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the court can consider that as a factor in making a sole custody award. 
The problem is that if you say you don't want joint custody, then chances 
are that you're going to end up in mediation where a mediator is going 
to try and convince you that you do want joint custody. And the point 
I'm trying to make is the law as it exists now more or less demands 
that you have it both ways. 
What I would suggest is that there are real two basic 
lems with the law. Number one, it's hypertechnical and it's too cum-
bersome, and number two, it doesn't adequately define joint custody. 
From my standpoint, I would prefer to see a different approach taken 
than existing law takes. I think AB 1706 is not objectionable. I 
think that if we're going to have preferences in custody awards and 
we're going to give a first preference to joint custody~ that it should 
be an all or nothing proposition. I don't think we should be tting 
physical and legal joint custody. Either we're going to be committed 
to joint custody or we aren't. The problem I see with AB 1706 is that 
if we're going to stay with joint custody as the preferred form of 
child custody, then we better define what we're talking about. And 
that's been a major problem with the bill because no court has defined 
what legal custody is and no court has defined what physical custody is 
in the joint custody context. So if we're going to use the language 
"joint custody," I think we should define in the bill what we're talking 
about, and I think AB 2202 by Assemblyman Imbrecht does just that. One 
of the really serious problems we faced in the drafting of AB 1480 and 
SB 477 is that we could not come up with a workable definition of ioint 
custody. I think that AB 2202 goes a long way in that direction 
ASSEMBLY~~N LARRY STIRLING: Excuse me, Mr. Belzer. Is 
AB 2202 a pending bill? 
MR. BELZER: Yes, that's Mr. Imbrccht's bil . It was intro-
duced on April 27, 1981. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: So it's a competing bill with Mr. 
Kapiloff's? 
MR. BELZER: Well, they really aren't in conflict. AB 2202 
does basically the same thing that AB 1706 would do with the exception 
that it defines the distinction between joint legal and joint physical 
custody. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Do you think the definitions are 
fine? 
MR. BELZER: 
able and ... 
I think the definitions are perfectly accept-
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Larry, have you looked at it? 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: I haven't had an opportunity to read 
the bill. If I may •.. 
MR. BELZER: In my view, that's been a serious drawback in 
existing legislation,that we don't know. When we talk about joint 
custody, everybody has his own definition of what it is. Some people 
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call it "joint custody;" some call 
custody." Whatever arrangement, 
it " it cus 
needs to 
the bill 
too much in j cus I think 
is to say, if we're going to say that jo 
ence, o custody is first preference. Let s 
it, let's do away with all the other stuff. 
the planned parent 1 tion. Let's do 
bersome that get in people's 
these cases, and parent's know what 
th point in time, I don't see any reason we 
with a lot of other 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: I'm 
ing that's present law 
MR. BELZER: No, I'm that the 
is it's too some. 
6 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: How about 1706? 
MR. BELZER: I think in that 1 
4600.5 with the one 
jo splits should not be 
a good deal of section 4600.5 of the Civil s 
and not have much effect. 
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a Judicial Council 
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MR. BELZER: Well, some problems were raised late in debate 
when AB l 
when the 
sidered at the time. 
although I ze 
7 went through. It was how to divide 
transfer off, and that question real 
up the child 
wasn't con-
I very frankly haven't given tha much 
that 's a problem. I real couldn't make ... 
CHAIRPillN HARRIS: I appreciate that. It seems to me that one 
of the issues s raised continually about cus s how 
in fact we for the economic well-being of the ld. We talk 
about his best interests, which sometimes of course is economic assess-
ments that have to be looked at as well. I think that can be of 
the out process so I would have apprec your on 
that, but I don't any other questions of you, Mr. Belzer. Do you? 
COMMITTEE MEMBERS: No. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you, Mr. Belzer. 
Judge in the 
Court. 
Mr. Chairman, members 
I will scuss th AB 1706, which I s 
jo enactment and AB 2202, which 
bill, both joint physical-legal 
will recommend aga t the major thrust of AB 
hesita , recommend in favor of AB 2202. 
I d 1 f t of all 







the Cornmi tee, 
s basical a 
is the Imbrecht 
ions. I 
th some 





that amazes we can to 
discuss 
ta not an 
discuss this 
and not the war 
sue without mention and cer-
on the children. I would suggest that while we 
we should at all times bear in mind the children 
that goes on between the adults. I a icular 
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interest in this kind of legislation because I am the product of prob-
ably one of the first joint custody in this My 
mother and father were divorced when my s and I were two years of 
age and they knew, or they thought, at the time that did not like 
one another but they were sure that they loved my s me very 
much. So they decided that my mother would have my sister and me for 
two years and that my father would have us for two years,and we spent 
our entire lives that way. The first school that I went to for more 
than two years was UCLA Law School. I'm very eased to have you know 
that my mother and father apparently were so sed with the re-
sults of their early decision that they themselves that they 
were really in love and they remarr some years after my sister and 
I had flown the coop. (Laughter) 
I would suggest that Sections 4600 and 4600.5 should be given 
a chance to work and changed only where necessary. Because AB 2202, the 
Imbrecht bill, is an attempt at clarifica to define some terms, .. we 
approve that. But I am bound at this point to tell you that the Family 
Law Committee of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the Central Dis-
trict, were so threatened by the tinkering, called , and the 
premature legislating upon this subject, that f 
that even AB 2202 be opposed. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask a question. You use the word 
"premature." Why do you feel it's ? 
"Premature" basically because we, at least most 
of the j our court, are really just familiar with the 
ideas and the attitudes surrounding the whole concept. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Are they having ems it? 
I really do not believe they are. I also have 
some di I am very disappointed at the number of people 
who actually are asking for joint custody. We have a very small number 
of people who ask for it. I thought that we would at least get an in-
crease of about maybe a 100 percent,br the number of people 
who are asking for joint custody up to about 50 , but we are dis-
appointed in that. We have not had the in that range. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Judge, I have a question. a part 
of that is the fact that the Judicial Council hasn't the form. 
The form was approved on January 1 of 1980, the same time the Imbrecht 
bill was effective. I think one of my real frustrations with the whole 
subject matter is the failure of the Judicial Council to come 
to grips, to change their forms to with existing law. 
think 're going to get a vote from joint when the 
tioners and certainly the parents,who fortunately 
with this system rarely once in a 1 , 
in certain areas of the state,don't know the 
unless the form that they fill out and sign, attorney signs, brings 
that to their attention, I can see why there hasn't been 
drastic occurring. 
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JUDGE MILLS: Well, I don't believe that there would be too 
much difficulty in getting the form changed. Obviously ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well, when we had the first hearing, I 
raked the Judicial Council over the coals, and the form hasn't been 
changed yet. 
JUDGE MILLS: Well, let me tell you that I will assist in any 
way I can to see that the form is changed. I don't believe that even the 
changing of a form, however, is going to affect what is the main suspicion 
here. The main suspicion is that you cannot trust judges to act in the 
best interests of the children. That's why I think we are dealing so 
strongly in the area of presumptions. The idea of a presumption is to 
create a situation such that if nothing else happens you have a given 
which will be the end result of whatever hearing you might have. I would 
suggest that before we do a great deal in terms of changing the basic law 
of joint custody we ought to really wait until some of the several studies 
are out which analyze what has happened in joint custody arrangements 
which have already been allowed under our system,so that we can continue 
our resolve that joint custody is a proper way to go and to reassure our-
selves and, for the rest of us who might not have too much confidence in 
it,to develop sorne faith in joint custody in terms of cooperative parent-
ing. Now I want to really spend most of my time talking about why I op-
posed AB 1706. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: But on that point, Judge, aren't you 
really arguing that you would rather see an evolution of case law in this 
area rather than statutory changes by the Legislature? Isn't that the 
effect of what you just said? I can agree and understand that pre-
sumptions, be they rebuttable or conclusive, show a lack of confidence on 
the part of the Legislature in the ability of the judie to recognize 
changes in social structures and social needs. That's true. That occurs 
throughout the law, and it's occurring more and more in the Penal Code, 
as a matter of fact. Just look at the drunk driving bills that we've just 
ended up passing. But the real effect is that we have a problem. We can 
change the law. We change the policy of the state and we are the con-
stitutional policy setters of the state, and we don't see a reaction in 
the judiciary. You're arguing, I believe, and now you tell me if I'm 
wrong, that you want to see an evolution of case law where the judges 
tamper and experiment with the system and they come up with what is a 
mean and then that will be the laws applied rather than what this Leg s-
lature ... 
JUDGE MILLS: No, I'll ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: If you'll excuse me, is this suspicion 
misplaced? 
JUDGE MILLS: Well, first of all, the suspicion, I believe, is 
misplaced. But, to answer your question, Mr. Robinson, I am convinced 
that it is the responsibility of judges to not make the law. It's your 
responsibility, and I would not hope that we must depend upon the further 
development of joint custody just on the basis of what judges decide 
because that way we probably will not develop the kind of policy that I'm 
sure the Legislature had in mind when it started out with joint custody 
under the present legislation. About AB 1706 ... 
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ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: I'm sorr~ I have 
CHAIR~lliN HARRIS: Yes Mr Stirl 
is that a 
contest them and you have a 
custody in your court. Is that 
, that you won't ... 
JUDGE MILLS: No, that is dec 
much in favo o cus pos 
be ed upon parties. It is my humble 
joint cus upon people who have 
to with one another 
the children in an 
should not do that 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: That s 
JUDGE MILLS: My position is that 
have a 
that can be antic 
that cannot be ted, 
custody. 
the number o 
You ind 
e ied in 
statements had a ch 1 that your 
trickle down effect? 




JUDGE MILLS: I real don 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Thank you. 
JUDGE MILLS: Let me conclude 
of that l 
finds is unfit exacerbate 
anachronism in family law since no-fault of 
turns to the considerations of unfitness. 











one where the 
how to ra 
our d 
our child or 
and let us 
is the one 
make up 
should be, so I, the j 
and here is what I mean by joint custody," 
an outl 
I think also that 1706 elevates the des res 
above the best interests of the child, and this is 
case law of our state. It is based upon a kind of 
goes 1 this. The judges can't be trusted to make 
the best interests of the child; therefore,a 
assure If the parties don't agree, the court must, 
court, must find one of the parties is unfit. Now if that 
well-placed, guess who's going to be found unf 
must order jo custody, and the terms will be 
suspect judge. Or ... 
Judge Mills, excuse me 
tell us 




, the court 
the same 
earlier from was these same fitness quest are exacer-
bated by current law and that this bill is not go in anyway re-
ize the itness question as it relates to ... 
Well, it has to reemphasize the fitness question 
time in many years the words are in i-
court now is going to have to make a find o unfitness. 
Well, in your court 
hear fitness ques the parents cannot agree 
due evidence and testimony that questions the f 
ent? Does that occur on a cow~on ... 
t of all, is extreme to this 
"unfitness" is not used in our court. We do not 
t's an anachronism it is 
hear thes 
sues? 
Yes we do, but we are look the best interes 
of the ch labelling of the parents which can ious 




ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well, what term is used to desc ibe 
JUDGE MILLS: The terms that we use are " best ts of 
current language that we find most satisfac 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Okay, if the term "unfitness" was stricken 
bill,would that change your position on the bill? 
JUDGE MILLS: In terms of a finding of the lack of pa 
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capacity of one of the parents, I'm not even sure that I would be pleased 
if that were a necessary finding. Let me wind up by say that there is 
no convincing evidence that joint custody can work without a plan regarding 
those circumstances which can be foreseen by the The ability of 
a party to negotiate regarding those unexpected circumstances and occurr-
ences which arise is absolutely imperative. There is no convincing evi-
dence that joint custody can work when imposed without agreement of 
the parties or that children are not serious hurt in the ting con-
fusion, hostilities,and uncertainties. Final , there is nothing in AB 
1706 which in my opinion would favorably ton any of the aforemen-
tioned considerations. In concluding, on Mr. Harris' question regarding 
support, I think that support in the question of custody is perhaps the 
at least second most important consideration, if not,as far as many of 
the parents are concerned, the primary consideration in custody, and I'm 
not too sure over what. People who insist upon having the time divided 
50-50 between parents, are not they real ing to avoid a support 
responsibility, thereby not really emphas z the best interests of the 
children? So, I think, Mr. Harris, that your question regarding the im-
portance of support and how it impinges on the question of custody and/or 
visitation is extremely important. Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. Mr. Robinson has another question. 
JUDGE MILLS: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Judge Mills, there's one issue that you 
didn't cover, and I understand your suspicion of the Legislature forcing 
presumptions on you. The effect of presumptions in other areas of the 
law has often forced negotiations and settlements amongst the 
parties. You only have to go to the Labor Code and worker's compensation, 
where we put out first presumptions in the California law at the turn of 
the century, to see that. You evidently do not believe that there's any-
way that our a presumption the law in favor of joint custody 
is going to force the parents, realiz that that is the state of the law, 
not depending upon the rumors of what your disposi apt to 
be, and I mean you collectively -- any judge that would be hearing this 
case -- but looking at the law, they see and their see there is 
a presumption. Isn't it entirely possible that those then will 
get together negotiate an amicable involving joint custody, 
absent any definitive definition of the 't that a real possi-
bility from the enactment of this bill? 
ity, but I think 
's real 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: That's been the precedent though as far 
as ns. mean, you take the ion of 1.0 in 
blood alcohol, that forces a lot of compromise, most of the frustration 
on the part of the public -- a lot of plea barga to reckless or drunk 
driving. Every presumption that I'm aware of in the existing law has 
forced compromises and forced so , and it seems to me that es-
pecially in the area of domestic relations law the se to be 
achieved absent confrontation in the courtroom to the state's best 
interest. 
JUDGE MILLS: Well, certa I agree your latter statement, 
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and we're do we have to. In fact, we are do 
conciliation court in Los Angeles, to make sure that the have an 
opportuni to work out the problems regarding custody and support without 
the necess ty of intervening courts. As a matter of fact, you cannot get 
any business done in our court without going direc to the court of con-
cil tion first, even when there is a suggestion of a But in 
terms of the risk or the likelihood that a presumption 11 force an agree-
ment between the , my problem is not wanting to assume the risk of 
a great deal of damage being done to children who are in joint 
custody arrangements where the parents do not have the abili to deal 
with the business of their children on a joint basis. The 
that joint custody works in every situation except where there is evi-
dence to the contrary is simply not a healthy ion, 
bearing in mind that people who come into our courts on these cases are 
people who cannot agree on anything. They cannot agree on the d ion of 
the pots and pans. How then can we expect that ll agree on the 
arrangements of their children? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: There's no 
(Laughter) 
on pots and pans. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask one question in conclus 
is your feeling about, on the issue of child support a s 
for support? There's a lot of inconsistency, for 
Los Angeles and Sacramento county superior courts. There s 
vergence in the amount of child support that one would pay 





JUDGE MILLS: Well, I really think that there be 
a requirement that there be schedules. And these schedules, incidental 
are extremely helpful in affecting disposition of cases because 
can anticipate what a judge might do in a given si However, you 
to allow some room for local areas to be able their own 
ines because a guideline that works in Los ll not work 
Butte County, for obvious reasons. So yes, gu ines 
they should be encouraged on a statewide basis, but there should be 
the abil to make sure that the information those ines 
is absolutely nt and dependable. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Judge, I certa 
you for coming down and being part of the hear 
anybody has more impact on family law institutions the 
fornia than you do as head of the family law department 
Superior Court. Thank you. 
JUDGE MILLS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 
want to thank 
I don think 
State f Cali-
the L. A. 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I wanted to read the names of several of my 
favorite people. Let's see if I can get around to it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Is this an all inclusive list? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, no. (Laughter) The California Associ-
ation of Marriage and Family Therapists, which is of AB 1706. 
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers of Northern California, which 
opposes AB 1706. The Office of Child Support Enforcement, of 
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Health and Human Services, which expresses some concern over AB 1706. 
The Department of Social Services, the State of California, which 
addresses the effect of AB 1706 on AFDC el ibility and enforcement of 
child support. The reason they are all my favor people is they 
submitted their testimony in writing so we can distribute it. (Laughter) 
[Appendix A through D] 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Hr. Harris. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: While your next witness is coming, may 
I ask Mrs. Hicks a question? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Mr. Kapiloff and Mrs. Hicks, the last 
testimony raised the issue of who is ultimately responsible for what the 
arrangements are for support and raises in my mind the issue of who ul-
timately has to give permission to a minor to do serious things 
like join the military or get married and this sort of thing ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Play football. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: •.. go into politics, any of those 
serious kinds of issues. Under a joint custody relationship, does it 
have to be a committee agreement, or can either party vote no and kibosh 
the decision? How do you anticipate that working? 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: Let me try and answer this. I think you 
would resolve it the same way that it is resolved when the parents are 
still married. If the parents are still married, it must be a joint de-
cision, and I would imagine under those circumstances depending upon who 
would be permitted, who could sign the papers, you know. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Is that really true, Mr. Kapiloff? I 
think you can join the military on one signature ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: All right. But, what I'm saying is you 
can't join ..• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I think it's either signature or the 
military up. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: That's right, but imagine the situation 
where either the mother or father can sign and approve the child's join-
ing the military if the parents are married. Why would it be any differ-
ent? Why would we try to change the situation where the parents are now 
separated but there's joint custody? 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Essential they have to make the 
decision in January rather than February,one way or the other. Okay. 
MS. HICKS: I have just one comment to make. We do have man-
datory mediation and some of the difficult situations are written 
into the joint custody agreement, so there is available ic counseling 
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that can help in that situation. Also, some fami 
of those major issues will be responsible 




Okay. We have two witnesses now 
fathers enting The Cus Assoc 
Gerald A. Silver, 
presentation will 
would you like to 
the California Fami Law Coalition. The 
tape and Gentlemen 
come forward? 
MR. JAMES A. Committee members, I am James A. Cook. I 
appreciate speak. I do want to correct what may now 
be a widespread opinion. I am here on behalf of The Jo Cus 
Association, represents some 600 members, over 15 of whom are 
women, the bulk of whom are professionals concerned th this 
I come to th s issue because I was persona 
legislative fforts to joint cus in 1976-
involved in the initiation of the present law in 
throughout ' 9. Furthermore, I have been deal with the 2 
judicial committees in 24 different states and have traveled to the other 
states, helping them to implement a law patterned after the California 
form. 
Wha you have before you are several 
to br the test of some prominent and 
who could not be here. That is part of the tes 
sentation concerns two items, that wh is 
the other called "Implementation of Joint 
statistical of what has been occurring. Let 
and I be rather than cover 
two. 
statute passed 
two years ago at the Bar Assoc 
said from the podium. One was 
t year the slature was 
f judicial 1 lation of that sess 
Law Section of the Bar,from their pod 
most s ficant of family law leg lation 
no-fault divorce. So what is wrong? Why are we 
That's the crux of what I have to say. 
First off, I m hesitant to hear 
before you to check 
1m-
furthermore 




that it not presume jo custody in all cases. It's 
a A burden of proof is o fered to 
for reason is provided. Furthermore, best 
are protected. The wording rema in the or 
statute, and it is a portion of AB 1706. 
tness" is a word that I want to careful 
al I s Hicks is using fitness in a 
that of the denial of parenting rights, which al 
, we are all nevertheless (or at least Iri 
) we would be willing to the 
of the provocation that it seems to have 
caution you, however, about is sometimes you wil 
instead of fitness, want to talk about criter 
out to be an even more nebulous "fitness" and 
-19-





criteria, many of 
which I consider unconstitutional and highly questionable. 
for instance, is it should be limited because of geography. 
that unconstitutional, but it does inspire what we get r 
custodian deliberately moving with the child so they can say 
graphically joint custody is inconvenient. 
One of which, 
Not only is 
now, a sole 
that geo--
There are improvements that are needed in the statute -
an unambiguous first step presumption for joint custody. Although the 
Legislature would appear to have given that presumption and the policy 
statement of the original bill, we are finding, unfortunately, parents 
are having to go into court and debate the intention of the Legislature 
rather than getting on with our present case. So, we need a clear cut, 
unambiguous first step presumption. Also, the frequent and continuing 
contact which is certainly physical contact has been subverted by diverting 
these cases into joint legal custody. 
Now, I mentioned that I'm dealing with the judiciary committees 
in 24 other states on this topic. In the State of Nevada we were success-
ful in getting a bill through patterned exactly after the California one, 
so we would have contiguous states for there's a lot of movement back 
and forth. We have a similar bill with one exception. They corrected 
the joint legal custody problem, making only available when the par-
ents do agree. In every other state where we are now scussing this 
issue, they all see the flaw and the diversion that has occurred in the 
California system and are either not using the term ''joint legal" at all 
or determining ways to proscribe it. 
There is a problem of more equitability of time together~ I've 
been unable to address that because of time here, but you have a statement 
before you by Dr. Frank Williams in child psychiatry at Cedars-Sinai 
Hospital and the former president of the American Association of Adolescent 
Psychiatry, who attempts to tell you one of the reasons for more 
equitability of time to help overcome the competi s of achieving 
equitability. [Appendix E] 
I'm obviously racing because I do want to 
the statistics. 
on to some of 
Joint custody should be considered from the outset, from the 
first temporary order rather than delay, that long delay, till trial date 
much later on wherein then the opponents come in and say, "Well, the child 
is already well-established in the sole custody situation." The statute 
t the present time allows and encourages joint custody from the initiating 
orders, but it is not being given at the initial rary orders. 
The reasons for denial. Three times in the statute a judge is 
asked to give the reasons for denial of joint custody if it is denied. 
Almost invariably reasons are not being given, which causes two problems. 
First, the parent seeking joint physical custody has no standard or 
barometer whereby to correct their situation to be qualified for it in 
the eyes of the law. And the second and most ff t is they 
don't have a focus that will make for an efficient, less costly appeal of 
this matter. 
Let me just say something about reasons ... 
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CHAI~~N HARRIS: Okay, we're going to have to ask you to sum-
marize. We really are going to try to limit everybody to five minutes. 
You are approaching that limit. 
MR. COOK: All right, I then better not cover reasons. 
Since much of my statistical coverage is on those parents who 
are asking for joint custody, who are they by and large? Who is going in? 
We are finding that 76 percent of the individual parents especially inter-
ested in joint custody did not in fact initiate nor seek divorce. Of 
that 76 percent, 72 percent of those parents pre to preserve the 
family and sought either reconciliation or conciliation of some sort. The 
parents interested in joint custody tend not to be the initiator of di-
vorce. 
What was the impetus for this survey? I'm going to say some-
thing very provocative, and people in the audience might want to jump 
on it. Why did we find that survey was necessary? Well, reputedly, and 
I say this with great caution because I was not personally present, on 
December 8, 1979, after the bill had passed and before it was implemented 
on January 1st, there was an ad hoc meeting of a few judges and commission-
ers in Los Angeles, discussing this bill. Now, I'm rumor, and 
anybody can say anything they want to. The proof has to be in what 
happened to the cases subsequently. The rumor out f that was: "You can 
circumvent the actual, equitable physical contact diverting it into 
joint legal custody, and as for reasons, ask our own conciliation court 
people for reasons why they would not give joint custody." Well, all 
right,whether that meet did or did not take place,it up a 
problem: "My God, we've got to follow through and find out what 
to the implementation." 
So, what we have surveyed was the decrees 85 j in 20 
different courtrooms in 19 different Cal1'forn1'a N f h ow, rom t e 
standpoint of how are the children faring in this, nk that if the 
opportunity for joint custody for children hinges on the present pattern 
of implementation, overwhelmingly, children are not going to get it. 
Furthermore, if the opportunity for children to enjoy joint physical cus-
tody requ both their parents to agree first before going into the 
f~rmal courtroom, the children are not going to get it. We surveyed 176 
d~fferent ~rom. 109 divorcing families, whose average age at 
d1vorce b~ the way 1s .e1ght years, and that is what is runninq now. 
Only 44 ot the 176 ch1ldren achieved joint physical and legal custody 
in 25 out of 109 cases. You must remember, I'm ta about parents' 
who want to and are not getting to. 
What about those situations wherein at least one parent has ex-
pressed an inter~st joint custody and put in a desire and a commitment 
to cooperate, wh1ch many people consider a good criteria? What happens 
to them? Thus far only one-third of the parents requesting joint physical 
-21-
and legal custody were decreed joint physical and 1 custody. Now, 
that's a survey of some 69 cases; 69 of them are in that category. One-
third were decreed it. Less than a third were given mere joint legal 
custody with physical custody to one parent,and over the remaining third 
got no participation in any joint custody whatsoever despite their commit-
ment and cooperation. What happened to those who only wanted joint legal 
custody? Only half of them got it, and the were, and really there 
were very few but ... In two-thirds of the cases, at least one parent 
asked for in some form and didn't get it. How many parents are agree-
ing? What is the percentage of those who are going when both parents 
agree? Only nine of the 109 did both agree and received , but there were 
cases where they both agreed and didn't get it. Incidental , it happens 
to evenly split between those who both ask for and didn't get it. One-
half, the mother got sole custody; the other half,the happened to 
get sole custody. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. You're go to have to summarize it. 
I don't mean to be rude. I sound that way, but that's not my intent.~ 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: That's the first time you've ever ad-
mitted that ... (Laughter) We'll have to have a transcript of after-
wards. 
MR. COOK: Then I'd have to take one sue although I certainly 
have a number of applicable issues. The one issue to focus on: What is 
the problem with requiring an agreement? It's rather emphasized to me 
again and again as it was while sitting in the waiting room of the Los 
Angeles Conciliation Court, not more than about f weeks ago, and nobody 
knew who I was, and I sat down next to a lawyer for his cl , waiting 
for the client to go into the conciliation court. The lawyer was saying, 
''Now listen, you don't have to agree to a You're thereto listen. 
're in there to find out what they give away. Now don't you worry. 
We're not offering joint legal custody, but you'll get sole ical cus-
" And she said, "But I don't know what joint custody is." 
And he said, "It doesn't matter. Neither does else. You're 
to have the control because you'll have sole ical." The sian 
iven as long as the judges say, "We must have before we'll 
ider it." The other side of the coin is: " don't agree. You've 
got a lot more leverage." Therefore, this is one o the enormous impetuses, 
so let's have a presumption and a burden of proof on the 
sole custody. 
I'll close it by saying we are certa surmise: Why 
does an individual like this have an interest in ? I see many 
f you because I happen to be a paid lobbyist for other matters, and so 
I'm and around Sacramento a great deal. However, on topic I give 
my time free, as most of the people in audience do, but it hasn't 
been a free trip. The attorneys' fees, in my case, are now over 
$67,000. I have not initiated a single item of action,and all I have 
is joint custody, which has not been ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: $67,000? Where have been? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I told the Chairman we 
ture the whole system and go back to the courts, 
them to meet the current needs. 
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to restruc-
we can def 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much. Yes,sir. 
MR. GERALD A. SILVER: Yes, good morning. I'm Gerald A. 
Silver. I'm going to be speaking on behalf of the California Fami r.,nv 
Coalition Thi is an association of the principal fathers' and me11's 
r groups across the state that are unified in the position that I 
will cover today. I'll be speaking on behalf of the many second wives, 
grandparents, and children that are directly affected by this. 
Let me first, and not counting my five minutes, please, give 
you a bit of background. I happen to be a college professor, a doc-
torate at UCLA, an author of some fifteen college textbooks and also, 
, an author of a book, co-authored by my ex ... by my present wife, 
called Weekend Fathers,and we've done a great deal of research and 
analysis on this. Incidentally, my first wife was a co-author of about 
six or seven of my books, and my present wife is co-authoring some of 
the new books that we're working on, and I now have a prenuptial aqree-
ment, I should add. (Laughter) 
I have four children. I have gone through the California 
divorce courts, lost everything at the trial level, went through the 
appellate court, and lost at the appellate level. It took three and a 
half years and my tab is $22,000, so Jim has some one-upmanship on me 
in that regard. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You share a list of attorneys with 
him. 
MR. SILVER: Right. I consider myself a law-abiding citizen. 
Probably the worse offense I'd ever encountered prior to my encountering 
court was simply the parking ticket. Since, the divorce courts, 
found in contempt of court. A judge has evicted me from my 
48 hours. I was dispossessed of the home which ultimately 
was sold against or over my signature and finally have been found in con-
and was sentenced to five days in Los Angeles County jail and was 
put on probation by a California judge since I was able to post five and 
a half thousand dollars in advance of that. I've been frankly 
d as a human being and as a father, and frankly, I'm upset. I 
am very, very mad and very hostile. Now, putting all that aside, let me 
go to my ... (Laughter) 
(UNKNOWN): Now we'll talk about the merits! (Laughter) 
MR. SILVER: I won't bore you by taking the time to review 
literature on the subject. It's all sitting over there along the side. 
There are dozens of studies, and you know,as well as I do,that frequent 
and continuing contact, close contact with both parents is absolu 
essential for well-balanced children. You also know that,almost without 
exception, judges have ordered custody of minor children to ex-wives and 
it created a generation of weekend fathers. 
You also are quite aware of the winner take all situation 
that we presently have. You may not be aware, at this point, of some 
interesting facts that will be presented a little later by Commissioner 
Alexander and Dr. Ilfeld with respect to unconsented joint custody situ-
ations, and that's going to be important to take a close look at when 
they come up. 
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Finally, let me say that -- well, not finally. Let me now go 
over what I consider ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But close to next to last, right? 
MR. SILVER: Right, next to last. The five big myths, the mis-
statements, you ike, of the 1980's with respect to law. Here 
they are, and they are absolutely untrue: 
Statement number one - "If the couple can't agree when they're 
married, how can you expect them to agree on such key issues of children, 
as raising the children after divorce?" That's usually the first sen-
tenet~ I hear from the judge or a commissioner when we discuss the topic. 
l suggest that's a myth because if you talk to joint custody parents, 
they will tell you that things got better after the divorce. They used 
to fight and bicker because of the close proximity,and often the children 
were the dumping ground for that hostility. After the divorce they were 
able to agree, and things got better. 
Second myth - "Joint custody children are shuffled back and 
forth, usually like ping-pong balls, suitcase in hand between both par-
ents." Another absolutely untrue statement. In a joint custody situ-
ation, a viable situation, there are two loving, caring parents, two 
households, two sets of toys if they're young children, yes, two blankets 
in both households. 
Third, another myth - "Men financially abandon their children 
after divorce and it requires a diligent effort of district attorneys 
and the use of the federal locator system to track down these runaway 
fathers." That's a myth, and I suggest that you take a look at your 
current statistics from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census. 
It will show that almost three-quarters of the women who should receive 
ch ld support regularly do receive that and that only 28 of 
fa i 
sc women don't receive child support as ordered. And I would suggest ... 
s 
Excuse me, don't you think that that is a 
rate? 
MR. SILVER: Oh, absolutely, but what amazes me is the large 
percentage of men who continue to pay child support to post office 
boxes, who never get to see their kids. It's the pos side that's 
amaz to me. (Applause) 
Finally, the fourth myth - "Men don't want to see their children 
after divorce, and they don't avail themselves of the visitation rights 
they're now afforded." We hear that all the time. That's not true. 
suggest that men want to see their children. There's nothing emotion-
lly any different between men and women with respect to children. 
Jt is a violent system that systematical excludes men and distances 
them from their children, and that's the reason they aren't close to 
ir kids. It's not. that don't want to, but cunnot b(' closl:. 
And the fifth myth is what I'll call "The laws, courtroom 
procedures, and the efforts of judges and district attorneys and attor-
neys are aimed at the best interests of the child." Now that "best inter-
ests of the child" is a catchall phrase that means absolutely nothing 
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because it cannot be clearly defined. It has never been clearly defined, 
and we see some of the greatest injustices that separate fathers from 
their children and one sibling from another all under the banner of the 
"best interests of the child." 
Now, I've touched upon a number of the problems and myths, 
and now let me touch upon some specific changes that must be made in 
California law ..• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: How long is your list of specifics? 
MR. SILVER: Say again. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: How long is your list of specifics? 
MR. SILVER: They're very brief. There are about a dozen 
items. 
Let me just touch on the key points that I made. 
Number one - legislative change that must be made. The 
present law is unclear and confusing. We must have a rebuttable pre-
sump~ion that simply says that the norm will be joint physical and legal 
custody and only, and I'm going to say this very dogmatically, if one 
parent is unfit then there should not be joint physical and legal cus-
tody. The coalition believes that you've got to come to grips and bite 
the bullet on this issue. If the parents are both fit, they must be 
given,as a matter of course,joint physical and legal custody. 
Next point, the present system,is as you've heard,now allows 
the uncooperative parent to be the winner. That's got to be discouraged. 
Another point is that we must now deal with the issue of 
children being taken out of the jurisdiction. We have fathers who are 
paying child support to post office boxes. They would be happy to 
be weekend fathers. They can't be, and that has to be addressed. 
The next point is that we think that there must be some mecha-
nism for systematically informing parents about the viable option of 
joint custody at the time they go in for their divorce because an in-
formation exchange must be provided. The law must do something about 
actually providing that option. Certainly the "1281" form not only 
doesn't provide the option; it literally discourages it or forecloses 
it from consideration. 
Next, there must be an equal division of community property. 
We talk about the domino theory, where the ex-wife gets the house, the 
furniture, the kids, the pets, the magazine subscriptions. That's un-
fair because the weekend father cannot be a full time father or a real 
father if he doesn't have a fair and equal division of community property. 
-25-
Next, you must strengthen the conciliation people, the concili-
tion court. 'rc going to be testifying against this bill, and with 
due respect to Hugh Mcisaac and the other conciliation people, I feel 
very strongly about this even though they are opposing the bill (they 
have a right to disagree with me). I don't agree with their position, 
but I s 11 say those kinds of people, the mediators, the conciliators 
of this world, need more money, more physical facilities along the line 
of SB 961. 
Next, this horrible situation of the attorneys fees, it has 
to be addressed ... 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Okay, you've got 60 seconds . 
MR. SILVER: ... the legal cost. 
Finally, I want to also talk about the OSC' s., the men who 
are excluded from their houses on short notice. There is an abuse of that. 
There are, finally, abuses of contempt orders that we regularly see. 
All of these things are summarized in my remarks. If you're asking for 
a specific definition, the yellow paper that I've given you in the· record 
gives a definition of joint physical and legal custody that my wife and 
have gleaned after having talked to many legislators across the coun-
T suggest that it's much more than simple, frequent and continu-
contact. [Appendix F] 
Let me close by saying this. I was very, very upset yester-
I ve been here for a couple of days on this. I was very upset 
when I sat in with the California Judges Association meeting. Judge 
ls was present and several others. Thirteen hundred California judges 
a budget of $240,000, spending tens of thousands of dollars 
legislation, and I think that this is a serious problem. 
have been charged with a sacred responsibility of passing the 
lavls of state. The judges have a sacred responsibility of carrying 
their judicial function. I think it's a disgrace, and our coalition 
video 
that the Legislature must take clear and definitive action to 
the judges from interfering with the writing of the law. If you 
do that, I think they have to be completely kept out of this 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you, Mr. Silver. 
MR. SILVER: I'll answer any questions. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Silver, do you have any other remarks 
not lncluded in your paper? We'll keep the record open long 
include them. We will need to have a transcript of this 
MR. SILVER: Well, after hearing from Mike Barber, the district 
, I'll be glad to respond. 
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MR. COOK: Yes, I do 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: , would ike to turn it on very 
quickly. 
MR. COOK: Yes I'l you br ef por ion of Jt ond 
Ln it lc uoi ere. Some~ of you may have aJ 
seen this, but ... All of the lie tel sion network stations Cali-
fornia did a show called "Two Parents, Two Homes." It was all done with-
in the last seven months. I'm not go show all of it. I'm starting 
it toward the close where there are of judges. (Video tape) 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Thank you very much. 
MR. COOK: Thank you for your time. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right, we now have a number of jurists who 
have to leave shortly. We'd like to call them all up at once if we might. 
Judge Michael Greer of the Superior Court of San Diego County,representing 
the aforementioned California Judges Association and their $250,000. 
(Laughter) 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Mr. Chairman, just so that nobody is 
insulted, tments downtown. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, and you'll be leaving shortly. 
I believe Judge Todd is also here ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'm go 
t. Judge William Todd of the 
if we can get two more seats, also 
to call everybody up. Hold on. All 
ior Court of San Diego County, and, 
County and Garrett,the 
Gentlemen f 
Thank you. Yes. 
J. E. T. Rutter of the ior 
Director of the Conciliation 
d all come forward, we're 
JUDGE WILLIAM L. TODD: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I am Judge 
Todd of ior Court,and I come to you with 
ence first as a lawyer and then as a member of the superior court bench 
in the domestic relations field as well as the juvenile court fielrl. 
About four years,ago our court recognized that the problem of 
child custody was not being addressed in the best way, at least in our 
court. We recognized that the most vicious, demeaning trials conducted 
in our courthouse were those where child custody was being litigated in 
the open courtroom. We studied programs in Fresno County, Sacramento 
County, Maricopa County in Arizona and carne to the conclusion that medi-
ation was the tool that should be addressed in the area of contested 
child custody. We strengthened our conciliation court. I really hon-
estly believe that Civil Code Section 4607,requiring mandatory mediation 
in custody disputes,was at least part an outgrowth of the effort we 
made here in San Diego County. 
Let me tell you what experience has been as a result. We 
now through the mediation process, without formal courtroom advocacy, 
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are able settle 65 filed in our court 
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of court time and 
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contact with both parents 
ld, and the best way to 
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this field, as a 
further as a judge 
fami life can be 
judge 
who 
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most 
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that come in that 
I 
go 
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leg up or gives 
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't prevent any 




s your read of the 
the television a minute 
exis law notwith-
reading of the existing 
i clearly stated for 
your 
way, but one of your col 
saying that that's not 
That's contradictory. I mean I can 
angle you do if you read the statute that 
was just on the boob tube over there 
, that there is no preference in that ... 
JUDGE TODD: Well he should have come here and question sat, 
because I it that way. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Good. 
JUDGE TODD: Thank you very much. 
CHAI~ffiN HARRIS: Thank you very much. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: I'm confused! If your position is 
"con' t change as ; leave us the law," and I can 
understand the position, but that there is a presumption presently, as 
you answered Mr. Robinson, doesn't that indicate that all 
these successes are based on the legislative policy that savs start 
out ... 
JUDGE TODD: I think the policy of the law as now stated indi-
cates a preference for joint custody. And I think that that is in our 
mediation process. But I think when you make it a redundant presumption 
it signals to counsel and to litigants that they can now go into the 
courtroom forcing the other side to litigate fitness, and that's some-
thing we've worked so hard to eliminate from these terrible courtroom 
battles. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Well, I understand. I think the ques-
ion would se 1 think the judge who read the th 
in the disjunctive is absolutely cor s that the point of confusion? 
Is the dispute then over the word tself or over as practiced? The 
itself is pretty clear. It's in the disjunctive,and if one 
j ets it to say that that's the ion, that it's not 
then rebuttable, but that's the way their operating and that's great de-
pend on the energy and the fairness of the judges in that process, but 
in other courts where it's all that are not fair, that there's 
a the j that we're not go to do this, the people 
here are seeking some resolution to that. Then the question arises: Can 
we resolve their without upsett your local success rate? 
other 
effect and ... 
I don't think so because I think when you add 
~hat's what it is), t shifts the burden in 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: The judge was correct. It's stated 
in the disjunctive, and it should be stated that the purpose of the 
Legislature is continuing contact among both parents and the child. So 
is it the problem here that one court under your supervision interprets 
it correctly and another court under another judge's supervision inter-
prets it adversely? Can we solve that problem without upsetting your 
apple• cart? That's the question, or do I just misperceive the issue? 















I should note to you that 4600.5 of the Civil Code provides 
that if joint custody is denied the court must, under existing 
California law, state its reasons for denylng that award subject to 
appeal. That is the existing California law. 
And, now the point is this. Five years ago when I took the 
bench in this county, as a new judge I was presented a family custody 
fight. It amounted to a two to three day bloodletting, in which chil-
dren were crying and parents were screaming. That's the last one I 
handled in that way. Today we have the situation where we keep these 
matters out of the courtroom. They don't belong in a courtroom! They 
don't belong in a court of law. They don't belong in litigation. The 
Legislature has sought to separate the custody battle from the rest of 
the battle. Make them try it and deal with it separately. You don't 
even get into a courtroom until you've met with a mediator, and the 
mediators are very successful and getting more successful as we train 
them. We must keep these children out of the courtroom because they're 
scarred when they begin. They're scarred by the breakup of the family, 
and if we don't soothe those scars, if we don't heal these problems at 
the outset, these problems turn into the juvenile problems that turn 
into the adult criminal problems in our court. They're the basis of 
what's going on in our society, the breakdown of the family. Now, if 
we don't solve these problems intelligently, if we don't deal with this 
serious difficulty, not from the viewpoint of mommy or daddy, but from 
the viewpoint of the child,who didn't ask to be born to those parents, 
we're in serious trouble. 
I think that, just from the overall viewpoint, in San Diego 
we have had the opportunity to look at this for three years. We dbn't 
have the time to present them now, but our statistics are very impress-
ive and we've kept them. Mr. Bloom, when he addresses you later on, may 
have the opportunity to give them. But give the rest of the state the 
opportunity that they've only had for less than a year to catch up to 
where we are in San Diego, to learn the tools and to get the right atti-
tude. And let this legislation stay in and see what's happening. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Judge Greer, has the California Judqes 
Association done any review as to the consistent application of the law? 
JUDGE GREER: No, not that I know of. 
county by county and court by court. 
They're doing it 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: There seems to be one problem dealing with 
the interpretation we saw on television with one judge, for example. 
It should disturb most of us as to whether or not we passed a law that 
is misunderstood or misinterpreted or certainly not consistent. 
JUDGE GREER: I can answer that by saying that when we looked 
at Fresno, when we looked at Sacramento, or a court in Arizona that had 
been applying the same kind of reasoning that exists in and sits in 
place in California, the success has been outstanding, but you have to 
have the attitudes of the lawyers changed and many of you who are 
lawyers know you don't like change. The judges have those ... 











and Mr. Oliver were in front of us. 
October. The form has not been 
contempt. 
JUDGE GREER: I can't 
with you. out one 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I 
the Chief Justice, in copy to the 
please. 
We're till sitt here in mid-
, and I think it's a serious 
you. I'm 100 percent 
that, right now ... 
that you address that concern to 
ttee, a copy of your letter, 
JUDGE GREER: It will be done. Let me make one point before 
Mr. Stirling moves from this point. Right now we're seeing 160 de-
fault divorces a month, and in a great many of those divorces there are 
children as part of the marriage. Put this presumption in,and those 
default divorces will beconle litigated divorces. Do that,and you'll 
pay for six new judges in this county just to carry the load. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You could not deal with the language? 
JUDGE GREER: Oh, we could deal with the language. I'm talk-
ing about 1706 as it sits there now. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: It could be amended so as to deal with that 
problem. You could create a presumption and still allow for the situ-
ation where there are defaults where the people don't want to contest it. 
JUDGE GREER: As soon as you create a presumption,you put the 
burden on the attorney to carry that. 
JUDGE TODD: There'd have to be a hearing and evidence pre-
sented then. 
JUDGE GREER: As soon as you do that,you set up a trial. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Stirl 
Yes, sorry. I apol ze to you 
a~ 
asked me to ask 




commitment. Mr. Imbrecht 
whether they had any comments 
on his definitions in his bill. 
JUDGE GREER: Their position s have no objections to 
the definitions set forth in his bill and they think it clarifies. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: So it does clarify it. 
JUDGE GREER: That's correct. 
JUDGE TODD: I agree. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Judge Rutter. I'd also like (Mr. 
Garrett,if you'd move over) to call up Commissioner John Alexander of 




was a conversa with 
and the proposed 
back we had a conver-
about the difference in 
creates a 
view it as the di between an invitation to agree 
to do battle Now that 
frankly am puzzled by the 
judie is reluctant to 
11 because I have not experienced 
those, of course, who do not get what 
I think, what Todd 
statements that the 
i of the joint custody 
luctance. Now, there are 
But, we are pursuing agreements whenever we can 
custody to the extent that 's feasible, however 
For example ... 
That's always true. 
them and joint 
it may be defined. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON Excuse me, it your reading 
for joint cus-of the law s policy there s 
tody? Is that your reading of the exist 
I read it that 
for joint cus , that means. 
with the law, the definit of what it 
contact I understand. I approve of the 
but I'm not in favor of the other 
come an order to show cause ( 
there s a question of vis 
be one, no testimony is taken. 
talk about it then. And if we 
f worked out 
the parties 
contested cus 
this is a law 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROB 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: 
Staff wil a copy 
there is a policy of preference 
And that's one of the problems 
means. Frequent and continuing 
definition in AB 2202, 
In our court, if you 
iminary hearing) and 
trial if there's going to 
down to the mediator. You 
arrangement, it 
has an experimental 
ever do. We don't 
to your attention 
be at trial. 
and you don t need 
1 out the law. 
repeaters that have 
, never 
etter, I can understand 
letter so I have to 
share it with you. 
letter. 
JUDGE RUTTER: There is a r stance to declaring joint cus-
or rdless f the best 
And, if there's anybody who is more 
propr right to possession of 
best interests or not, and even f 
to them. Because, 
have noth but f , and 
have Mr. the 
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ts of the child. 
with an alle9ed parental 
whether it's in the child's 
tes it, then I'm not 
sary system, where we 
it out of that, and we 
The current law is be emented without substantial diffi-
culty, but we must bear in mind that the problems did not arise out of 
the pronouncement or non-pronouncement f words like "joint custody,' 
but from helping each fami decide where the child is going to spend his 
or her time and under what circumstances. Originally there were some 
who were confused by the phrase, and they took it to mean they 
had a right, "my right," to shared time. Fifty-fifty. The child s 
went down the drain. Now, that number is diminishing. The prob-
lem with the contested cases is that are generally cases in which the 
parents have lost the ability to analyze what is in the best interests of 
the child, and they come to the worse place in the world to get it done. 
And, that's an adversary trial in the courtroom. We can't help that. 
That's the only system we've got. Most of the time, those parties are 
in there to get more or to win or to show that the other party is a bad 
person. The mediation process has substantial taken care of this. 
Joint legal cus , have to say, is a concept that I can 
well do without. Usually, when that problem comes along, I ask, or the 
mediator or counselor asks the party, "What is it that you want?" And 
they write down a list of medical reports, consultation on school matters, 
health, welfare of the child. And the other party says, "That's okay," 
and that's the end of the custody problem. Now, if they are at 
odds with each other on absolutely everything, you cannot have joint 
legal custody, when the ques is: "Does the child go to PS-10 or 
attend Harbor Lutheran?" He can't be both places at once. You can't 
have a veto power in one place, as to whether or not the child shall have 
an n, unless you want a j to decide it in court, and I think 
we could do without that all thcr. t really doesn't help us a great 
dL:a 1. 
Now, as I indicated, the one problem with the law is that just 
saying that joint custody is desirable and it's our policy and defining 
the shar of the physical custody in such a way as to assure 
and continued contact with both actually, in a contested 
action, of very little help to the j The child is fifteen and the 
parties live 95 miles apart. The can only go to one school. The 
ques is: "Where is the ld go to be and when?" The breakup 
made child so dependent on one that a conpetent psychiatrist 
says that he's got to be "home" most of the time until he gets over it. 
The phrase doesn't help us at all. The parents have agreed to alternate 
weeks and they live close to each other, but the child can't take it. 
I've heard of one judge who got a call from a fifteen year old child, 
who was spending two weeks here and two weeks there. The child was 
calling the judge to help him out because he couldn't stand the strain 
At least he couldn't stand it right then, maybe later. So, I just 
to say that there are problems that we have to work with and catch 
phrases and buzz words just don't us a bit. 
Let's shorten up a little bit here. As a matter of fact, 
there are sometimes, I'm sure you would agree, where the child is so 
psychologically devasted by the breakup that he can tolerate only 
minimal contact with one parent, even though that parent is a loving, 
caring, nurturing parent and perfectly fit, and that brings me to the 
something that everybody else has mentioned. There's no substitute for 
the word "fit." We worked for years to get rid of the unfit parent 
doctrine in our courts, and here it comes back again, with a specifi-
cation that we should have to find somebody is unfit and then deliver 
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and we haven't 
want some on 
three sentences 
to hear it. 
a definition of 
fine. The un-
s in a child's 
fatal flaw in this 
s, which would work 
can just take out 
and then insert a set of 
be done, in any case, 
child, and that's a 
It requires con-
1 t the 
cannot 
judges, but we 
Your 
as to an 
says "I don't 
you." There s no 
ividual's being 
icial scretion 
or not there should 
be some of consis between one child support order and 
another. There to be some way that we can look at it and say, 
"That makes sense. There's something rational. There's some logic 
that flows through all of this." 
JUDGE RUTTER: You're th 
an order is made. It's much too 
to 1 either, so what do do? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Right. 
of the case where 
spouse can't afford 
JUDGE RUTTER: (Pause) ... Well some minimums wouldn't exactly 
solve that problem. Some maximums might ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Some kind of a standard so that one can look 
at that standard and say, "Wow, I'm paying twice what is looked upon as 
being appropriate or the average or the mean for child support!" 
JUDGE RUTTER: Perhaps, but then on the other hand, of course, 
the judge s requ explain his decision anyhow, so if required to 
do so, f he made an order that simply wasn't sustainable by the facts, 
he'd ha a rather difficult time do It might cause him to change 
his mind on that. I recognize the em. There are people who are 
receiving too little, and there are e who are paying too much, and 
I'm not sure that a schedule that says, "If the gross is this, and the 
net is that, then the order shall be in the range of A to B, unless the 
judge ins otherwise," is going to solve the problem. But, as a 
guideline it might not be too bad if we required, for example, each 
county to adopt some guidelines by a certain date and publish them. 
Most counties do have guidelines. 
The last question is: What in the law are needed to 
collect past-due support more expeditiously or provide an incentive for 
My answer is: None. We've done everything we can, up 
ex parte, without , assignment of wages, and 
there are those who think that we have al stepped pretty far over 
the constitutional line al with that. Beyond that,collecting 
s j awful nut to crack. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Mr. Garrett. 
MR. GARY W. Most what I have prepared to sav wou]o 
be a re tera ~'~-~~~- has al been said, so the Committee 
t up three with my presentation because I will elimi-
nate that. [Appendix G] 
The mediation staff in Orange County has given vigorous support 
to joint custody in cases when it's not the child's expense. The great-
est injustice we can do to children of any age is to mandate that they 
be subjected to the same battlefield that the divorce was supposed to 
have eliminated. Out of the last 3800 cases that my staff has mediated, 
the joint custody agreement, and I'm specifically referring to joint 
physical custody, has been reached in about 304 cases, which represents 
eight percent. The truth of the matter is that most parents do not want 
joint custody. A law mandating joint cus would benefit less than one 
and a half percent of the divorcing population, and let me give you a sta-
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of ,000 fil a year. 
visitation is not an issue. So 
issues. We 
contested. That 
many of which 
even interested in jo cus 
wi 5,00 divorce fil 
than one percent of those are 
year 
affected 
of the contested cus-
is leaves 15 percent as 
se cases for trial, 
many of those are not 
talk about? Start-
s that less 
leg 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Garrett to take issue with 
that, not what you re do in my own county, be-
cause if there's such a letter, or such a pol Judge King's thing 
San Francisco, that would readi in you could come up with 
a of one percent. I mean whether formalized in a letter 
or whether it's just informal stood in corridors of the court-
house that you're just not go join cus if either parent 
has reservations about joint custody, then you're going to be very success-
ful in your mediation effort, because both s are going to advise 
the clients, "Well, your ex is not go a with this. It's a non-
issue, and the isposition of the court is to do this, this or this." 
So ll go off and you'll be e to mediate the remaining problems. 
If you were c those San Francisco, for example, 
fter my e and if I had an issue 
before his court, and in at all the costs 
that would be involved, I gua.rantee would compromise very 




't know .. 
. GARRETT: I agree. 
like 
cour j are go 
practice law, never 
in my own c 
to be the 
been before one of them, 
s letter, and I also 








t you re not go 
firm belief that, based 
individual who is 
et in those me-
out of it . 
f one San 
sition on these issues 
t, just like 
ch superior 
s, and I don't 
and don't ever 
intend to be before one of them. I know which ones are going to be 
tough, and I know which ones are qoing to be more lenient. Okay, 
and I'm not down in thal cou.rt.nous c~Vt'-::l , su i know the p.raclJ..lloners 
know, and I think the same is true in the domestic relations court, and 
the same is true in the probate court, and the same is true in the ju-
venile court. Those facts skew the results of any 15,000 cases, or any 
60,000 cases in Los Angeles. 
MR. GARRETT: I agree with your proposition. Let me tell you 
the way we handle it, and it's unanimous among my staff. As the parties 
come in, we first discuss the matter with both counsel. Counseling, we 
see both parties together. We normally start by saying, "You have two 
choices. You can relegate your responsibility as parents to the judge 
and let the court make the decisions affecting you and the lives of your 
children, or the two of you can get on about the business of being par-
ents, and here's where we start." And, we discuss the possibility of 
joint physical custody with every single one of our litigants. The 
choice then becomes theirs, as to whether they can handle this kind of 
an arrangement. So, I know of no such type of a proposition •.. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well, I wasn't accusing you of it. What 
I wanted to do was I wanted the record to reflect that type of informal 
dialogue very definitely affects the result, looking at the past year, 
for your operation or for any other court. And, there's no other dialogue, 
you never advise the litigates what the predisposition ... 
MR. GARRETT: After thirty years in this business, I've learned 
to not guess what a judge is going to do. I suppose it might even make 
a difference on what side of the bed he got up that morning. But, I'm 
not going to make a guess what the judge is going to do because I'm 
probably going to be wrong. We're merely telling people, "Here's 
your opportunity to get on about the business of being parents. Here's 
your opportunity to believe in the concept that parents are forever. 
Here is your opportunity to make the kinds of choices and the decisions 
that the two of you can live with, and it would be in the best interests 
of the children." 
parents 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Okay. 
MR. GARRETT: As I've stated, we're successful in ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Is it possible then ... 
MR. GARRETT: ... about 85 percent of the cases, in helping the 
an agreement that they can live with. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Okay, assuming that state of facts, 
would it be possible to amend the Kapiloff bill then to allow either 
one of the litigants to waive joint custody so that the presumption would 
not exist where one of them waived it? I mean to restate that policy. 
Mr. Kapiloff, I'm going to the fear that we're going to cause litigation. 
I mean given the Orange County situation as it's been described, there's 
evidently not a real desire on a lot of these litigants to partake in 
joint custody, so why should we make the court address the issue through 
the vehicle of presumption? When in fact one parent just wants to waive 
-39-









CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I don t th 
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other than that, i 
s in the courthouse who 
several years. The par-
oint physical cus 
what I meant. I 
HR. GARRETT: Tha s all I know about that ... 
the 









them, of course but 
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e of deliver 




the proof of it 
, 1980. The 
the interest of time. 
there at the end Here 
didn't hear every one of 
were out there. And these 
, what does t show? 
shows 414 total. Exclusive custody awards, 276. Flare-ups of later con-
troversy, 31.5 percent. Same period joint awards, 138 only, 15.9 per-
cent. In round numbers, 32 percent exclusive, 16 percent joint. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: This is all ical custody? 
SSIONER That's legal custody .•. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Oh, it's loq<ll custody ... 
COMMISSIONER ALEXANDER: Physical custody arrangements range 
from all kinds of variation, Mr. Robinson. If you read ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well, I appreciate Judge Rutter's state-
ment that we might as well just throw legal custody out, and I think he's 
absol right. 
COMMISSIONER ALEXANDER: No, sir, I don't agree with that. I 
think you need -- I'm getting away from my text, but I suggest very 
strongly to you-- you need to overhaul Section 4600.5(b), and put in a 
good set of definitions. You can get custody itself from Burge v City 
and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d, in my detailed statement.-.-.--
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Okay, rather than get you off, you're 
saying 15 percent is legal custody. 
COMMISSIONER ALEXANDER: No, these are failure rates of per-
manent awards of joint legal custody that flared up in court later on. 
And, I'm go to give you an example in a minute. Now, the key to it, 
, is: What about the ones where one parent didn't consent? You 
haven't heard much about that. Eighteen out of 138 were done without 
the consent and most of them over the objection of one parent, including 
one I'm going to tell you about. Only six out of the eighteen flared 
up. That's a 33.3 failure rate,only 1.8 above the failure rate for all 
of the exclusive cases. Here is the high risks sub~sample. This is in 
Table 4, ladies and gentlemen, in my detailed statement of October 6, 
and,Mr. Robinson,if you don't have a copy of it, I'd appreciate the 
chance .. 
gave it to a recyc 
( ) 
I've got so much paper up here. If we 
could pay off the state's deficit. 
COMMISSIONER Well, please don't do that. Please 
don't do ) Now here is one out of it. This 
is case J-21. Now let me summarize it qu Stipulated interloc, 
exclus custody of two girls to the mother, visitation to the father. 
Home to the mother to be sold later, when both girls reach 18 or die and, 
here is the kicker, or if mother no longer had custody of at least one 
of the daughters. Now, in the fall of '78, in the early stage of this 
study, father brought an OSC to change exclusive custody to him, which 
would have triggered the sale about eight years before the youngest 
reached 18. Why? Mother, he said, drank to excess and didn't supervise 
the s properly. Mother said, "Oh no, he wants really the forced 
premature sale." Now, skip the evidence. It actually sustained both. 
The girls were better off with the father and the new stepmother, who 
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father 
house 19 3 
father d sed his 
I call it the case 
I bel 
tatement, be-




for the Superior Court for Frank Zolin, and for the Family Service 
Council of California. I have distributed some written testimony that's 
available to you, and I'd like to call attention to a paragraph that's 
from an excellent study of joint custody called Fathers Without 
Partners by Rosenthal & Keshet and, in a far more elegant way than I 
trates some of the concerns about joint custody. [Appendix H.} 
First of all, I'd like to say that after working through 
1500 joint cus arrangements, many of those personally 
negotiated by myself, that there really is a point of agreement here, and 
that is that joint custody for parents who agree is a marvelous way to 
continue the parenting relationship. I think that for parents to co-
operate and work together obviously is in the children's best interests 
as well as their best ts. I think the present law permits that 
to take It allows to select from a range of options a 
that is best suited to the ldren's needs. For this reason, I 
would like to speak in support of AB 2202, which adds to the law some 
rather clear definitions about joint legal custody and joint physical 
custody, and I would like to speak in opposition to AB 1706 for the 
following reasons. The first is that it clearly elevates parental rights 
over children's needs. There is a group here that has really been rela-
tive unrepresented, and unspoken about, and those are the children who 
have to 1 day by day with the conflicts and concerns of their parents. 
And where parents don't agree, you're sentenc those kids to an existence 
of conflict and confusion that is certainly not in their best interests. 
The second is that ... 
Excuse me, that can also be the case where 
have who are bicker or fighting, et cetera. 
you move the child from that home as well? 
I 
reso 
or in some way ending that 
some way, e 
conflict. 
then in that situ-
by getting a divorce 






get involved in is how much 
between parents and their 
I don't think the state should be. 
Well, if you have joint custody though, the 
there are two parents of the 
have some responsibility but some 
that child. 
MR. MciSAAC: But I that if the state presumes that it is 
infue best interests of the child, then the state is really taking on a 
function that I'm not so that we ought to do. I think this is the 
responsibili of the individual parent to real make that decision. 
I think the second unintended result of this law will be that 
will cause or encourage families who are really not capable of having 
joint cus to assume this responsibility. And having been an advocate 
for the or 1 legislation, bel in joint custody, I think that 











islature. I mean we' e all human beings. We're 
obvious to make evaluations f facts and figures and ing 
to come up with some rational 
app so that there are not 
people ll be able to 
in law. 
t say that. I m say that the court 
each case can make those dec 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
MR. MciSAAC: But I think it would be a great mistake to make 
that decis all famil s, as it may not apply. Finally, I 
I would agree with what Silver said. What we really need is 
educa We need to at the po of entry into the di-
vorce process as they trans s experience to learn how to be parents, 
and not to mandate s but to really he them and give them educa-
es that will he them that objective. So, in 
summary to just make the following 
The present j cus islat should be given the 
chance to work. More efforts should be devoted to education, helping 
lies trans this exper e, and research into the effect upon the 
present law the lives of ldren before new laws are adopted. The 
law should not establish a preference for any arrangement, except the 
that are in the best interests of children. Since each 
child are so , establ a preference for the pre-
way of rais children raises far more questions than it gives 


















MR. MciSAAC: No it is not. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I s 




in our court. 
number th 50, 00 0 ••• 
you sir. 
Bloom, and I'm the Di-
and I'm ing here 
also as a representative of the as the Director of 
Cali Chapter 
ation Courts. 
Associa of Family Concili-
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the forum as a ' rights f We see ourselves as 
the protectors of the rights of the chi We see that the studies 
that are now coming in, that are very new, show the many benefits for 
children in jo custody. We stress this pol , and we reinforce it 
to the , but this isn't an argument here today about whether joint 
or not. We this a hundred percent. 
joint custody, do 
you mean 
I ask of you, 
ical custody? 
MR. BLOOM: I mean shared physical and legal responsibility. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You don't differentiate between the two? 
MR. BLOOM: No,I don't. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: There are no that you've noticed 
in one as oppos to the other, that you can ignore one or 
size one leq.:tlly in terms or leqislation and that the other ... 
I don't want to appear naive or oversimplify this, 
but I most of the cases that we see in our court develop 
some sort of a shared cus situation. There is no definition. Al-
I support Assembly Bill 2202 in terms of giving some sort of a 
definition to physical and legal custody, it still doesn't say exactly 
if should be 50 percent of the time, 22 percent of the time, or what-
Jo custody, phys ally, may be any kind of a cooperative 
I feel of the parents whereby frequent and continuing contact is 
ed. 
current law allows the court to evaluate the 
and to assist the in developing 
shared custody are consistent with the 
of the Pr Best ts of the 
it into a parents' r argument rather than the 
children evaluation, I feel that we'll increase court 
to prove a as unfit to share custody. This new 
islation, I feel would promote battles to disprove benefits of joint 
cus , and we've been work so hard to build joint custody kinds of 
situations. I think with this ion one has to prove another 
unfit if don't want joint cus you'll just enhance all 
the negative ever brought about regarding custody or shar-
these 
I so feel our courts work very dil encouraging 
share the custodial responsibi ities children. Many 
recommendations we make where there's a di over custody of the 
children are generally based upon the willingness of the parent more 
l to be willing rather to share custody and the judges I think are 
to order 
best 
sensitive to this. But I don't legislation can necessar-
behavior of I think it happens in the 
The current law courts the authority 
of child custody consistent with the 
the children. 
My last remark is basically that I feel an important point in 
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I think you ve heard horror 
them as weapons against 
kids,I get the house; 
this,I get that," in-
children absolutely 
division, "If I the 
child support; if I do 
ch and I've s 
f pressure. 
Yes. 
and now take out 
ical, we are now talking 
that child to be with 
him from Thursday to Sun-
about the security and 
ion of having to fight. 
let me ask a question. 
s in law are ... 
It's obviously 
, how do you to define which parent 
other? It seems to me that the question 
subject of joint custody really relates to 
have an 1 interest in the child and should, 
Preci 
through Wednesday ... 
kind of a syndrome, 
that we can do things 
ing of the 
40 cases 
of those, except one, 
we even into court. 
to tell my clients ... 
ical custody? 
let me say ... 
distinction 
As to joint 
and I wouldn't hinder 
ical cus wherein 
would get involved in saying 
is in the best interests of this 
is the em. That is the problem 
We need some more time. There's no 
stated. At this juncture we have 
a situation where nt is be our county 
and 
for. 
I can't for all, 
Then the question fal 
s what 
tends 
in every situa where it's being asked 
s down to the issue: Now where do we place 
fathers are concerned about because it is 
mother because she's female but 
pr caretaker and that is 
the child) to have more than 50 per-




settled the case ... 
MR. McMAHON 
is genera 
is rewarded for usual 




You know these people 
f can't cooperate 
The argument that 
we can't make an order. 
The co can say, "I'm 
, two 
of court, 
then go to 
, it is the non-
her noncooperation, who 
00.5 , mandating 
allow frequent 
I just make one 
who 
would want to keep 
customs which 
gives one person 
is much more 
for all the corn-
material 
more about 
be open on it 
I still don't 
jurisdictions 
And for those 
fication will bal-
zed pretty bad I'm 
ction may be different 
case in San 
counselor really 
Court? 














doe not agree to 
no jo custody. 
understand that. But, Mr. 
the bottom of is, are we talk-
, or are ta about .•. 
the 
th. 
There is a 
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that the first 
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have been a prophet 
prob-
extent. Not in con-
to have to 
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the consultant have 
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available? 
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two homes and 
the children. 
the t.asks 




as stated a number f other 
ive. One of the very positive 
legislation that exists, and the new 
divert battling couples away from 
not destructive to the children 
t between the 
of reso seems 
, unwarranted and regress-
the joint custody 
law, is to attempt to 
adversary system, which is 
idif s the hostile posi-
method 
a process of compe-
titian and of mudsl , in fact go to make the real essence 
of joint custody even more diff t to achieve. 
Just this month, I've a three year longitudinal re-
search project, which is go be conducted jointly with Dr. Judith 
Wallerstein, at the Center the in Transition, in Corte 
Madera California. I research has been entered into evi-
dence here. Several of our j goals are develop data that bear 
directly on these questions - first of all, more specific data about 
children, what kinds of children do well in what kinds of arrangements; 
to compare joint custody in famil where are disputing and in 
families where parents are in agreement about joint custody; and also 
to develop knowledge and models of s and assistance to families 
who are ted in do joint custody. 
As bill 1480, the joint custody law, is still 
quite new, and I think we need to the time to take the 
option, to make use of the , to educate judges, attorneys, mental 
health profess ls, and about al that we know so far about 
joint , to allow the mediation law a chance to work, and particu-
lar ts of d fferent arrangements for 
fferent children in social policy in this 




It's a private 
interested in 




Francisco because o 
gants. Are you familiar 
Prior to the 
lity to the 
the effects of 
their best 





- how it actually 
in the law? 
the law. 
testimony earlier today 
and County of San 
to attorneys and liti-
the one that 
that it ical 
DR. STEINMAN: 
STEINMAN: 
cus fact ... 
I'm 
wi 1 no be 
Those were to 
Well familiar with that. I am 
j cus 
s certainl 
es into mediation and 
made numerous orders of jo 
where there were s 
m not to pu you in a pos 
to understand exactly what's go in 
San Francisco ... 
INMAN I real don't have specific enough informa-
tion about 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well, is it your read 
t, that there is an 
tate pol of oint cus ? 
DR. STEINMAN: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN HARRI Thank you. Are you ? 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOF'F: No. 
HARRIS: No ust 
to ask one 
don't you come here and 
s I 
understand what you measure 
J 
i divorce s ttinq 
the current 







ch ldrcn who arc 
thereof, or what? 
the divorce s 
ts as to 
qa ins tJ1c 
agai st the 
ncJ, or some 
against? 
combination 
are you meL!sur 
DR. STEINMAN: is point s was a s that was t 
compar to ldren in sole custody or children in non-
divorced families. This was to look at the experience from the point 
of view of the child, through in-depth clinical interviews. 
So the thing it tells you i 
that some of the fact that the parents were 
We still don't know whether 
or 1 ss difficul than if 
divorced were experiencing difficul 
there was experience on the whole more 




Yes, but her point still is that 




don't know whether the 
to children where there 
point was .. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: .. to determine whether its ln the 
best interests of the children ... 
custody 
don't make 
Her po is even if joint 
as a result was mixed. Therefore, 
that that s the r way to go. 
non 
tive of 
i that that's a 
law. 
The changes would be trauma, 
Because we do know one thing, that 
divorce real question is What's in the best 
interests of the child? Are children in th s tt better off over-
all than children in a sole cus setting? That she has not 
answered at all. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: I don't 
think ... 
she to. 
. STEINMAN: No, was 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Did I t the thesis correc 
DR. STEINMAN: Yes. It s ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: That has no bear on at all. 
DR. STEINMAN: I is very true that it is not possible to 
say that situation per se created the ustment 
difficulties that these children were experienc , but what it does 
say is that the situation did not these children, and,in fact, 
were overburdened in the situation ... 




ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Is it fair to say it didn't help them? 
DR STEINMAN: There were a number of ldren ... 
Is it fair to say it didn't 
ing point is, how can you say whether 
DR. STEINMAN: There were ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I mean if you compare a child who 
consequences as a result of in s 
a child who s suffer experience from 
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the death of a 
mean, you can't make the 
At least I didn't that from 
now your testimony, then I 
we need to the bas 
us 
DR. STEINMAN: Well, I'm also that the ch 
not only in ro e adjustment, varied terms 
ability to master the specific tasks involved in the jo 
situation, and ... 
forma 
ASSEMBLYMAN 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You ust can't jump to conclusions. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Dr. Ilfeld. 
Ilfeld, and I'm a 
tris California. 
my statements experience as a 
my co-research 
tes ied earlier 
John Alexander, 
F t of all, 
says that we don't have 
and at the 
She has not seen the 
summer and fall. My 
Alexand 
you 
study came just this 
study, which measures d 
upon children. These 
But even d 
deal that we al 
sole cus is very harmful for 
testified as to the desirabili 
of the child with both 
bill, and I looked at the defini 
s, there is 
What we do 
that's essentially what it says. So, the data, and I'm 
merate the data, the data speak to 
call it "presumption," if you want to call it " " 
attorney, I don't know what these - but, clear 
a first order of preference or a des for joint cus 










I'm not an 
there is 
that 
Now first of to the Alexander data, which 
my wife and I are publ jo with him. Essentially, in capsule 
form, and if you wish I can elaborate upon it, we look at relitigation. 
Over a two year period the rel rates for sole custody are 
e as high than those for in joint custody. Mind you, this 
is on a of over 400. Furthermore where did not agree, 
at least whether or not to have joint cus may agree after 
the decis made, cour on those 18 cases (which is not a 
sample, but it's the t that has so far) only 6 
have come back for relitigation. That's essentially the same, literally 
one point. Essentially the same, one percentage point away, 
essentially the same as relitigation rate for sole custody. In other 
words, even where parents don't agree as to joint custody, even in the 
mil f the adversary system where 're to fight- be-
cause f fight for sole cus and don't agree for joint custody, 
you'll sole cus -even then, joint custody does no 
worse than sole 
Now, why is rel tion important? First, of all it's ob-
viously important because it means lower work for the courts, and I'm 
bothered that the judges aren't here to hear because I think they'd 
be ed that there'd be less work for if there were more joint 
cus But, rel is indicative of parental conflict, 
and lict researchers agree relates directly to child adjust-
ment. So, this is why our study showing that joint custody is half 
the rel ion of sole custody is something that has to be taken very 
serious There is a clear argument in favor of the desirability 
preference (however you want to word it) of joint custody over sole 
for most, not all famil The I read Assemblyman Kapi-
bil it does not say "all ie ." 
't that a little skewed 
in existence 
se at the 
took was a commitment. 
with you if we'd dealing with cases where 
the court had ordered jo cus notwithstanding the objection of one 
But if you're just s o cus arrangements, it 
me that on a norm you would have less relitigation because, 
the norm,the Imbrecht bill, accord to so far, is not 
adhered to. At leas the intent of Mr. Imbrecht is not being 
this state. So you have a skewed sample is what 
DR. ILFELD: I'm sure. what way? 
There was essentially an agreement 
of 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: There was or compromising. 
There were more They were not a ... 
DR. ILF:t:JD: No. Let's thn>w out 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Where vou have sole custody, often-
you're go who- is very displeased with the 
-6 
result of his or her litigation, and that in itself is apt to generate 
more litigation in the future. As ... 
DR. ILFELD: Well, I pointed ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: ... the parent with custody takes on 
another relationship with another human being, or any kinds of other 
issues, drinking or what have you, could cause increased litigation. 
DR. ILFELD: Well, first of all, for whatever the reasons, the 
fact that there's less relitigation, for whatever the reason, is good 
for the child. I don't care what the reasons are ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I understand that, but you're missing 
my point. My point is that if you're going to compare apples to apples, 
you should only be talking about joint custody where it's been ordered 
by the court over the objection of a parent. That compared to sole 
custody arrangements, would be ... 
DR. ILFELD: 
have that compar son. 
That's why I'm comparing. I'm doing that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Oh! These are not joint custodies 
that are compromised? 
I 
DR. ILFELD: Now, wait a minute, please. Now, when I'm talk-
ing about joint custody, when I say it has half the rate of relitiga-
tion of sole custody, I am talking about- Let's turn to table ... 
Please, this might help out. I only have one table. Turn to table 
number one. (Laughter) 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You might only have one table, but I 
have 56 briefs up here! (Laughter) 
DR. ILFELD: Well, okay. I can even simplify it beyond that. 
When I refer to "joint custody," I mean those ordered by the court, 
whether or not consented or unconsented by both parents. Now, it turns 
out that a very small -and I don't have my calculator with me, I can 
guess here ... hold on- there were 138 awards of joint custody. Only 
22 of those were contested but came out joint custody. So, in other 
words, most of the joint custody I'm talking about is where it was 
agreed upon by the parents. That's a relitigation rate of 16 percent. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: No, I understand that. 
DR. ILFELD: There were 18 cases in which the parents did 
not agree to have joint custody. This figure 22 refers to those cases 
coming back out of all the 138 unconsented joint custody cases appeared 
for relitigation, which is 33 percent,which is essentially the same as 
the percentage of relitigation for sole custody. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: And all I was trying to do was to keep 
your testimony on that plane. 
DR. ILFELD: Oh, okay. 
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court enforced jo 
another thing. Mr. Robinson, 
stipulated. These 
pointed out with the other 
around here r 
DR. ILFELD: , now you made another point, as long ... 
and 
DR. as you have reasonable parents. I 
it's that there are many more reason-
in Santa Monica than there are San Francisco for in-
now, Commissioner Alexander tells me that the joint cus-
are about 50 in Santa Monica. So, I main-
i not just whether or not are agreeable or cooper-
intain that it s a system ult the law, and second-
that determines the amount oint custody. 
but it's 
to 
more like 's 
s 
San Francisco, 
has a different atti-
th the same law. 
We a maintain it's the law be-
with liation counselors, the present law 
f , to not agree. I other words if you don't 
, if you want to have so cus , you're going to 
have to do is not 
the 
. ILFELD: That has been 
think is be con-
ication of the law. 
ng too. 
I 's varied of the law, and 
s a notwiths some of the other 
that are being made. It's the fact that you can go to San 
Francisco and a different ustice from what you get in Santa Monica, 
for , on basical the same fact pattern. 
Mr. Harris, I would intain that one of the 
be j dif in different constituencies 
is because the law is not clear. It says, 
it says, "Joint custody or to either 
preference. So the law is ambiguous. 
"Preference for," and then 
" Now that doesn't show a 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: The next tructs 
the judge that if he does not find joint custody, he must state his 
reasons. 
DR. ILFELD: True. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: ... so that clearly puts a preference in 
state policy, and,not being a lawyer and just being a simple accountant, 
it seems to me that you have to take that whole section together. You 
can't just take a sentence because it's convenient and decide that you're 
going to agree with that sentence. It's that whole section of the law 
that's being applied differently in San Francisco than it is in Santa 
Monica and then, according to the witnesses we have from Orange County, 
in Orange County, too. That concerns me. While I'm sympathetic towards 
what Mr. Kapiloff's trying to do, that also concerns me very seriously 
because we're supposed to be establishing a policy that's uniform in 
all 58 counties of the state. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Dr. Ilfeld,could you summarize your tes 
mony, please? 
DR. ILFELD: Okay. If I could just continue ... I was saying 
how our data shows joint custody to be superior to sole custody, without 
going into the details, which I just did. You're going to hear Dr. 
Pojman in a moment,and I recommend that you listen very,very closely. 
I'm going to mention several things that I think need emphasiz , I 
have reviewed his very detailed s First of all, he has a rela-
tively small sample, larger than many around here, but it's 20 
in each group, and there are four groups. Now, and this is 
because it seems like "Gee, his es are small," when you 
tistically siqnificant diff('rcnccs, with small s, it's more power-
ful for your in tion. In other words, his findings are more 
potent. Yes, they're more potent. No. I see heads shaking; but, no, 
they really are more potent. He can show you the data. Because in 
larger numbers, you can fudge statistical The differences don't 
have to be that great. With larger numbers they become "statistical " 
significant. So with small numbers when you have statistical differ-
ences, that means there are big differences, and indeed that's some-
thing to pay attention to. 
The other thing that is not underlined, I , in his 
study that should be is that in his assessment of the children from 
multiple viewpoints, sole custody does extraordinarily poorly, does as 
badly as unhappy marriages, and he had to search throughout the city 
of Los Angeles "for unhappy marriages" but he couldn't find them just 
in his one school district. My point being, it's not just that joint 
custody does well, but that sole custody, sole custody is doing very 
very poorly, and his is not the only study that shows this. Again, I 
think a point in support of preference, very strong preference, for 
joint custody. 
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it was Orange County) 
Now as to the 
t counselors see the 
after the 
can t agree to have a 
battl forevermore, 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. 
Dr. Pojman ease. 
Pojman. m a 
Commissioner for the Marriage 





Thank you very much, Dr. Ilfeld. 
my name is Everett 
been for 13 years. I was a 
Counselors Examination. I 
Basically, I passed out a s for this explaining the re-
sults of joint custody when compared to sole custody. I've read time 
and time again how a study like this has never been done. I can see 
why it's never been done. Try and go to the county courthouse and find 
records on joint custody. It's incredibly difficult. Not many have 
been awarded. I had to search throughout L. A. County, and also for 
mothers, trying to find subjects. I believe I even called Dr. Steinman 
at one time trying to find subjects. I did find 20 subjects who had 
boys. I restricted it to boys in joint custody. 
I then went through randomly selected children from two 
different school districts to find matched groups with sole custody. I 
put in variables such as matching length of time since divorce and sep-
aration as well. They were divorced anywhere from one year to seven 
years time. These were boys I was studying between the ages of five 
and thirteen. I also compared and contrasted these children to boys 
of intact, happily married homes and intact, unhappily married homes. 
These boys were examined on three different types of standardized 
psychological instruments, psychological tests which are the norm and 
have very high reliability. 
What I basically found was that boys of joint cus were 
far superior to boys of sole cus in almost every psycho ical test 
that I had given, at the significant t 01 and .05 level. Joint cus-
tody boys also did much better, which was interesting to see, than the 
unhappily married group, whereas sole custody boys did not do any better 
than the unhappily married group. When boys of joint custody were com-
pared to boys of the happi married group, there were no total test 
significant differences, but there were some significant differences 
in a few sub test scores on the California test of personalities, which 
means that boys o joint custody, at least in my sample, did almost as 
well as boys in happ married families and did signific much 
better than boys of sole custody and ily married families. 
As a school p ist and also through my research, I have 
been working with the as well. As Dr. Ilfeld said in his 
study about the noncustodial , the children initially formed 
many contacts with their parent or some contact with their parent, but 
within two or three years the contact is less and less, and it's en-
couraged by the custodial parent. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Excuse me. The consultant raised an 
esting question that I'd like to know the answer to. How do you define 
"unhappily" as opposed to "happily" married? (Laughter) 
DR. POJMAN: 
psychologis 
If you ask that question to four different 
come up with four different answers. But I did 
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it a standard set tests. It was standardized. It was a 
marital adjustment i I took those who had the most spousal com-
those who had the least 1 complaints on this 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All r 
DR. POJMAN: I came a and "unhappy" marital 
situatlon. As a psychologist and a marr family counselor, and also 
with my study, I find that these boys and ls easily lose contact 
the noncustodial parent and generally they have hostility after 
a while for their noncustodial parent, which is a direct reaction from 
the hurt that they feel. They go on to have authority problems later 
in life and become very embittered. This is fueled, of course, by the 
custodial parent at times. I feel in joint custody we don't see this 
situation because the two parents are forced to so some communication 
with each other. I found that one of the biggest things that opened 
my eyes was that some of these parents hated their ex-spouse but they 
said they'd communicate because they both loved their children, and 
that was something that was really agreed upon by both groups. I 
real feel strongly that the parents love their children and they're 
not go to do anything consciously to hurt them. 
One more thing I wanted to say is that we talk about fitness, 
about what is fit and how the person will react to being unfit. I 
wonder how the child reacts to being unfit. I think when a child 
can't see his parents, his other parent on a continual basis, 
t's absurd. 
Table 3, the back, which was not in the handout but I 
a f you have, gives you a comparison of boys' joint 
the other three groups. The "plus" means that there is a s 
cant difference at the .05 level to the level to the 
variable in the same column. The "n.s." means it's nonsignificant. 
As you see with this, many tests were not s ificant, but for the total 
tests which were the Inferred Self Scale and the Louisville 
Checklist (which is the securi level for the compilation of 
all the scores), there are signif differences again on joint cus-
and so forth. 
I have another table which I wish I would have given to you, 
when I compared happi married to all the three groups, and I have it 
in.my sertation. You're free to write me and get a copy if you send 
me a few dollars for reproduc ( ) It demonstrates that 
the married group did by far superior to every group except 
again the joint custody. It shows it very definitely, clearly. So 
we do know that joint custody boys are doing, as a matter of fact, 
well. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Very good. 
DR. DIJ\NE TROMDE'rTl\: Ilc~llo my 1s Dr. Diane Trombetta. 
q i Vc'n you ,1 sm<J pclC C' , lhv !'t'd d!Hl wh i one·. The red and whi tc 
is an drticlc th<1t I' !J n•fcr t.o Llh'l~ that 1 just had published. 
ix The front page of what l 'vc given you is my resume, which 
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even when a 
Think of all the 
it after 
in place for implement 
as individuals want to 
to or not. You 
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DR. TROMBETTA: No, my chi dren were never interviewed by 
anyone in sys , at all. 
ASSEMBLYMAN Not in or outside the courtroom? 
DR. TROMBETTA: No not at all. 
So the determination of best interests 
was a witness. 
DR. TROMBETTA: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: . Trombetta, T want to thank you for your 
your ex~erience is ins htful. The fact that 
th prof ssional knowl and a factual experience should 
much in unders the 
We have a number f witnesses 
I now wish we had the judges on last. 




Yes, so do I. Maybe we could have 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
We could issue subpoenas duces tecum 
r cases ... ( ) 
ASSEMBLYMAN 
re? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: s. 
Po f 
ierson? Ms. Gassner? 
I'll have three more 
you like to begin? 
to elimi.nate 
as you can. We have, I 
in the issue, and 
to have summaries 
, over here. 
Would the chair entertain a motion 
o Will the chair accept the motion to 
the three major benches (SanD , Los les, and San Fran-
) to summarize the d of the cases and present that 
chairman? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I think that wou d probably be appropriate. 

















All r , we just want to see what we can 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Do you ace that motion, or do 
any oppos 
I don't 
I just articulate briefly two 
irst of all, we have, I think, 
both sides of issue as to the merits and 
So it that we have polarized 
we don't have the data 
ion is that we do have, 
is true, that's what's 
carrying out the will of 
s intolerable to me, or we have inconsistencies 
in law,which is unconstitutional in my judgment. And, 
if data supports my suspicions, and they're only suspicions, then 
we have a number of issues to confront the slature as a branch of 
which to be dealt 
, I would ask that you 
those three benches, as 
Cll~>lO(ly. 
I will do that, and it is four 
and San Francisco. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Ye , four. 
work you, Mr. S 
come up some ques 11 Slrvey them. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Certa 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Ladies firs . 
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, 
my name l'~Tt:~~;:;::::-:;::-;:rr~;---T 'm an I have practiced in Cali-
fornia for years. I was invited to testify 
,among other th I' former chairperson of 
on Fami and Children, on the Commission of Law and Men-
f the State Bar ssions. For a 
I've worked los with number of people who've been 
invo and concerned with children of divorce, and among 
Wallerstein, John Suarez, Calof, and others. I also 
on the established Mills to help write 
Co-Parenting," on what we les County under-
stand as AB 1480, Civil Code Sec 4600 and 4600.5. I 
am here, in fact my own expense, because 
for the past been the welfare and 
11-be families. I have a 
minutes. I would like 
to ask two or participants here. 
One is ... 
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ask them separa 






MS. SWERDLOW: Then would the Committee to consider. 
To Dr. said that approximate one-third of the children 
who were involved in a oint custodial arrangement, and these were with 
families who had the best of intentions and were cooperative, that those 
children did not appear to be well. Was there a follow-up of 
those children? How have been along subsequent to the 
change in the ical 1 arrangement? That's one question. 
And the other Dr. Ilfeld ... I understood from his testi-
mony that much of his bas on the information supplied by 
Commissioner Alexander, and I wondered whether he in fact interviewed 
those families. And if he the families, did he interview 
the children, and did he do it on more than one occasion? I would like 
the Committee to know that my concern here and my orientation is what 
is in the best s f the child. What is in the best interests of 
the child or children? And, by the way, when we do, or when this Com-
mittee does,hopefully secure the information from the three large 
counties - divorce informa , that 11 not give you the next bit 
of information that you real need. And that is: How have the children 
been doing under the various kinds of or under the various cus-
todial ? 
The ilof 
least, is fundamental 
of choice mus be 
fam Through the wo 
gists over the past thir 
stress 
also know tha not 
to the child which 
ze that which, to me at 
ng, that the custodial 
ular child in a specific 
sionals and soc 
have known that divorce is 
ticular the young child. We 
results in emotional damage 
During the decade of the 
on the impact of divorce on 
not solely, by Judy Waller-
in Cal fornia - we learned that one of the ways 
t of the stress experienced by children of 
divorce was to have both remain in contact, remain involved 
and concerned with the child. way, Kel and Wallerstein also 
found that where the child had control of the access to both parents, 
that was another factor the stress. And, I wonder 
when Dr. Trombetta was she said that her children live 
three What access have they had to her? 
Because, through my point and from working with Judy Waller-
stein, the emphasis is not on a 1 custodial plan, but rather a fact. 
How much access does the child have to both parents? The child needs 
to feel that nei one of the has abandoned that child. It's 
the child's feel and the child's needs, and not the parental rights 
or parental feel ,that we have to be concerned with here. 
The work of, as I said 
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izes the sens f 
We're ta terms 
means the sense of 
child during the first 
s if you're a nursing 
MS. SWERDLOltl: 
neys I know are, 
f you are a nursing mother, as some attor-
(LAUGHTER) 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:! even know one or two legislators! 
LAUGHTER) 
MS. SWERDLOW: ... and ust nurse the child then .. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Some are males! (LAUGHTER) 
MS. SWERDLOW: 
over to someone se, 
strong sense of that 
ime involvement 
... and put the child down and turn the child 
doubt that that child is going to have a very 
icular person later on. We're talking about 
ion to quali involvement. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Here's the problem I have with this 
1 of tes m sure it's all relevant to the individual 
decision, the individual case, I'm not sure how it's relevant to Mr. 
Kapiloff's legislation or the existing law. 
there is a 
choice. 
'I'he Kap lo f 
that joint cus 
lc9islation would mandate that 
is the custodial plan of 
n, the 
is not a 
Mr. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Okay, as I understand the motiva-
a fair field going in, so that there 
ion against joint cus 
MS . .SWERDLOW: I think ... 
... and that·now that the reason that 
1 
overcome the inertia of the exis 
tice, which is the child is a 
traducing the bills is to 
two decade presumption, in prac-
ven to the mother unless there is 
some reason no to. I' t sure how your testimony squares with what 
we're to decide here. 
the ind 
MS. SWERDLOW: What f'm say 
1 n the indiv dual 
is that we've got to look at 
family ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: ... So as you go in, you have a 
mother, a a or more, and the presumption should 
be that we should do what's best for the child in the long run. We've 
introduced sc ific evidence that indicates that positive contact 
with both a male and a female balance, or reason-
able balance, and is But we have to look at lega~ rights, that both 
want to have at least the or 1 same right of access to the 
child,and from that po on somebody, probably a judge, evaluates all 
these factors and makes a dec ion on some custodial plan ... 
MS. SWERDLOW: That's correct. We're talking about ... 
-7 
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as to what the 
parties ask for 
joint custody,then there is a presumption. 
custody is a custodial plan of choice. 
In that instance, joint 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Is there any other area of the law 
where the Legislature has required the judge to set out the reason 
that he didn't grant something if the islature didn't want him to 
grant it to begin with? 
MS. SWERDLOW: I ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: We don't deliberately put burdens on 
judges. We told that judge, that if you don't give joint custody 
then you must lay out in public your reasons for not doing so. We 
set the policy. The judge doesn't set the policy. He's supposed to 
apply the law as we draft it, given the circumstances of a particular 
case that's before him. We certainly can't structure a statute that's 
going to take care of the whole proliferation of cases that emerge, 
domestic law or any other section of the law. 
MS. SWERDLOW: What I fail ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We're going to have to move along. 
MS. SWERDLOW: Excuse me. I fail to understand your point. 
The law as it exists now requires that a judge, where those parties 
wish to have joint custody and the judge does not order that joint 
custody, must set forth the reason why he did not grant joint custody. 
We have that now in the law. That's a matter of education. That's a 
matter of rapping them on the knuckles from the ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: The way I read it, any party can want 
joint custody and he has to spell out his reasons for not granting it. 
It doesn't take both of them. That's the way I read it. I'm just a 
layman. 
MS. SWERDLOW: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Now, wait a minute. (Knock, Knock). 
I want to reassume control of this. (Laughter) Wait a minute. Hold 
on. Would you like to summarize this? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: He always treats me like this, and 
I ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Would you like to summarize? I don't want 
to be rude, but I am going to move on. 
MS. SWERDLOW: Yes, I would. Not only does the Kapiloff 
bill fail to take into account that each custody situation is unique, 
in that we are considering a specific child in a specific family, but 
I believe that it will encourage a bitter and ugly adversarial, ju-
dicial proceeding that would be completely destructive of the develop-
ment of harmony down the line between the two parents. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much. 
ruptions. In normal court you wouldn't see it. 
not only with the witnesses but with each other. 
-77-
Sorry, for the inter-




ierson. I was,for 


















li tion. Fami 
structive the 
would make the 





some of the 
of the 
f 

























AB 2 0 
the members f the 




want to make sure 
Section opposes AB 1706. 
the Imbrecht bill? 
the statewide Bar Board taken 
Executive Committee for the 
s ... " 
you r 
, "Has the Board of Governors of 
the 
the same as the Sec " 
s 




says, "You darn sure 
to then say "I'm 
If he doesn 1 t 
have to al 
now, the way the law stands 
SEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: No, the way Mr. loff's bill 
80 
MS. PIERSON: My reading of Mr. Kapiloff's bill is that he 
would have to declare one of the parents unfit. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: That's his only alternative? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: What I think Mr. Kapiloff is s 
MS. PIERSON: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: First of all, if that is the case ... 
Let it be known, one of the problems I have with people who start out 
in an oppose position and have no intention at all of ever moving 
from it is that they'll never contact you ~nd talk with you about 
what your intentions are in an effort to try and make you feel better. 
And that's too bad, but the Family Law Section never did. Now, frankly 
it was never my intention to preclude a judge from following the dic-
tates of the request of the parents. If the parents do not want joint 
custody, they should be given that right. Moreover, I agree on your 
question, that the choice of fitness is a poor choice of language and 
we want and we are going to have to find some more sophisticated 
criteria, certainly. If they're just objecting to the fact that we're 
establishing a presumption, that can't be because at least some people 
believe the presumption is established by the Imbrecht law. The ques-
tion is the weight of that presumption. 
MS. PIERSON: I would ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: ... And really that's what we're talk-
ing about. I have no intentions, and I will assure this committee I 
intend to amend the bill to cover this point. I have no intention of 
precluding a judge from ordering other than joint custody where 
he finds somebody unfit. That would be ridiculous, and I will amend 
the bill, and I will show you all the amended bill. 
All I want is some good faith on your part and not just to 
say,"No, no, no, no, it can't work. It never can work." I've heard 
that argument since the old civil rights days when everybody said, 
"Civil rights won't work. It's just a matter of education. It's 
just a question of changing people's minds. You can't legislate these 
things. They just have to come about by social change." That's non-
sense, just absolute nonsense. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING So you're committing to amend that? 
It's either joint custody or a finding of unfitness, Mr. Kapiloff. 
He'll fix it so that ... Do you suppose we could give Mr. Imbrecht 
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result of the bill that we are 
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be enforced by court order, and it can be used to forward the best 
interests of the child. We would urge the adoption of that bill. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Very quickly, next set of 
witnesses, please come forward. Do you want to ask a question? 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: I'm 
there's a sub rosa agenda going on here. 
simultaneous battle over where the assets 
the child, and who has to pay them? From 
to figure out whether 
Is there a collateral or 
go, since the assets follow 
your experience? 
MS. GASSNER: In my experience, that's not the case. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: So what we see is what we're 
debating? 
MS. GASSNER: That's my 
MS. PIERSON: I'd like to point out to you that I believe 
it's 4600.5 of the Civil Code requires that custody issues and prop-
erty issues be bifurcated. I think this makes a difference. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: I understand that. 
to see if the real battle here is economic. 
I just wanted 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much. 
Martin Shucart, Marcia Nolan, and Laura Glickman. 
you'd like to go first. 
Mr. Barber, Mr. 
Mr. Barber, if 
MR. MICHAEL BARBER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 
out of order. I have a plane to catch at 4:40 ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Good luck. 
me 
MR. BARBER: I hope. I represent the District Attorneys 
Association and the Family Support Council of the District Attorneys 
Association. I'm a deputy distr a in Sacramento. 
In viewing this legislation from our point of view, we have 
simply looked at both bills, because we were invited to testify on 
both bills, as a step towards a cleanup surrounding the issues of 
joint custody and issues that are peripheral to it. At this time, 
frankly we have no position per se to take on the issue one way or 
the other; however, there are peripheral issues that are created by 
this that I don't think the Legislature's begun to address. We're 
concerned, for instance, in the child stealing legislation that has 
been quite successful in terms of it's implementation at least in our 
county, San Bernardino County, and several others throuqh the state, thAt 
because of the use of the word "custody" in there, we're going to 
see situations where people who have the child 49.5 percent of the 
time will think they should have the full 50 percent and will be in 
asking for felony warrants, using the axe to kill cannons. 
I am concerned, for instance, with the parents in juvenile 
courts unless there's an expressed statement in the legislation re-
ferring the priority of juvenile placement or any custody order in 
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AFDC, notwithstanding financial aid,because they will not meet mini-
mum time limits in the home under federal law. This is not something 
that can be dealt with here at the state level. It would have to re-
quire a change in federal legislation. Thus, in terms of definitions 
you may wish to look at that. 
As a general rule, in these cases, I think that the most 
important step forward I've seen, because we are in visitation/custody 
cases now in the D.A. 's office, is in the area of pro per access to 
courts in terms of counseling. Under 4600, we've installed this in 
Sacramento courts, and where there have been visitation problems the 
individuals who are having this conflict over visitation are in fact 
taking advantage of it. It may bother some people here for me to say 
this, but in all candor I think what we're doing is a cosmetic 
change of the word "visitation" and calling it "custody" because that 
makes people feel better. If that is in fact the case,then the prob-
lems that now occur in terms of sorting out visitation and visitation 
rights will be transferred to the bailiwick of custody, but they will 
nonetheless not go away. 
We heard complaints and comments here about the courts. The 
problem as I see it is access to the courts, access and mediation. And 
all too often in divorce cases,while I think rightfully they're before 
the superior court because of the long-range effects on people, a lot 
of little issues have come up, really involving the context of what 
might be called small claims actions or we would envision a small 
claims action. Thus, in terms of subsequent litigation, custody dis-
putes and mediation, I would hope that whatever is created out of this 
legislation would simplify subsequent access to the courts so that these 
matters may be resolved promptly, that whatever mediation service, 
counseling service, conciliation service, or superior court judge hears 
the matter, maybe the individual can be placed in contact without hav-
ing to go through the expense of a lawyer and without having to go 
through a range of formal procedures. 
This brings me to the second point of my testimony that Ms. 
Young requested me to talk to, and that is the problem of child support. 
You have heard testimony here that child support is not a problem. 
From our point of view,it is a dramatic problem. The 1975 census figures 
show that 75 percent of the population was otherwise eligible for 
support in the country and was not receiving it in 1975. In fact, I 
have the 1975 pamphlet here. In 1978 this was dissipated to some 
But out of 7.1 million sinqle-parcnt families in the country in 1978, 
only 1.7 million received sup~lrt in full so the problem is not going 
away although it is becoming dissipated. Right now ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: That was nationwide? 
MR. BARBER: That was nationwide. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: We don't have the data for Cali-
fornia? 
MR. BARBER: I have some data, Mr. Stirling. I did not come 
down with data on the percentage of paying cases, and it does vary all 
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over about 30 percent of our welfare cases are pay some-
thing and over 50 percent of our nonwelfare cases are pay-
ing someth regularly. However, and nonetheless, based on audited 
figures that were turned into the Internal Revenue Service recently in 
relation to the federal tax offset program wh is go to expand 
the state tax offset program, there is owed in California 
agencies as re sement for AFDC under court orders and 
in excess of 630 million dollars. the f is 
in excess of two billion dollars and that encompasses only 41 states. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: And money that people 





MR. BARBER: Child ... and spousal. far, the lar-
s ld support,not The first question that 
proposed was what about an automatic cost of 1 raise in 
orders. Case law the has not that 
mandate; however, I would suggest that possibly child 
be presumed to be raised subject to a rebuttal 
by an who can come into court within a limited period of 
time and prove that did not keep pace with the cost of living and 
thus that access to the court and due process. If 
you s mandate legislative f without g an indi-
vidual a chance to rebut, I think cause the statute to be 
str down, but it is one consideration. I would prefer that access 
to the court, and this is something because this hearing came up rather 
I haven't been able to clear with the D.A.'s, but I would pre-
fer that access to the court be simplified and give people a no-fault 
shot at modif ion of their order once every six months with-










It would seem to me 
and not have to 
ess if in fact 
necessar have to go back 
concil ion or 
that someone should be 
involve the 
could be viewed on 
BARBER: So as the indiv were act under the 
ultimate 
terms of a 
of the 
the State 
court. I couldn't agree more. In 
's Support Committee 
in the DSS. 
numerous courts. There 
are scales now be over the states. The l 
tation on the use of these scales, of course is that an indi-
vidual should have an oppor ty to show how ind circum-
stances may vary from the pre ions that go into the scale. They 
are then isory and only a turc form, al I have to say 
that in about 90 to 95 of the cases, t in fact 
being used to decide what the support obl to be,at least 
in the first tance. 
Fina , as to in the law I think the pr 
lem in Cali , and I think that 600 mill dollar £ 
that we have a problem, lies not in changes in 
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larly have to defend his or 
nobody wants to do in terms 
these are two areas that 
something that I think 
support situation. Al 
attacked legislation, I under-
stand that the 
, and tha 
the orders that 
that you all addressed 
to back up with 
I am 1 , and I 
was of the task e that went back on be-
half of the DSS to look at what did back there and why they 
collected so much more support than did. One remedy that they had 
was that every dollar of child support and support went 
a judicial trustee. There was no ion and no way out. The cases 
were monitored from the the divorce act was filed. That was 
, but the who were willing to say if you 
were as little as wanted to see the ividual back 
in court to in were 100 behind. The del ies that 
constitute that $630 million here Cal someth 
$3,500 per: case. I wonder i we had the that 
have in whether or no would ever be a 
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tes 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Th 
quest ns you could back to 
Sacramento, so you can catch your 
CHAIRMAN HARRI Al 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: 'd 
point. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
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today representing the Family Law Section of the Los Angeles County 
Bar Association. I also happen to be the co-chairperson of the Family 
Law Colloquium, that's coming up the first week in November in Los 
Angeles. 
The Family Law Section of the Los Angeles County Bar Assoc 
ation opposes Assemblyman Kapiloff's bill and supports Assemblyman 
Imbrecht's bill with some minor changes in terms of definition. We 
oppose Assemblyman Kapiloff's bill for the reasons that have been pre-
viously stated. Number one, the presumption we do not believe, 
and of course it's up to this Committee to make a final decision, has 
been supported by the behaviorial science studies that have been done 
to this point. We've seen no particular evidence that the best in-
terests of the child are involved in every instance by way of a pre-
sumption with the joint custody situation. We further oppose AB 1706, 
and apparently Assemblyman Kapiloff has agreed to change this standard 
of proof, hopefully, to the best interests of the child and away from 
unfitness on the part of either parent. Speaking as an attorney and 
speaking as one who does a great deal of family law work, if unfitness 
was left as a standard, you would find many, many more child custody 
litigations than you find today. You would find that they would be 
bloodier. You would find that there would be a great deal of employ-
ment for private detectives, which appears to be going out of style 
in the area of even the child custody disputes that we now have. We 
would really be laying open a very, very serious area in terms of 
litigation and,of course, its resulting impact on both the parents as 
well as the children themselves. 
Now, we support Assemblyman Imbrecht's bill for a very im-
portant reason, that reason being even as a certified family law special-
ist, and by the way I represent probably just as many fathers as I do 
mothers, when a client of mine asks me what joint custody means or what 
joint legal custody means, I must tell them in all candor, and perhaps 
my professional responsibility carrier requires me to tell them, that 
I don't know what joint custody means in terms of the statute. What 
Assemblyman Imbrecht's bill does is to at long last give us a defini-
tion for those terms that have been moving around in the area of cus-
tody not just since 1980 but for many, many years. 
I've often said that what people wanted to happen in the 
original bill in 1980 was for joint custody to go from a placebo to 
a panacea. Unfortunately, that's not what's happened. What's really 
happened is,even in the last year and a half or two years,that the 
concept of joint custody in most instances has gone back to the placebo 
that you hand generally the father when he starts to say anything at 
all about the custody of the children. In response to something that 
Mr. Stirling said- I notice he's walking out of the room ... 
(Assemblyman L. Stirling returned to room.) (Laughter) 
MR. SHUCART: Yes, there are some sub rosa aspects in my 
opinion,and the op1nion of many of my colleagues,to the area of joint 
custody and sole custody, and they do involve the issue of child 
support. Many, many a parent who seeks joint custody will subsequently 
seek and, sometimes not very subsequent to his or her initial seeking 
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of joint custody, a reduction in what he or she would normally pay as 
child support as based upon the fact that that person now has joint 
custody. Therefore, it costs them more money, even though the physical 
amount of time or the amount of time that the child is in that per-
son's physical custody is no different than it would have been under 
a sole custody order. 
I would also harken to something that my predecessor speaker, 
Mr. Barber, said. It is not clear at all that with respect to the is-
sue of joint custody that a parent who has joint legal custody can be 
prosecuted under either the child stealing or the violation of visi-
tation statutes, Penal Code Sections 278 and 278.5. District attorneys 
around the state differ in those two areas. I would just urge that 
this Judiciary Committee help us out in the area of practicing law by 
giving us better definitions of those terms that are used every day in 
the courts,and the way you can do that is to support Assemblyman Im-
brecht's bill and to oppose Assemblyman Kapiloff's bill. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much. Thank you. 
MS. MARCIA L. NOLAN: Thank you very much. I'm Marcia Nolan, 
and I'm representing the San Diego County Bar Family Law Section and 
also the legislation sub-committee on family law. I'm also here indi-
vidually. The comment I want to make for the section is we did not 
have the Imbrecht bill before us in order to allow me to testify on 
behalf of the section in that matter. Very briefly, the section and 
the County Bar Board of Directors' position was that,as written,the 
Kapiloff bill is inappropriate for all of the reasons that have been 
stated here today, which I will not enumerate in particular. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
by reference. (Laughter) 
You will incorporate all those comments 
MS. NOLAN: That's right. Mr. Kapiloff has already agreed 
to correct one of the major problems. I do see it involves, in our 
section we have agreed, a substantial problem as it is written. Mr. 
Kapiloff's bill does allow any unhappy parent who has 49 percent of the 
time with the child to go into court and to litigate in court the fact 
that they have not had exactly 50 percent. As written, I think that's 
what Mr. Kapiloff's bill says. I'm sure that there can be amendments 
to it, wherein he can say that it does not mean that all parents are 
entitled to 50 percent of the tjme. 
I would like to try to add something to what's gone on here 
today rather than to just repeat it. What I had prepared took me 
several hours. I am going to deviate from it and make some comments, 
if I can, as to what's gone on. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We have your written testimony though? 
MS. NOLAN: No, you do not. 
in writing until Thursday. 
I did not know this was to be 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, we'll keep the record open if you'd 
like to submit it. 
MS. NOLAN: I would. I was a delegate to the State Bar, 
and I've been very busy, and I'm sorry to ... 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We understand. 
MS. NOLAN: I agree with Mrs. Hicks that the terminology 
used substantially dictates the way we feel about an issue. I think 
that needs to be very much considered by you people when you write 
any kind of legislation,especially in the family law area. I think 
a resolution which is also often offered by mental health profession-
als, experienced courts, and practitioners is to get child litigation 
out of the courts and into mediation and arbitration, and I,for one, 
personally do not feel that there should be any child custody liti-
gation in the courtroom. I think that we need to think about that. 
Regarding child support, it's a legal fiction that custody 
and support are not tied together. It's unrealistic, and it's a fan-
tasy, in spite of the fact that that is the position of the family sup-
port division of the district attorney's office for as long as I have prac-
ticed law. It's plain bull. It is tied together, and don't tell any 
or any mother whose ever not had their child that they should 
go out and support the child when they're not around the time that the 
child is in need. We need to change the laws in that area. 
I disagree with Judge Mills when he says that you can't order 
joint custody if people don't want it. I think you can under the 
proper circumstances, given an environment for those people to be ahlP 
to work through their own animosities, to ventilate, to get out of the 
angry posture, and to get into a mediation process. 
I think we need to talk about the Hennepin County Experiment. 
not heard it brought up here. Most of the people in concilia-
are aware that they use three to six months with par-
ents in a mediation setting, allowing the parents to try to mediate 
and They have full time counselors who facilitate these 
parents in working out their own custodial arrangements. That's not 
been talked about. I don't happen to have a copy of it, but I think 
it should be looked into. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: What was the name? 
MS. NOLAN: The Hennepin County Experiment, which in fact 
was one of the forerunners of our whole concept of using the concilia-
tion court counselors as it stands today. That was one of the things 
we looked at. 
Parents don't have to like each other to continue the parent-
hood program. 
A comment made by Mr. Silver, I would respond to. Men not 
wanting to see their children is a reality. Many times that reality ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: And women not wanting to see their children 
is a reality. 
MS. NOLAN: I'm sure it is, and maybe I should say non-
custodial parents, but I hate the word "custody" and I hate the word 
"non" so much that I try not to use it. One of the reasons why is 
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because its painful your children on Sunday afternoon,to take 
them to the and hear that have a different set of values. 
to hear what's going on in the other home. husband is a noncui-
todial parent. My husband has been in tears when he has sent his 
daughters home on weekends because o what he has heard is going on 
the other home. The ldren don't want to leave, and he has come 
to me in tears and said, Marcia, I'm not going to see those any-
more. It hurts too much and it hurts too much." So, when you 
have these parents who aren't visiting, who aren't seeing their children, 
you might want to ask the question why. Or, do you assume it's because 
they don't love or care about their kids? 
Noncustodial , as I think I've covered, do 
angry about pay when 're not allowed some shared 
time with children. I want to point out that I personally, and 
I've never had a built into every one of the court orders I 
have written in the last five years that the parents must seek the 
services of the family court counseling services or some other agency 
before resorting to litigation subsequent to any trial. I think that 
needs to be done. 
I want to comment about Don K 
not what you think he is, Mr. Robinson. 
is one of the foremost initiators in the 
that. .. 
I know the man. He is 
In fact, Donald King probably 
conciliation court processes 
to his 
ASSEMBLYMAN My criticism of Judge King only goes 
change in policies adopted by the State 
b 
MS. NOLAN: I tand t. tell you that it 
, Don 's mind,as in mine, means divid s 
two homes. It does not mean that he is against shared 
think you need to clear that with Judge , but I 
think that that s what s it custody means. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: He can clear it while he's answering 
send him. (Laughter) 
MS. NOLAN: to Mr. Stirl 's comments (he is not 
here), just terms of his question, yes, economics often do play 
a role, at least in my experiences s an attorney. In some requests 
for joint cus cr represent y 80 percent men, and I must 
that I have found that some of them who are suddenly saying, 
"I want joint cus ," don't want to the kids the bath; they 
don't want to wash the clothes; don t want to feed them and do 
the dishes and wipe their noses, but do want a reduction in 
support.) , it an economic event. I don't think it is in terms of 
phi , and I don't think your Committee should change its philos-
ophy, and I think we need to encourage s to share in their 
parentinq. 
Mr. Barber said ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Would you like to summarize? I don't know 
how far your 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I'm enjoying this testimony •.. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Of course, but she's not the last witness. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I'm aware of that. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: If you can summarize, I'd appreciate it. 
MS. NOLAN: It can't work because it's going to clog the 
court. I haven't gotten to what I've prepared! 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That's what I figured! (Laughter) 
MS. NOLAN: Everybody else has been saying this too. Let 
me make one more comment. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
MS. NOLAN: I'm trying to do that. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Your testimony is very good. Please under-
stand that I'm rushing you only because of the limitations of time. 
MS. NOLAN: I understand. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Chairman, I want to point out that 
it seems that witnesses coming from San Diego tend to - both sides 
of this bill - be considerably more responsive to one, acknowl-
edging that there is in fact a problem out there, and two, it appears 
that they're working a lot better together than any other section of 
the state, and that was the only reason I wanted to ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, I understand. 
MS. NOLAN: I will reduce this to writing if the Committee 
wishes that, but I'd like, as much for the audience here, and I wish 
the judges were here, to propose to you a plan, what I've not heard 
anybody do since they've been testifyin0. 
Number one, Mr. Imbrecht's bill, I think, is a better bill 
because it defines joint custody. It defines legal custody and so 
forth. I have given a handout. I think it should go further. I think 
it should define split custody. I think you need to define divided 
custody, only because it's a smaller area. It's more precise. You've 
got all four forms of custody that a court can use, the attorney can 
use, and the clients can use to know what in hell they're talking 
about when you say, "We're going to get you joint custody." I would 
suggest all four that I have proposed or some similar wording. 
Number two, you the legislators, Mr. Imbrecht and all the 
rest of you, have made a dichotomy in the way the bills regarding cus-
tody are written. It's a small thinq. It's trivial, but you keep 
"awarding" custody to people, and the word is "grant" if you've got 
to have the judiciary involved at all. I can't tell you, and people 
tell me it's trivial, but I can't tell you how many clients have come 
up to me and said, "How come she got awarded the car and I get awarded 
visitation?" If we're going to be clear, if we're going to be con-
-92-
sistent, it's a very simple thing. You've got a whole resolution be-
fore you that I've presented to the convention which by the way was 
withdrawn because of some other problems. While you're rewriting it 
would you please take all the "awards" out? Put the word "grant" in. 
We all would just feel better. I think we have to be consistent in 
our philosophy. 
I said we have to expand our definitions. I also think that 
one other point that has not been made at all today is that 4600 and 
4600.5 both speak very definitively to the court may order a plan of the 
parties to be implemented. I personally feel that they should order it 
in all cases. I don't care whether it's the parties' plan on their 
own, with the help of the conciliation court, or court order because 
nobody can agree. But the an must be implemented; otherwise you're 
right back .•. I don't care if i~Kapiloff's bill, or whoever it is. 
Nobody knows what you're talking about. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I think that's very good. Point well taken. 
MS. NOLAN: 
is you change your 
discretion. 
Plans should be submitted. All I'm suggesting 
egislation to "must" instead of in the court's 
There's another problem also. Within our own county, Judge 
Joseph, who's a marvelous man and one of the most caring judges I have 
known, and Judge Malkus, who's extremely bright (he's been a family 
law practitioner for years), totally disagree on what 4600 means when 
it says, "The parties may and the court shall." Believe it or not, 
there is a real dissension even in this county as to whether or not 
the courts on their own motion can order joint custody, regardless 
of which kind. 
ASSEMBLYMAN Yes I think that's exactly what Mr. 
loff was ... 
That has to be clear that the court can do it on 
its own mo 
changed. 
s of whose bill you endorse that has to be 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: That goes to the problem of Judge 
King. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
that if one ec 
rests with the court. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
Would you like to wrap it up? 
But t goes to those judges who think 
ir jurisdiction, that option no longer 




No, in our courts there is a concern that if 
ink ubout it the court can't even suggest it. 
that, I think. 
One other point is we might consider some way in which we 
could do a double blind if we have to have a custody trial where it's 
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"Parent A" and "Parent B" rather than "the mother" and "the father." If we 
could find a way to work in that situation, it would probably take care 
of the whole problem, at least in terms of the sexual issues. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: One of my main concerns is that there be 
some degree of consistency. I don't want to see a situation,obviously, 
where you have a list of criteria, and you just do it mechanically. 
You send it into a computer and let the computer decide who gets the 
child and do a Solomon number where you split the child in two and let 
each parent have part of the body. But, I'm really interested more 
specifically in people being able to understand that there is some 
rationale, that it's not on the whim of the judge, that he didn't get 
up one day and say, "Gee, you know, my wife was mean to me last night; 
no woman should have legal custody of any child." 
MS. NOLAN: You might note that I also handed out,and which 
was a part of the packages out there, part of the resolutions. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: It might have been a female judge if 
it's a husband. (Laughter) 
sexist. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, either way, either way. I'm not 
(Laughter) 
MS. NOLAN: The San Diego delegation, I admit I'm the author 
of it, did in fact provide some criteria which we think should be 
included in 4600.5. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Kapiloff, I'm sure you'll review that. 
won't you? 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: I certainly will. 
MS. NOLAN: I think it might take care of some of your prob-
lems in terms o varying counties. I don't know that the courts should 
be required, but if the guidelines are there at least all judges and 
all lawyers know what criteria you're looking at. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. 
MS. NOLAN: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay, Ms. Glickman. 
Mr. Kapiloff, if you've got anymore good ideas like this, 
keep them to yourself. (Laughter) 
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF: Just want to make sure that you guys 
work a full day! (Laughter) 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Kapiloff has the capacity to kill 
his own bills! (Laughter) 











MR. SHUCART: While Judge Mills does of course speak for the 
Los Angeles County Superior Court in the family law area, in the Central 
Division, Judge Mills is a calendar judge and as well establishes pol-
icy, but the real decisions as to whether or not there is a presumption 
are made at the trial court level by the fifty or so judicial officers 
who handle matters of child custody. As far as my experience goes in 
the Los Angeles County Superior Courts, there is no presumption one 
way or the other unless the parties agree, in which instance there is 
a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of the child. 
Both parties go in. They may make whatever request they wish, and they 
are treated equally, whether they are requesting joint custody or they're 
requesting sole custody. The courts in Los Angeles County make a de-
cision based upon the facts, with neither particular custody arrange-
ment being given any presumption in the law. If 1706 is to pass, there 
will be such a presumption for ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: That's the exact reason that ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay, let me turn the mike back to Ms. 
Glickman. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: That's the exact reason that we're 
going to subpoena records from those four courts, to show the 
Committee staff and Committee members and themselves whether in 
fact the practice is that there is a presumption where one individual 
objects then joint custody is removed from consideration. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Shucart, do you know how many judges 
in L. A. County Superior Court deal with family law? Do you know? 
MR. SHUCART: Thirty-three, I believe. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I see, plus 50 commissioners? 
MR. SHUCART: No, judges and commissioners. I believe, there 
are 33 judicial officers in Los Angeles County to deal with family law. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You don't know how many are judges and how 
many are commissioners? 
MR. SHUCART: Probably about 15 commissioners 
and the rest are judges. Those are basically sitting family law judges. 
In the branch courts, many times contested custody cases are not handled 
by the commissioner and are sent out to normal regular sitting civil 
judges. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay, I understand. Ms. Glickman. 
MS. GLICKMAN: I'm trying to recall where I was and ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: With Richard Robinson here ijOU will never 
be where you were again. (Laughter) 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: We've all agreed on unfit. You'd 
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e matters have been 
as a slator, to listen 
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different." That's 
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passes out. 
MS. GLICKMAN: I can appreciate that, and I think that cer-
tainly is the function of the Legislature of this state. The reason 
that I make mention of this cautionary note is that it is very diffi-
cult sometimes to gain a perspective from individual stories as to 
what has happened to individual people in their own divorce case. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay, I understand. 
MS. GLICKMAN: I'm not suggesting that I know it all because 
I'm an attorney, far from it. I would suggest to you that I have at 
least a different perspective as an attorney representing a variety 
of clients with a variety of custodial desires and arrangements, and 
I would just want you to be aware you cannot always create harmony and 
create that which we all wish were the case by a legislative enactment. 
With regard to 
yers' Association of Los 
amended in one respect. 
custody - joint physical 
would be very helpful, I 
AB 2202, let me indicate that the Women Law-
Angeles would support that measure if it were 
The notion that these terms "joint legal 
custody" need to be defined is very true and 
think. 
I would, on behalf of our organization, suggest that you 
ought not to strike the language which states that a court may award 
joint legal custody without an award of joint physical custody. There 
are instances in which joint legal custody ought to be ordered. That 
does not mean that in every one of those instances joint physical cus-
tody ought also to be awarded. 
And without articulating each and every possible fact situ-
ation for you, I think you have the imagination to realize that not 
every family situation lends itself to joint physical custody, but 
many of them do lend themselves to joint legal custody as essentially 
defined in AB 2202. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I understand. Your point is well taken. 
Thank you, Ms. Glickman. 
MS. GLICKMAN: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. Mr. Hausey, would you like 
to come up with Mr. Aros? 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: I was wondering if the Family Law 
Section could put together a model code or something for the Legislature 
to consider, or is the Imbrecht bill or the Kapiloff bill the model 
code? 
MR. SHUCART: The L. A. County Bar has put together one as 
I believe the State Bar Family Law Section has put together one. 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Has that been proffered? Does 
anybody know if somebody is carrying those bills? 
MR. SHUCART: I believe that we've been in contact with 
Assemblyman Imbrecht, and he has a copy of the proposed changes by 
the Los Angeles County Bar Association and also from the State Bar 
Family Law Section. 
-98-
lators 
po , Mr. Chairman ... 
goes far 
needs 
, which you 
because it 
send those to us as 
over ambiguity 
approach one of the legis-
ike to 
is Rudolfo Aros. I'm 
our clients don't 
are some related 
support that they 
need to be addressed along 
people have. 
that were included in 
cost of l increase 
sort of a schedule and 
taken in the enforcement of 
clients be predomi-
because those receiving 
s of e for enforce-
them to the dis-
We don't 
we're 









back and get a 
l services will 
f the requests for 
I th really needs 
ication and something I 
ich is rather unusual for 





for the forms that are being used in family law matters would be exceed-
ingly helpful so that these people can in fact go back in and get a 
modification when it is necessary. 
To go on into the proposal that there be some sort of schedule 
for support obligations, I've gotten kind of mixed reactions 
from the programs that I represent. Some of the programs think that 
those schedules would be adverse to our clients' interest because they 
don't actually reflect their economic circumstances. Those schedules 
almost always reflect what would be considered to be normal circum-
stances and our clients, I think by definition, are not in the normal 
circumstances. They exist below the poverty line, for the most part. 
But, on the other hand, some of our programs are saying, "We need those 
schedules." We need support schedules, and the reason we need those 
support schedules is because quite often what happens is that people 
are being brought into the district attorney's office and being asked 
to make support payments on children and those district attorneys will 
not even follow the existing support schedules that are prevalent in 
their county. They will ask for more then the support schedule will 
ask for from our clients because our clients, being unsophisticated, 
not having access to attorneys and feeling intimidated by the system 
that's being utilized to collect the support payments payments through 
the district attorney's office,will agree without seeking assistance 
or advice from counsel. So we think that maybe there is justification 
for using support schedules that might be advantageous to our clients, 
but I think that it is absolutely essential that these support schedules 
have included within them some consideration for the obligations that 
that person has to all of his or her children, not just to the children 
that they're having to support under this support order. I think it's 
essential that that schedule also take into consideration disposable 
income and I think that as a minimum you ought to have federal poverty 
guidelines as the amount that you deduct from their income to determine 
what is disposable so that those persons who don't have at least what 
the government determines as the poverty guideline would not 
have to make a substantial support payment. The problem that's cre-
ated there is oftentimes you have people who are in that situation who 
have to make support payments and arc remarried. What you do is you 
te <:1 burden on that second fumily so that the spouse of that person 
ends up subsidizing his previous spouse bece1usc she hils to make up the 
difference of what her current family needs because his income can't 
do that. 
Finally, with respect to the issue of making enforcement 
eas , we agreed that enforcement should be easy. It should not be 
difficult to enforce a support order. We also think, however, that 
there's a real problem with respect to arrearages. Our clients, when 
they come to us,quite often have been previously employed and have a 
substantial support order that they are obligated to make payments 
under. They lose their job or for some reason aren't getting the same 
sort of income. They cannot at that point afford to go hire an attorney 
for a modification. There exists a substantial period of time between 
which they regain employment or have an ability to pay. That arrearage 
accumulates during that period of time. We think that there ought to 
be some mechanism so that either you tie the enforcement of the payment 
of an arrearage to that person's ability to pay during the period of 












e not to wait two to three 
is be made so that the 
Barber also suggested 
there be some continuing 
and when some-
that could 
to the point 
e and bring 
be made in the oppor-
as well as 
with respect to ability to 
heard Mr. Barber's testi~ 
concluded, and I'm 
relates to the some 600 million dollars 
issued to AFDC about your comments. 
t we have refer to the impact of this legis-
relates to the legal implication of physical 
I wish you'd comment on that and any 
afternoon. 
I from the Department of 
take the child who lives 
creates a em. If that child went with the 
money cannot follow because that household has to be 
We have a the federa regulations,and those 
state regs. The money that Mr. 
of that so I can t comment on that 
have for the issue that confronts us 
aw. 
t have a em. 
that s presently intra-
, there 
have any 
ems under the 
be 
all I have to add. 
t oppos to bill at this time. 
at this po 
0 
MR. HAUSEY: Not at this point. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: If the 
be opposed. (Laughter) 
deficit gets any worse, you'll 
Mr. Chairman? 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Yes, Mr. Stirl 
ASSEMBLYMAN L. STIRLING: Just before everybody leaves, I'd 
like to compliment the Chair and the testimony that we've had here 
The State of California has been well served by the quality of 
e and the quality of the testimony that they brought forward. 
I'm appreciative of this, and I know others on the Committee are. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Stirling, I appreciate your questioning. 
You put more legalese into this hearing than any hearing I've been at 
so far. (Laughter) We have two other witnesses, and I'd like to ask 
them to come forward if they'd like. One, Mr. Sherwin Harris. Is 
Mr. Harris here? Mr. Harris is not here. Mr. Guzzetta? Are you still 
here? Would you like to testify very briefly on anything that you 
have heard during the course of this hearing. 
MR. LAWRENCE GUZZETTA: Mr. Chairman, I actually am volunteer-
to be a witness. I thought it'd be appropriate since we had pro-
fessional opinions being put forth, from judges and from lawyers. Some-
th from professionals in the field of my qualifications might in fact 
be of interest to the Committee since I am an expert. I'm a loving par-
ent. I'm a loving parent who, a year and a half ago, saw his family 
leave his residence. I'm a loving parent who has tried to obtain joint 
ical custody as I perceive it to be the best for the children and 
for the , and in fact I might answer any questions from your 
Corr~ittee as to what it entails because I've just recently 
been turned down on joint physical cus 
On what bas s have you been turned down, 
Mr. Guzz 
MR. GUZZETTA: In my , it was predicated on my spouse's 
e custody, however, with a winger, and that is 
that two of the children also expressed that desire. 
I see, how many children are there alto-
? 
MR. GUZZETTA: There are three children. 
So you , perhaps ,that the court looked 
at the so-ca ests of the child? 
MR. GUZZETTA: Yes, and I have difficulty with that because 
I that the children were coerced into their ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: How old a.rc the children? 








MR. GUZZETTA: Well, if the judge doesn't go along with the 
order and does not give you a written reason why,so that it interferes 
with my field processes I understand it ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: And this case was tried in which county? 
MR. GUZZETTA: Orange County. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You asked for joint custody,and the 
case was tried before a judge after the enactment of Mr. Imbrecht's 
bill which changed the statutes as it relates to joint custody. 
MR. ZZETTA: That is correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: January 1, 1980. 
MR. GUZZETTA: The final came down August 19th. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: When did the judge first make a 
decision? 
MR. GUZZETTA: August 19th of this year. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Are you in Mr. Robinson's district? 
MR. GUZZETTA: Who's Mr. Robinson? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you live in his district? Is he your 
as 
MR. GUZZETTA: No. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Oh, scc,hc'd give you a free legal opinion 
if you were t! ( ) 
MR. GUZZETTA: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to share an opinion, 
and it's one that's just developing. Two years ago I didn't have any 
op In fact, lis to the testimony, I kept hearing over 
and over again the good intention of the participants, which in my mind, 
hold little or no water because they have never been there. If they have, 
then I want to hear their opinion. That doesn't mean I'm saying that 
someone can't comment, but it's kind of like the priest who used to give 
sexual advice. I'd like to know how did he do it if he hadn't experi-
enced it. I'm very serious in that regard. I could not begin to snare 
you the frustrations of ing through 14 months of seeing my 
children bounced around and expenditure of $24,000. To Mr. Stirling 
I would say that I'm of the opinion that my spouse and others, (I'm a 
middle upper income level, according to numbers) are very definitely 
against joint physical custody because she recognizes in her opinion 
that without sole custody she loses child support because, in fact, our 
incomes are comparable, that if we go to a joint physical custody then 
her position for spousal or child support is nonexistent. We both have 
homes to maintain so I think economics is very definitely something 
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witnesses at times, 
everyone a chance 
As for 
to extend their remarks or 
open for about - how long? 
the of next week, 
We want to make sure 
this record is complete so that Mr. Kapiloff and other members of the 
Legislature will have the benefit of the testimony we heard today and 
be able to review the record in writing and to make subsequent changes 
as appropriate to this legislation or other legislation on the subject 
of custody of children or their support. I'd like to conclude the 
hearing this afternoon. I thank all of you for your indulgence and 
patience. Thank you. 
# # # # # # 
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APPENDIX A 
California Association Marriage and Family Therapists 
13 October 1981 
The Honorable Lawrence Kapiloff 
State Assembly 
Room 5128, State Capital 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Assemblyman Kapiloff: 
The California Association of Marriage and Family Therapists supports 
your bill, AB 1706, regarding the awarding of joint child custody, in 
marital separation and/or dissolution cases. The major tenet of your 
bill is that "frequent and continuing contact with both parents" and 
sharing "the rights and responsibilities of child rea ng" enhances the 
child's development. This measure would mandate that joint custody 
be the first "order of preference according to the best interests 
of the child", thus soundly applying the major tenet upon which the 
State's public policy is based. 
We urge passage of this measure in light of the important role both par-
ents play in the child-rearing process. Al it, mandation alone does 
not guarantee that both parents will equally, fully and willingly 
involved in the continuing ild-rearing process. It does, however, 
compel the parents to mediate r differences vis a vis their off-
spring and develop a e an their bei raised. Likewise, 
it moves toward remov ng the child from the "negotiating table" as a 
by-product of the ma tal di cul es. 
Our over 4,500 member practitioners throughout the State work daily 
with couples and families in distress. The continuing role of the 
parents in a child's life is as essential after the break-up of the 
marriage as it is durin9 the marriage. We believe AB 1706 will bring 
families just one step closer to achieving more compatible dissolution 
relationships, in the same manner as they once worked toward building 
positive marital and family relationships. 
21ill:) Cumin" dd liio South. Suit(' 20H, San Diq.;o, CA \J2l0t-; • (714) 2!17-7121 
D. Stc·n·n Alt'xandn II. M. A 
CXI"rutitr Dirf'clor 
Gl,>l).(t" M Jacob'. \I.A 
J'r,·sidcn t 
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Page Two 
The Honorable Lawrence Kapiloff 
13 October 1981 
Again, we support this measure and look forward to its 
If I or our membership can be of further assistance, 
~~' : 
Sincerely, {L 
'-j .~\i. -) 
D. Steven Alexander II 
Executive Director 
DSA II:acm 
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PLEASE ADDRESS ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO 
P. 0. Box 1257 
Oc 9, 1981 San 1, CA 94915 
The Elihu M. Harris 
Committee on Judie 
Street, Room 820 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Ch Harris: 
The American of ial is 
a zation of attorneys founded to encourage 
the prac ce, elevate the standards 
and advance the cause of mat al law to the end 
that the welfare of the family and society be preserved. 
of The Northern Ca ifornia Chapter of 
the includes recognized leaders of the 
profession who emphasize the ce of family law. 
The Nor 
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October 9, 1981 
Page 2 
More importantly, AB 1706 is a g 
in that it focuses custody 1 on instead 
of the best interests of the children. circumstances, 
children inevitably become the pawns in ir 's struggle 
to prove that the other is unfit. ca ifor i is as it should 
be: Issues of custody and visita should decided on 
the basis of the best interests of the children. 
We respectfully request that this letter be read into 
and added to the record of your scheduled for 
October 14, 1981. Thank you. 
Respectful yours, 
Richard F. Barry 
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or placed in a foster home. The major difficulty with joint physical custody 
will be determining which parent (if either) is the caretaker relative -i.e., 
with whom does the child live? 
Federal. law and regulation assume that a child has but one caretaker relative. 
The child "lives with11 the relative who actua.l.ly assumes responsibility for 
day-to-day care and control of the child, regardless of the nature of any exist-
ing custody decree. 
In cases of joint physical custody, the determination of which parent is the 
caretaker relative will depend on the facts of each case. When it can be deter-
mined that the child 11lives with11 one parent, the 11visits11 to the other parent 
are temporary absences and do not interrupt eligibility regardless of the 
regularity of such 11visits 11 • When the child lives with each parent for a sub-
stantial period of time, the most reasonable approach is to consider that the 
child's "home" (and the caretaker relative) changes with the move. Where the 
child rotates from one parent to the other on an equal basis for short periods 
of time, it is not possible to designate one parent as the caretaker relative. 
The child would not be "visiting" one parent, but would be living with each 
parent. Consequently, it is doubtful that deprivation due to absence could be 
established. 
Under current federal law and regulation, a child in a short-term equal sharing 
situation may be considered: 
l. not "living with" a caretaker relative, or 
2. 11living with" each parent for the period of time pbysical.ly present 
in each parent's home, or 
3. 11living vith11 both parents 
Under situation one, there is no eligibility for the child. 
Under situation two, the county would be administratively unable to pay a correct 
monthly grant or issue the warrant to the correct payee where the "home" with each 
parent was for a period less than one month. Also, this situation ignores the 
issue of which parent should be included in the assistance payment. Even if each 
parent provided the home for a full month, the AFDC grant could not continue to a 
needy parent during the month the child is with the other parent. It is questionable 
if the needy parent could maintain the home without the AFDC grant. 
Situation three requires a very broad interpretation of the child's 11home 11 and the 
persons living in that "home". :Both parents would be included in the assistance 
unit with the income and resources of all family members considered. This is a 
viable alternative only where both parents are needy and only if deprivation can 
be based on unemployment or incapacity. If the child were considered to "live with" 
both parents (both parents would be considered the person who has physical custody) 
then the residence of the child is the residence of both parents. If the parents 
live in different counties or one parent lives out of state, the determination of 
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Assembly Judiciary Committee 
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In our work with extremely 
of divorce, my staff and I have been impres 
parents can learn to cooperate, with 
their underlying anger and hurts re1a 
experience, parents cooperate better 
unilateral legal or physical custody. 
which are used to manipulate, fight and resist 
can be turned toward structuring the best 
each parent with their children. 
AB 1706 heralds a new era for chil d vorce --
can get he1p from child development clinics 
issues around child rearing, scheduli , 
than such matters being decided completel in 
help us move towards evaluations and dec sions 
erase a parent, but instead will hel 
scheduling and 1ife•s activities whi 
their children. 
Thank you for your consideration and 
pendi legislation. 
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I am president of Fathers' Rights of 
California Family Law Coalition, and an 
Congress for Men. These are my quali 
issues on today's agenda. I would 1 
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carefully to provide 
In the sts of brevity, I would 1 findings of 
the principal research in lay terms. All that divorce is 
hard on children and certainly emotionally on divorc spouses. 
So there no panacea, including joint , that will make divorce 
painless and non-traumatic. Virtua all show that the mother 
has been sole custody of minor almost thout exception. 
Dad's wind up as weekend fathers, spossessed home ly, and 
the love and affection they knew as a the divorce. 
Studies show that children are best 
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Another major and conclusion that parents 
who are allowed to remain close to willingly 
take an the ir ldren. 
Research have been 
excluded as custodial who sometimes to count· 
clerks or post office boxes, soon distance themse their children. 
In a word, the presumption of a father creates the self-ful-
filling prophecy and spawns a weekend fathers. It should 
come as no se fathers close to children after 
divorce will take an active role nurturing 
of their children. 
SOME POPULAR MYTHS REGARDING FAMILY LAW 
Ask any lay person, 
child support and you 
ment about the nature 
would like to di 
MYTH 1.: If the 
of children, men, 
of the common 
alike. 
e can 
comment on j 
almost agree-
support. I 
held by lay 
when married, how can you 
expect them to agree on such 
are divorced. 






















friends, two sets 
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ment between two worlds. 
school and to 
schedule is comfortable and secure. 
MYTH 3.: Most men 
and it 
locator 
FACT: Most men do not 
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of the women actually 
full amount and another 
amounts). Only 28.4% 
shed flow of child 
senfranchisement 
ldren not their lack 
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MYTH 4.: Most men don't want to see the 
and don't avail themselves of the visitation 
divorce 
afforded them. 
FACT: Most men have a great need to be c to the children after 
divorce and feel that they are not see their children 
as often as they like. Further, their weekend father status, grant-
ing them visitation rights, often defined by the ex-wife, creates an 
emotionally difficult situation for many men. would like to see 
their children more often and in a more normal day-to-day setting. 
The role of weekend father simply does not the normal 
parenting routine and thus works against establi a relationship 
with the child. 
MYTH 5.: The laws, courtroom procedures, and the efforts of judges 
and attorneys are aimed at the "best interests of the child". 
FACT: The legal adversary system as it is presently implemented in 
California works against the best interests of the children. Fathers 
are systematically excluded from the of children after 
divorce, the laws focus upon child support col while overlooking 
enforcement of visitation rights, and do not deal the whole child 
or whole parent. Some of the greatest perpetrated on chil-
dren and fathers alike by our family law courts are done under the 
banner of "the best interests of the 
PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION WHICH SHOULD BE ADDRESSED 
IN FUTURE LEGISLATION 
1. The present joint custody law (cc 4600) is unclear 
While Section 4600.5 states that there is a pre 
is in the best interests of a minor where 
preferential list is confusing. The code should state 
be awarded jointly as the first presumption. It 
establish a rebuttable presumption of 
and confusing. 
that joint custody 
have , the 
that custody should 
1 that the law 
and not allow 
the present "joint or to either parent" to 
that most judges are failing to grant joint 
our observation 
and legal custody in 
spite of the preamble statement. 
AB 1706 would establish a rebuttable unless one of the parents 
is unfit. This key piece of legis make known to Californians 
that co-parenting is expected, in fact the law. It would not 
allow sole custody awards simply because a j felt was "the best 
interests of the child". .Z\B 1706 would reduce confl and make it known 
that neither party can use the children as a weapon to hurt the other. 
The way the law is presently written 1 are to go to court 
and to convince a judge that jo s the best of 
their children. Thus each custody becomes a slative 
session aimed at selling a judge on joint 1 and legal custody. In 
effect, each spouse is forced to pass law each time 
he appears in court. 
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2. A tern should tuted to ensure that judges are com-
plying with the law. 
percent of contested cases 
such seven 
j 
3. The legal 
sole custody. 
should encourage 
parent can frustrate 
the child, that is j 
the law is pre 
what research has 
cal and 
4. A custodial parent should not 
the children 
sent law permits 
frustrate all i 
paying child support 
cern to non-custodial 
state has proposed that 
jurisdiction is 
5. The present 
presumption of j 
information j 
available to divorcing spouses. 
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ties for disseminating 
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spouses are not told what is 
in the best interests of 
investigations that support 
results of studies and 
and 
6. The law should be to assure that there sion 
of community , not one in name 
either using court order 
possession of the fami 
liquid assets, 
not cash in, 
cannot agree, the 
proceeds 
an equal footing. 
7. There must be 
arbitration, and less upon 
tice of allowing spouses 
destructive courtroom battle, is disgraceful. 
attorneys who are schooled the 1 
by training and to deal 
components of divorce. More money must 
provided, for concil and mental health 
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The present prac-
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8. Visitation rights must be 
legal force as the collection 
there should be less reliance 
parenting, but where visitation awards have been 
that the district attorneys and courts 
with child support matters. 
9. The laws should be changed so that divorce 
present of awarding s fees to 
affluent party encourages the person who 
more law suits. Divorce litigation has 
Some controls must be put upon 
of emotionally distraught litigants. 
victimized by attorneys who do not seek 
sow discord in the dissolving 
10. Controls need to be placed 
who have used sometimes illegal, 
in col child support. We 
living clauses should be instituted in 
find their incomes have decreased because 
The state must begin to emphasize the needs 
concentrate only on the monetary 
11. slation needs 
dwell 
of any 
) . Many j 
of 
"fear" 
This is often done 
of violence, 
abusive conduct 
12. should be 
A is a powerful weapon 
law it is used as a tool to collect 
language or of emotional 
been cast jail and have become 
because have behaved 
\ve do not bel that 
there is real foundation for 
riate 
arena would be 
appropriate to 
mental 
to deal with 
by 
Finally, the slature must take 
forms (such as Family Law Petition 
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Assembly Committee on ary 
1127 11th Street - Room 820 
Sacramento, CA 958 
Oc 9' 
Re: Ass 
Dear Chairman Harris: 
The greatest injustice we can to 
mandate they be ected to 
is supposed to have eliminated. 
who can agree on such an ion 
mediation, has had a profound and 
the power struggle between 
vigorously explored the 
3,800 cases since 
In my 30 years 
struggle" is the 
The tug-of-war, 
used as a club with 
say there are not 
child, but the 
presses itself 
Harvard Medical S 
in custody disputes 
who's dynamics not 
are constantly twisted. 
of the parent's "emo 
continue the custody war 
remain the victims of 
For children, joint 
the awesome respons 
they find it is permiss 
From the parent's point , joint cus to 
with an atti of 
their children. Joint 
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Santa Ana, California 92702 
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It is co-parenting. Most of all, it is a commitment to 
that parents are forever. The canno late se 
In my experience, the adversary process 
anger of separation and divorce. 
or mandating joint physical custody 
agreeable, will aggravate that 
years of mandatory mediation in 
definite change in attitudes of 
custody arrangements are being 
the Coniliation Court Counselors 
the option with divorcing parents. 
such agreements because all of us are 
visitation orders agreed to by the 
chance of survival than those 
Joint custody as an option, is the 
'disastrous for a child is for that 
pain of watching parents fight. 
its nature, brings both parents 
with each other. For some, this contact 
both physical violence and emotional con 
joint custody is not for every family. 
ness generated by divorce is often too 
be considered. It must be used on 
the child will benefit rather than 
In my opinion, the existing law 
Pre-conceived ideas of fighting 
a cultural value and an archaic 
altered before the idea of 
The committee should keep in 
physical custody wi benefit 
90% of all divorces proceed wi 
Of the remaining mediation reso 
leaving less than of the ori 
the 1~% set tri 










,TESTIMONY BEFORE ASSEHBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
Testimony of Hugh Mcisaac, Director 
Los Angeles County Conciliation Court 
, October 14, 1981 
INTERIM HEARINGS ON FAMILY LAW ISSUES 
The answers to the question raised in your request for testi-
mony are perhaps best expressed in a short passage from Fathers 
Without Partners by Rosenthal and Keshet, which reports an extensive 
review of joint custody arrangements and favors joint custody. 
Joint Custody - is it for everyone? 
In our research we have become impressed by the 
positive consequences of joint custody arrangements-
the personal growth of the father, and the possibility 
of having two parents and two homes for the child, thus 
providing him or her with extra support and care. In 
fact, the publicity attending joint custody cases and 
the popularity of such arrangements have been on the rise. 
There need to be some special circumstances, however, 
which make joint custody workable, and it is important 
that these be considered. 
A small number . . . "in the legal and mental health 
professions have been recommending joint custody as a 
means of undoing the blanket lack of consideration for 
the rights of fathers often evidenced by the courts. This 
has made joint custody into a pseudo-political issue, and 
a rallying point for many angry and frustrated fathers who 
had been unable, for whatever reason, to arrive at a satis-
factory solution to their marital conflict either legally 
or informally. 
While we are in sympathy with the rights and needs of 
disenfranchised fathers, we feel strongl~ that the half-
time arrangements which we have described require special 
considerations. There may be other ways of ensuring the 
involvement of each parent, whether or not they have legal 
custody, which do not entail an actual division of the 
child's residency. Forcing a child to spend half-time 
with a parent (mother or father) who is ill suited for 
daily child'care can obviously be as detrimental to the 
child's well-being as having no contact at all. 
One of the major preconditions of a satisfactory joint-
custody arrangement is the possibility of developing and 
maintaining a cooperative relationship between the ex-
spouses. As is clear from our narratives of marital 
breakup, there is usually a great deal of mutual antagonism. 
No matter how civilized a couple wishes t& behave, how 
reasonable they are about their separation arrangements, 
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The experience of conciliation courts and family law courts 
throughout the stat; where joint custody is ordered against the 
wishes of one parent is that these orders do not work and the 
parents continue to fight. Continued fighting is certainly not in 
the best interest of the child. In addition, AB 1706 is unduly 
restrictive of the Court 1 s latitude in making a decision where 
parents are in conflict over the care and control of their children, 
and elevates parental rights over children's needs. In our view, 
this legislation would burden both the con liation and investigation 
units and would shift the emphasis on cooperation that now prevails 
under the present statute, to the old fault process of competition. 
The extreme standard of finding a parent unfit will introduce all 
the vitriolic and negative litigation, bringing out the worst in 
families, rather than the best, as each attempts to show the other 
party is unfit. 
Rather than making joint custody presumptive, another approach 
might be to provide educational opportunities for families to under-
stand the responsibilitiesinvolved in making a cooperative, or joint 
custody arrangement work. The attached pamphlet is an attempt to 
achieve this objective, and might be useful for all families with 
young children going through the process of divorce. In addition, 
our Conciliation Court has sponsored seminars for families going 
through the process of divorce. Our last seminar was attended by 
• over 450 persons. An educational approach seems to make a great 
deal of sense, and will help families develop the strength and 
skills required to make a joint custodial arrangement. It will 
also help them move beyond the negative intimacy that so often per-
If 
vades the early stages of the divorce process, to a more fruitful 
- 3 -
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and productive,emotional state that promotes cooperation and is 
truly in the best i~terest of children. 
The definitions contained in AB 2202 are very helpful and 
should be added to the law. 
In summary, the present joint custody legislation should be 
given a chance to work. More effort should be devoted to educa-
tion, helping families transit this experience, and research into 
the effects upo~ the present law on the lives of children before 
new laws. are adopted. The law should not establish a preference 
for any arrangement except the arrangement in the best interest of 
children. Since each family and child is so unique establishing 
a preference for the "preferred" way raises many more questions 
than answers. 
, 




YOUR CHILD NEEDS BOTH OF YOU 
Prepared by the Los Angeles Committee 
to Implement California's 
Joint Custody Statute 
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Q!uurt 
MARRiAGE AND FAMILY COUNSELING SERVICES 
5UPERl0t't COURT COUNTY 01" lOS AN<,Fl 
1H NORTH HILl STRrET_ ROOM LOS A.N<>El~S (A ~r;r>!1 
Dear Parent: 
Thi; pamphlet is desirJned to help you under· 
stand California's law regarding the needs of 
your children before, during, and after ciissolu-
tion. We hope this information is helpful to 
you. 
Wh<'H' cllild1"n aw 1nvolv<~d. drv<liC<' <'> nol 
!lw '"'d oi your lamliy, II IS I<~<H'Jdlll/diiOII 
Much will be gained your working toqether 
as parents to help your children become caring, 
responsible adu Its. 
This pamphlet was prepared by a committee 
of judges, mental health professionals, 
attorneys, and parents with years of experience 
in working with parents goinq thmuqh the 
process of divorce. The task of ail parents, 
whether or not, their marriage continues, is a 
responsible one. if you have a good relationship 
with your children and they feel your love and 
acceptance, they will thrive and grow. 
Sincerely, 
Judge 
Family Law Departrnent 
& Conciliation Court 
COOPERATIVE PARENTING 
PAMPHlET 
Divorce is not the end of a family. It is a 
reorganization. Children benefit enormously 
when the parents cooperate. Children can be 
injured when the parents do not cooperate. 
This pamphlet will make it easier to cooperate 
by briefly explaining the law and giving you 
some guidelines to make it work for your 
family. 
Trained and experienced family counselors 
are in the community and in the Court who 
may give you as much help as you need to 
make a custody arrangement for your family. 
WHAT IS THE lAW? 
The law gives you the opportunity to make 
your own custody plan, or if the two of you 
cannot agree, either of you can suggest your 
plan to the Court. If the two of you make a 
custody plan which follows the guidelines in 
the law, the Judge will accept your plan. If you 
cannot agree to a plan which follows the guide· 
lines after conferences with a Conciliation 
Court counselor, the Judge will make the 
decision. 
The basic rule in child custody is that the 
plan must be in the best interest of the child, 
including consideration of the child's individual 
abilities and needs. Although the parents are 
divorced, the declared public policy of the state 
is to assure children frequent and continuing 
contact with both parents and to encourage 




a nutshell, are the 
You may have read, heard about, "joint 
custody," and are wondering whether it will 
work for are many different 
kinds of arrangements, which 
involves the children, and 
sharing equal of 
time may arrangement for your 
family depending needs and capacities 
of your children. custody plan 
may allow for the to spend more time 
with one parent, although both parents 
continue to share the major decision-making 
responsibility the children. If the 
judge decides to award custody to one parent, 
among other factors, the judge will consider 
which parent is more likely to allow the 
children frequent and continued contact with 
the other parent. 
Whether your custody plan is joint custody, 
or sole custody to one parent and visitation to 
the other parent, both parents are entitled to 
equal access to children's medical, dental, 
school and other records. 
Remember that it is in your child's best 
Jnterest that each parent has frequent and 
continuing contact with your child. This is 





describes how parents 
regardless of the 
The main 
best for your 
may be found in 
of the Civil Code. 
have this volume. 
WHAT ARE THE NEEDS OF 
PARENTS IN THE DISSOLUTION 
PROCESS? 
The process of divorce from the painful 
moment parents decide to end their marriage to 
the actual physical separation of family 
members - and afterward - is emotionally and 
financially stressful on everyone in the family: 
mother, father, and children. 
Parents are often angry, hostile toward each 
other, and unhappy during the dissoulution and 
each may think that his or her suffering is 
deeper and more longlasting than that of the 
other. Each parent may be .experiencing a 
sudden wrenching apart and loss of a lifestyle 
that had been built over a period of years and 
that had served as an anchor to his, or her, life. 
Both parents are likely to feel abandoned and 
frightened about the future. The physical 
separation may leave both unsure of themselves 
and concerned over what the divorce may mean 
for their children. 
Parents often face a new position as single 
parents in their community and the necessity 
of trying to build a new life, frequently with 
no one to turn to for support. Women who 
have not maintained a job outside the home in 
addition to that of being a homemaker and 
parents are faced with the task of building a 
new career, a new identity, and providing for 
their own support. When the mother has the 
entire task of raising the children, she may 
feel this responsibility is an awesome burden. 
Sometimes, having to cope with all these tasks 
at the same time becomes so overwhelming that 
some parents stay angry and depressed. Many 
may even find it very difficult to begin the task 
of rebuilding their lives. 
3 
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The trauma fathers often experience can be 
equally painful. Earnings which may have been 
enough for one household, especially a one-
income family, may not be enough for two 
homes. Fathers may find ·this increased 
financial burden very difficult. In addition, 
most parents look to their family for the 
closeness, warmth, and nurturing in their lives. 
It is difficult and depressing for parents who 
leave the household after divorce to be 
suddenly alone in a strange place after having 
been surrounded for years by the warmth of 
the home and children. For parents whose 
former spouse moves out of the house and who 
may be unaccustomed to household and day-to-
day parenting duties, adjusting to this 
unfamiliar lifestyle can be overwhelming and 
bewildering. On the other hand, parents 
fathers, or mothers, and especially those who 
have been involved in day-to-day care and 
nurturing of their children, find that separation 
from their children can be particularly painful 
for both the absent parent and their children. 
Since each parent feels lonely, depressed and 
abandoned, they cling to the children and have 
trouble sharing them with each other. Each 
parent feels that contact with the children is a 
protection against the terrible loneliness and 
isolation while they are adjusting to their new 
lives. This is normal and understandable. The 
problem is that it is not the best thing for the 
children since it creates in them the feeling that 
they are desperately needed by each parent and 
the children feel a conflict because of loyalty to 
both parents. 
Although it may be very difficult at a time 
when both parents are feeling hurt and angry, 
both parents need to try to stop blaming each 
other for what went wrong with the marriage, 
4 
mourn its loss, and begin to work cooperatively 
toward a new and more successful relationship 
as parents of their children. Family counseling 
can be of help to divorcing parents in terms of 
understanding and coping with the stress which 
all members of the family feel at the time of 
the dissolution. 
Some parents are afraid of "losing the child" 
in a joint custody arrangement. On the 
contrary, cooperative parenting should 
encourage mutual support and continuing 
contact with the children and does not mean 
"losing the child." In fact, custody may 
even make the job of less stressful 
because it is shared. 
5 
trouble sleeping or eating for a brief time, or 
seem withdrawn after being with one parent 
and the shifting to the othl!r. This stress and 
unhappiness shown by the child does not 
necessarily mean one or both parents are not 
doing a good job of taking care of their 
children It means that this is a particularly 
important time when children need the comfort 
and support of both parents working together 
to ease the strain on everybody while all 
members of the family go through the process 
of reorganizing their lives. It takes patience, 
open communication -and time -for children 
as well as adults, to adjust to such significant 
changes. 
Parents can greatly help their children by 
trying to understand each child's individual 
needs and abilities at a particular age. Children 
need to be as free as possible from the 
bitterness and resentments that may continue 
to exist between fathers and mothers who are 
divorcing. The best way to do this is for parents 
to keep from making negative remarks about 
the other parent in front of the children, or 
blaming the other for the divorce. Working 
together cooperatively as parents - which is 
what is truly meant by "joint custody" -may 
lessen the danger of long-term harm to your 
children from your divorce, and may help speed 
up the process for both parents and their 
children to feel good about themselves again. 
7 
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DEVELOPING A COOPERATIVE 
PARENTING PLAN 
Finding new ways to resolve disagreements 
over child custody issues takes time, it takes a 
commitment from both mother and father and 
it may take help from others who understand 
the difficulties in learning to cooperate as 
parents when couples cease to be spouses. 
Agencies such as the Conciliation Court, family 
counseling agencies, divorce family clinics or 
parenting workshops are to help parents develop 
a cooperative parenting arrangement. 
Suggested steps for developing a cooperative 
parenting plan: 
1. Sit down and identify the needs of your 
children, which are different from your 
needs. 
2. Think of your role as parents, not as 
spouses, and try to separate feelings of anger 
and hurt to keep them from interfering with 
making decisions as parents. Seek help if you 
cannot. 
3. Review what you have done together as 
parents that worked. 
4. Develop an arrangement that continues this 
plan where it was successful and provides 
continuous, ongoing contact with both 
parents. Put it in writing. 
5. Think in units of time - work, school, 
vacation, and where possible, share the 
responsibility for your children's care 
around these natural transitions, as well as 
other responsibilities, such as dental, medical 
appointments, etc. 
6. Establish a pattern that works and follow it, 
but be flexible if situations change without 
insisting on a "fifty-fifty" division. 
7. Communicate regarding important events in 
8 
your child's life, or in you own life that may 
affect 
Develop talk over problems 
other parent without 
Be sure share 
parent may not have seen. 
9. Anticipate change and plan for it. Your 
will require you to do so. 
Work to adapt plan to your child's 
needs. 
10. Problems are bound to arise; when things go 
focus "what is wrong" not 
"who is wrong." 
11. Bury the past, and deal primarily with today 
and tomorrow. Try to consider everyone's 
needs, but make your decisions in what 
interest of children. 
INFORMATION 
Contact your attorney, the Los Angeles 
Conciliation Court, 974-5524, or any 




Joint Way Endthe 
are 
visit, not even in 
life goes not back· 
You are the 
arrows 
Kahlil Gibran 
October 14, 1981 
Elihu M. Harris, Chairman 
Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
Room 820 
11th and L Building 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Mr. Harris: 
APPENDIX I 
1600 Scott Street 
San Francisco, California 94115 
(415) 567-8860 
As director of the Joint Custody Study Project of Jewish Family & Children's 
Services in San Francisco, I would like to share with The Assembly Committee 
on the Judiciary certain findings pertinent to your consideration of AB 1706, 
as I believe passage of this legislation would be extremely premature at this 
time. The Joint Custody Study Project was funded from 1978-1980 by The San 
Francisco Foundation to explore how joint custody was actually working for 
parents and children. 
We studied 24 families with 32 children ranging in age from 4! to 15 years. 
We examined the psychological experience of these children living in dual-
home joint custody arrangements over a number of years. These were families 
in which the parents had mutually agreed to joint custody prior to California's 
joint custody law (AB 1480), and who were strongly committed to the arrange-
ment. Their decision was congruent not only with their values, their psycholo-
gical needs and their reliltionships with their children, but also with their 
life and work styles. 1\mong the chilracteristics most important to maintain-
ing this cooperative relationship were: 1) trust and mutual respect between 
parents; 2) a track record of cooperative parenting during the marriage; 
3) congruency of child-rearing values; 4) the capacity to control their 
anger; and, 5) a strong value placed on the child having two involved pa-
rents. These parents were generally satisfied with the joint custody and 
had been successful in maintaining a cooperative, smooth-running arrangement 
over a number of years. 
The children's experience of their joint custody situation was more mixed 
than that of their parents. The beneficial dimensions of joint custody for 
these children across the board were: 1) the message that both parents 
loved and wanted them, and went to a great deal of effort to jointly care 
for them; 2) the cessation of conflict between their parents; 3) access to 
both purents. 
Constituent Member of the Jewish Welfare Federation and the United Way of the Bay Area 






AB 1480 is still quite new. I believe we should allow time for more parents 
to make use of the , and to study the effects of 
arrangements on different children and families so that social 
be based on more data, can be 
dispassionately. We have a responsibility to the children of divorcing 
parents in California to assess the effects of this 
before presuming it is in their best interest. 
I would be very glad to further information to the Comrrtittee in consider-
ing the issue of joint custody. 
Susan Steinman, DSW 
Director Joint Project 
SB 
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62 DOES JOINT CUSTODY WORK? 
Work? A First k 
BY FREDERIC W. JR., M.D., HOLLY ZINGALE ILFELD, 
AND JOHN ALEXANDER, J.D. 
Joint with both divorced parents sharing child-
rearing is a recent and controversial 
phenomenon. To the authors' knowledge there have been 
no published outcome studies establishing its 
efficacy. The authors present data on 414 consecutive 
custody cases in a Los Angeles court over a 2-year period, 
rates (indicative of post divorce 
parental and joint custody. ln those 
cases which were returns to court, the proportion of 
relitigation was one-half that q( 
exclusive suggesting that joint custody is 
arrangement in terms of reduced 
J oint has been a partial solution for the deleterious on children of the 
number of divorces others have felt 
that effective child joint 
there are critical flaws in shared 
A great deal of controversy exists on 
agree on 
data about the effects 
which to base their arguments. The 
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139:1, January 1982 
compare the 
after an initial 
(276 fam-
To our knowl-
Am 1 Psychiatry 139:/, January 1982 
parent only and advocated that the custodial parent, 
not court~ or the noncustodial , should retain 
the right to determine when and if visitation will occur. 
Benedek and Benedek have !here 
be some benefits to joint 
any evidence they cautioned about several presumed 
risks of joint parenting. 
Several longitudinal clinical studies have looked at 
children of divorce and arrived at conclusions 
ive of joint custody. In a of 60 families 
with 130 children in Marin County (California), Wal-
lerstein and Kelly found that divorce might be 
beneficial for the adults but not for the children. The 
psychological relationship between the child and each 
of his original parents did not diminish in emotional 
importance to the child over the study, 
less of the degree of visitation of the noncustodial 
parent. Their findings pointed to the of the 
child's continuing relationship with both parents dur-
ing the postdivorce years whereby each parent would 
be responsible for and genuinely concerned with the 
child's well-being. They felt that the hazard 
which divorce posed to the psychological health of the 
children was in the disruptive or diminished parenting 
that might be consolidated within the postdivorce 
family arrangements, such as a functional absence of 
one parent and an overburdening of responsibility on 
the custodial parent. Thus the postdivorce arrange-
ments of continuing contact between the children and 
both parents seemed to be most important for the long-
term outcome of the children. Both Wallerstein and 
Kelly (8) and Heatherington and associates (9) have 
further acknowledged the economic, social, and psy-
chological vulnerability of the typical family in which 
divorce has occurred, i.e., a family with one custodial 
parent and one noncustodial parent. 
Another source has been case histories of 
those pioneering families who have joint 
custody. These have done this against 
familial and legal opposition and were few in number 
before the California law of 1980. Several authors(!, 
3, 10-12) have taken an in-depth look at the arrange-
ments these families have made and the effects O[l the 
children. Ofthese studies Steinman's ( 12) is the most 
extensive. She examined the and of 
living in a joint custody for children aml 
parents of 24 San Francisco area families. On the 
basis of two clinical semistructured interviews with 
each family member, she explored issues of parental 
relationships, time-sharing, finances, loyalty to each 
parent, confusion of the children, problems of geo-
graphical distance, and school and She 
concluded that these children had access to both 
parents and felt that both parents loved and wanted 
them. However, about one-third of the children felt 
overburdened by the demands and requirement~ of 
two homes and the need to maintain a presence 
in both homes. A major drawback to Steinman's study 
ILFELD, 
sive custody families. 
of success of 
exclusive 
studies included 
parents did not agree 
question of 
remains unanswered. 
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arrangement, so the 
for unconsented joint custody 
Within the past few months 
able his data the in emotion-
over boys in 
exclusive custody (E. doctoral 
dissertation, 1981, California Graduate Institute, 1100 
Glendon Ave., Los Calif. 90024). His quasi-
four groups of 20 boys 
each (age range, 5-13 in the following 
situations: and exclusive arrangements 
and intact families with and unhappy marriages. 
Throe different tools were used to assess the hoys: the 
Louisville Behavior Checklist (parent's rating), the 
Inferred Self-Concept Scale (teacher's rating), and the 
California Test of Personality (child's rating). Boys of 
were better emotionally 
adjusted than boys of exclusive and of the 
unhappily married group on the scale of the 
Louisville Behavior Checklist and on the 
Inferred Scale , one-way analysis 
of variance). Joint boys had higher personal 
adjustment scores on the California Test of Personality 
than did exclusive but the difference 
between the two groups short 
at the 
of exclusive in intact 
families with found no 
differences on any of the fhree tests. 
Comparing the outcomes of several different types 
of will be the task of this paper, for we have 
collected data on parental con-
among both joint and 
We assume that relitiga-
are in conflict with 
one another and !hal conflict strong enough to 
bring them to the courts has adverse effects on the 
children. in -,horL conflict im-
trouhle for !he children. While we realize that 
one indicator of whether custody 
works well tor the children. it does seem to be an 
objective measure parental conflicts. 
In this our show a clear superiority of 
joint custody over exclusive custody. A subset of our 
sample ( 18 cases) is a rather controversial group--
those familie~ who have been awarded joint custody 
withoU! the consent of both parents. Although small in 
number, this 1s an group, for it 
speaks to the of whether joint custody can 
work even when one of the has this form of 
custody forced on him or her by court mandate. Even 
in this subsample we found the amount of post divorce 
39-
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conflict to be no than that in the exclusive 
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for answer to the 
the coauthors (J.R.A.) 
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suggesting (tentatively, due to the small sample size) 
that unconsentedjoint custody is no more disruptive in 
terms of parental conflict than exclusive 
Furthermore, of the 6 relitigations, 2 were settled out 
of court by agreement of the parties involved. 
DISCUSSION 
Over a period of 2 years the West District Depart-
ment J of the Los Angeles County Superior Court had 
414 consecutive custody cases, two-thirds inv.elving 
exclusive custody and one-third joint custody. ln 
those cases which were returns to court, the propor-
tion of relitigation for joint custody families was one-
half that of exclusive custody families. From our 
preliminary study (including a small subsample in 
which joint custody was decreed without the consent 
of one of the parents), we conclude that the custody 
arrangement most beneficial in terms of lack of subse-
quent parental conflict is joint custody. !Of wur~e. 
time-sharing and other specific arrangements will vary 
according to the circumstances of each family.! 
An alternative interpretation of our finding'> is that 
the courts awarded joint custody to those parents who 
appeared more able to cooperate without court super-
vision, thus predisposing to a lower relitigation rate for 
joint custody. Since the precise basis of the court's 
decision is not known, we cannot directly test this 
interpretation. However, our data, which show that a 
higher proportion of exclusive custody awards were 
based on parental agreement than was the case for 
joint custody awards (91% versus 86%), do not sup-
port this interpretation. 
We make two assumptions in drawing conclusion'> 
from these data. First, following evidence from Wal-
lerstein and Kelly (8), we assume that problems with 
children's adjustment atler divorce are due more to the 
postdivorce arrangement and amount of conflict than 
to the divorce itself. Second, we assume that relitiga-
tion over a custody issue represents moderate to 
severe parental conflict that adversely all'ech the 
children. Given these assumptions, our findings and 
those of Pojman carry suggestions for future re"carch 
and perhaps for social policy and family law. Consid-
ering that the best interests of the children are fore-
most, all professionals should recognize a strong. 
positive indication for joint custody. Unless future 
data persuasively contradict our and Pojman · s find-
ings, the burden of proof that joint custody would not 
be in a child's best interests should be on the parent 
requesting sole custody. 
In addition to our relatively short follow-up period, 
other limitations of the data point the way for future 
investigations. To begin with, we have not examined 
the children firsthand. Furthermore, we have no infor-
mation on how each family put the custody order into 
practice. For instance, how did joint custody familie' 
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allocate between the two homes'! How 
much visitation with the noncustodial parent occurred 
in the exclusive families? Were both parents 
involved in decision more in joint custo-
dy than exclusive arrangements? To what 
extent was a written formulated and made a part 
of the court mandate? Such information would be 
important in determining the components of joint 
custody that make it more workable than exclusive 
custody. 
Beyond the made by each 
family, other factors, such as level of income: race or 
ethnicity: age<.;, sex. and number of children; and 
geographic proximity of the may well inRu-
ence the success of a particular custody arrangement. 
In future studies such factors as these need to be taken 
into account in assessing outcome. In addition. any 
future study should extend at least 2 years beyond the 
initial custody decision to ensure adequate time for 
follow-up. We plan to continue monitoring the present 
sample of eu~tody cases if they reappear in the Santa 
Monica court to sec whether the trends reported 
herein continue to hold, and we hope to have a future 
report on such long-term, follow-up data. We hope 
that other investigators will collect comparative data 
on different custody arrangements and that future 
social policy and family law will be based on such 
factual information rather !han on historical prece-
dent, social hypothetical speculation. or the 
adversarial milieu of the system. 
Further research needs to document the eltects of 
custody on and on the chil-
dren. As for which factors of cu-;tody arrange-
ment lead to a successful outcqme, we have our 
own hypothe'>es based on others' and our own clinical 
experience, which be tested in future studies. 
First, we that the more the time-
between the parents. the better the chance for 
successful outcome the children. Second. we antic-
ipate that a mandated written plan covering the 
common is~uc;; fa..:ed in decision making. -.uch as 
that suggc;,tcd (I), should prove more 
beneficial than such guidelines unstated. A 
part of ~uch a plan include, for example, defined 
actions such li~ted as cohabi-
tation, remarriage, or one parent's move from the 
area. Third, the children ~hould do better the closer 
the parents live to one another, especially if they are in 
the same school district. Last, we hypothesize that 
those joint cu~tody familie~ should do better who have 
agreed to (or had mandated the court) a process of 
mediation and arbitration specified for m<~ior decisions 
when family consensus cannot be reached. This last 
point sugge..,ts a changing role for mental health pro-
fessionals in custody decisions and deserves further 
comment. 
Until now mental health professionals have partici-
pated in the custody process a~ expert consllitanh 
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(13). In the adversarial arena of the legal system we 
have had to assess the family and recommend a choice 
between the two parents. With no-fault decisions. in 
which custody is retained fum.:tiona!ly hy both father 
and mother, we may lose this role of court consultant 
and evaluator. (An important exception occurs when 
one or both parents may be abusive to the child.) 
However, we may gain several new functions. First, 
we can help the separating family to develop a joint 
custody arrangement that meets that family's needs. 
Outside of the win/lose atmosphere of the courh. a 
divorcing couple should lind it easier to work through 
the details of a custody plan when assisted by the 
skilled coilahoration of counselors and lawyers. Sever-
al multidisciplinary clinics oriented to this primary 
prevention function of counseling for divorce and 
custody have already started in California. A second 
potential function for mental health professionals is 
that of mediator and arbitrator when the parents and 
children in a joint custody arrangement cannot agree 
on major decisions. Whether an arbitration clause is 
agreed to by both parents and/or mandated by court 
judgment, this measure will provide a partial way to 
resolve parental conflict without returning to the court 
system, which drains economic resources and fo'iters 
more contlict. New role-; such a" these need to he 
explored and developed as mental health profe.,sionals 
(lalpe• 
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I. STUD1ES AVVRESSING THE ISSUE THAT JOINT CUSTODY IS PRESUMABLY IN THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF THE CH1LV ANV THAT THE BURDEN OF PROUF THAT JOINT CUSTOVY WOULV NOT BE IN A 
CHILD'S BEST 1 NTEREST SHALL BE UPON Tfi[ PARENT REQULSTING SOL[ CUSTODY;. 
Waile.JL~.>:te~t. a.nd Kelly - ..Lo :the. ma.jo'L f>:tudy o6 c.IW.dflen ufl dJ.voflc.e - 131 chJ-i'dflen; 5 rr'l ~.; 
eondudv., :th.a:t '':the. JLe.l£LtioMiup and pbyehoiogic.a.J: Jmpotltanc.e between .the. c.luJ'd rwd 
both o!Uginai pMen:t..6 did not dJ.mA.n..L6h in emo:tuma.f i.mpoJt..ta.nc.e to thl.' ctuf.d 
ove.JL 5 ye.aJLf>." "Taken a.f> a whoie ou!t t)Jnd.i.ng6 poi.nt to Uw. .i.flabi.tdy 
o6 :the. chJ!d' .& co~nu.Lng netatioMhA_p w..Lth both pMe.n..t~ duJU.ng :the. po.:,;t:-d;votzce 
yeaJLf> in an a!L!Langement wh.Lc.h e.nabie;., each pMe.n..t -to be Jte-OpoMJ.bie 6otr. and 
ge.nuineiy c.onc.e.Jtned with the. we.U-bun.g o6 the chJ.e.dtr.en.. 11 
~que. o 6 Will ellA .tun' .& .e etteJt .to E.U.hu H ~ o t\ May 7 • 1 98 1 --
.otate-6 that .the.Jte. i.6 no -'!.Me.a!tc.h bhow-i.ng tha.t joA..nt c.u.!J.tody .i.J.J a beA';te/L evurangement 
6oJL ail ch.Lidne.n in dA.vohcing 6a.m..L£i.e/6. Th.i.6 {6 a m.{J.>..Cvde!rp.'letat.i.on o{J A.B. 1106 
.t>incethe. bill .opec~M.e.}.. o:the/1 uptiml6 be..6{deo Joint r!l6tody ohou.fd they be {n 
-the chJld' .6 be-O.t A.rdeJLM:t. 
d'aJ.m.o the/I.e Me no .otudJ.eJ.J o6 ju.int cuHodu Ju>cutzd<Hn <~uccclde& and {Jai.fuflr.6. Siuce 
heA May ietteJ!. :the. U6eld/Afexande!r and the PoJman &tud<.e_.o have been p!tCI.le.nteJ 
.thax do indeed a.f>Je.M .ouccV->.6 and 6a..Ltuhe o 6 j oA.n..t Ste..inman' 0 
.t>.tudy i.6 not the. oniy one. o6 a.Me.Mme.nt o6 :the c.h.LidJum (.oee Po 
c.iairn.& young c.hld'Le.n may be .thoubted bu thr_ c.han9e ..Cn envi.Jronment, hen own 
concl.u.t>~OM empha.f>.ize. the ~ac.t young clt.ifdtten af6o m'ed eon.t{nlli¥19 runtact wit/1 
bo-th pMe.n.U . 
he.JL c.o-au.thoJL, Joan Ke.U.y, fuagfl.eeJ.J w.Uh hell about both pMenU lwvJng to agJt.ee. 
that the.Jte be. joint cu6tody 6oft j oA.nt C£M:tody to ac.tua.Uy woJtk, 
note .that the W/K .o:tudy .t>how.& :the h.<gh amoun..t o6 damage to c.hJ.id'Le.n o6 dJ.voJtce. 
ail ofi whom wette. in ~oie c.!l6tody MMngeme.n..t-6. 
Steinman - a good e.xamina:Uon o6 :the expefl..Le.nce and J.mpa.c.t o6 R.iv.i_ng in a jo~n-t c.!l6tudy 
.oUua.tion 6o!t patr.en:t.6 and chJid!!e.n. 
P!tabiem.t>: 1) dov., not have a c.ompa!lMon gJtoup o6 Mie c!l6:tody 6a.miUM to compMe 
outc.ome..6 6oJt join..t v.o . .oote eu~.~:tody. 
2) JLe.ac.he-O c.on.d!l6JoM thax a.lt e umlJMJLented by hM data .oueh a.f> the. (.,ac.t 
.tha.t ma.,Ut:ta...ln..Lng a l.l.thong p!LMenc.e. in both homeJ.J .La a phobiem -in 
joint c!l6:tody. Might not :tiU.o i.o.oue o6 l!..oya.J:-ty and con6!!6ion be 
ovpn g!te.a.te.JL A_n .oote cul.tod!f a!L!LW19eme.nt.6 than -in nt e!l6todu? 
Ta.kel> :the. attitude. :tha.t j .c. ne.ed.o mo!te ~.;,;tudy be601te we. 11 embJta.c.e ..Lt a.f> 
a b!!oadiy applicable policy." TIU.o concl.u.o~on doe..o not a;t aU t)oH.ow 
6JLom heJt. data. lndeed, ~.>he. eahUVl ac.lmowiedge..o -the phove.n 6auf.U, 
a6 .t>oie eu6:tody {fuJtupUon o6 !te£a.U.on6hip wdh 6atheJL) and thevt 
demo~thiL:te..o with heh da;ta. the. g e.rH?Aaily po~d~ve outcome. o 6 j u..int 
c.w.dody J.n :tha-t "the c.hud'Len weAe. a.,Uached and had b:{·}wng R.oyaf! ttr 
to bo:th ( pM e.n:t 6 l . " 
NOH THAT NO DATA OR FACTS ARE PRESlNHV LW OPPONENTS OF A.B. 1706 IN THEIR LETTERS 
TO ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOfr.~ THEY PROVIDE NO QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE THAT ARGUES AGAINST 
THE PRESUMPTION OF JOINT CUSTOVY. MOREOVER, AS JUVGES OR CONCILIATION COURT COUNSELORS, 
THEY HAVE ACCESS TO LARGE CASE SAMPLES THAT COULV PROVE THEIR POINTS, BUT THEY GIVE 
NONE OF TH1S INFORMATION 1N A QUANTITATIVE MANNER (ONLY IN AN 1MPT<ESSION1STIC MANNER). 
U6el.d/Aie.xande.JL - !.lee. attached :te.x:t o6 the. 6-tu.dy 
fiindA.ngl.:- joint c.Mtody ha-t> ha£.6 the. hMe. o 6 he..Utigation :than Mie c!l6tody. 
-uneoMe.nte.d jain.t c.Mtody hiL!> :the. !.lame. Jta;te o6 he.iili_gation 0-.b .6o£e. cu&tody. 
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an order aw,mrdinll 
both parents and 
shared the parents in such a way as to assure the child or 
children of frequent and contact with both parents; 
provided, that such order may award legal cus-
tody without awarding joint physical custody.• 
19 
joint custody the court must 
presume rrang~~m1mt to the interests of the 
child(ren).s When has for joint 
custody, the court reasons for 
denial of an award of 
sole custody is "the court 
among other factors, which parent is more 
the child(ren) frequent and continuing contact 
noncustodial parent. "11 
Until passage of California was governed, 
as most states to by a statute 
providing that custody awarded following order of 
preference: (1) to either according to best inter-
ests of the child; (2) to person(s) whose home the 
child has been living a wholesome and stable environ-
ment; and (3) to any other person or persons deemed by the 
court to be suitable and able to provide adequate and 
proper care and guidance for the child. The exclusive pos-
session of children by one parent after divorce is a vener-
able tradition in the Western world; however, the view of 
which parent is to be preferred custodian changed 
in response to changes prevailing psychological theory 
and in the economic division labor. In the nineteenth 
century, for children were viewed as part of a fa-
ther•s property; thus fathers were preferred as exclusive le-
gal custodians after divorce: 
As to the question of the of a father to have custody of his 
infant child, in a sense it is true. But this is not an ac-
• ld. at 4600.5(c}. 
• ld. at § 4600.5(a). 
• ld. at 4600.5(b). 
• ld. at § 4600(b)(l). 
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count of any absolute right but for the benefit of the infant, the 
law presuming it to be for hie interest to be under the nur-
turance and care of his natural protector, both for maintenance 
and education.• 
215 
With the Industrial Revolution and the increasing sex-
ual division of labor, Victorian women became the idealized 
protectors of children, family life and familial values: 
"There is but a twilight zone between a mother's love and 
the atmosphere of heaven, and all things being equal, no 
child should be deprived of that maternal influence.'"'~ In 
more modern times the combined influences of psychoana-
lytic theory, maternal deprivation research and the contin-
ued division of sex roles have perpetuated the practice of 
awarding women exclusive custody of children after divorce. 
Pressures to change this view of children's best interests in 
divorce have their roots in at least two sources. The impe-
tus for change comes in part from recent psychological 
studies which show the detrimental effects, on both chil-
dren and parents, of postdivorce parental conflict and sole 
custody arrangements. These studies represent a shift in 
scientific interest and emphasis from the inherent trauma 
of the divorce experience to a study of external variables 
which affect response and adjustment to divorce-such as 
the nature of the adjudication process and the structure of 
the custodial arrangement itself. Other major sources of 
change are the legal profession's mounting ambivalence to-
ward its Solomonic task of choosing between fit parents and 
the practical inability of the courts to process the increasing 
numbers of custody disputes. 
II. THE SHIFT IN SciENTIFIC REsEARCH 
Most studies on the impact of divorce give lip service 
to the idea that divorce is not experienced in the same way 
by all families. Most divorce research, however, has en-
dorsed the assumption that divorce is inherently traumatic 
• United States v. Green, 26 F. C11.11. 30, 31-32 (D.R.I. 1824). 
1 Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203, 206 (Mo. App. 1938). 
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and that an intact nuclear family is the ideal environment 
in which to raise children.8 Data gathered primarily from 
clinical populations have been used to support theoretical 
models which analogize the divorce process to mourning• 
and to attachment and separation anxiety. HI Both of these 
models focus on the psychological impact of divorce and ex-
plain behavior by comparing divorce to other stressful life 
transitions. 
In more recent years studies have begun to examine 
critically the assumption that divorce is inherently trau-
matic. Many intervening variables have been suggested as 
affecting the extent to which divorce is damaging, including 
the organization of postdivorce custody arrangements.11 
The family interaction model suggests, for example, that 
new patterns of communication and interaction between di-
vorced parents, their children and any new family members 
have an impact beyond any individual's psychological 
response. 12 By pointing to the effects of the postdivorce 
environment as a critical factor in the response to di-
vorce, Gardner13 also supports the premise that divorce 
per se need not produce psychopathology. Roman14 and 
AbarbanePG describe the methodological shortcomings in 
• See, e.g., Derdeyn, Child Custody Contests in Historical Perspective, 133 
AM. J. PSYCH. 1369-76 (1976). 
8 See generally R. GARDNER, PsYCHOTHERAPY WITH CHILDREN OF DIVORCE 
(1976); F. Haja, Reconstituted Families in Family Therapy (unpublished paper 
cited in A. Abarbanel, Joint Custody Families: A Case Study Approach (1977) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, California School of Professional Psychology)); 
R. WEISS, MARITAL SEPARATION (1975). 
•• See generally H. GINOTT, BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD (1965) and ExPLAIN-
ING DIVORCE TO CHILDREN (E. Grollman ed. 1969). 
11 Trombetta & Lebbos, Co-Parenting: Everyone's Best Interest, 17 CONCILI-
ATION CouRTs REV. 13-25 (1979). 
" Broderick, Beyond the Five Conceptual Frameworks: A Decade of Devel-
opment in Family Theory, 33 J. MARR. & FAM. 139 passim (1971). See also M. 
RoMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT 48 passim (1979). 
" See generally R. GARDNER, supra note 9. 
,. M. RoMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 12, at 48-54. 
•• A. Abarbanel, Joint Custody Families: A Case Stydy Approach (1977) (un-
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19 
is 
.. Wallerstein & Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the 
Child in Early Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 20-32 (1976). 
u Weiss, The Emotional Impact of Marital Separation, 32 J. Soc. Issul!8 
135-46 (1976). 
•• See, e.g., Well-Being During 
Marital Separation, AMERICAN WAY 
or DIVORCE: PuaCR!I'TIONs FOR (1975); R. Wsrss, MARITAL SEPARATION 
(1975); Wallace, Mazeway Disintegration: Individual's Perception of Socio· 
Cultural Disoraanization, 16 HuMAN ORGANIZATION 23-27 
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University). 
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study notes that combined needs of the children may 
be intolerable to the emotionally unsupported solitary par-
ent. Since the emotional requirements of children are very 
likely to take the form of demands for physical attention or 
personal service, the remaining parent may be subject to 
physical as well as emotional exhaustion. "39 
Perhaps because it is he who usually leaves the home 
and suffers the trauma of separation from his children, the 
divorced father seems to undergo greater initial changes in 
self-concept than the mother, although the effects appear to 
last longer in the mother. 40 Mothers have reported feeling 
physically unattractive and helpless; fathers complain of 
not knowing who they are and of feeling rootless. Divorced 
parents have also expressed the feeling that they have 
failed as parents and as spouses, and that they function 
poorly in social situations. In fact, "the amount of time a 
parent spends with a child does directly affect his or her 
competence in dealing with that child."'1 
It is a mistake to assume, of course, that these 
problems are experienced by all divorcing parents. In addi-
tion, some stresses tend to be common; still others are asso-
ciated with the different roles of custodial versus noncus-
todial parent. Finally, professionals may offer different 
theories of the divorce process to explain the symptoms 
they encounter. However, despite these qualifications and 
the fact that most people eventually cope successfully with 
many of their divorce-related problems, "the course of ad-
justment is often unexpectedly painful. "42 
Existing studies indicate that the following factors 
seem to be particularly important in adult adjustment to 
divorce: (1) The development of a satisfactory heterosexual 
•• Glasser & Navarre, Structural Problems of the One-Parent Family, 21 J. 
Soc. IssuES 107 (1965). 
•• See note 18 supra. 
•• J. Greif, supra note 17, at 9 . 








•• Payne & Pittard, 
(1969). 
115-24 
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anger toward each other. Several support systems have 
been associated with more effective functioning of the cus-
todial parent and or her child-for example, friends, 
grandparents and siblings. However, none of these seem as 
salient as a continued, positive, mutually supportive rela-
tionship between the divorced couple and the continued in-
volvement of the noncustodial parent with the child.114 To 
the extent that parental dysfunction affects children ad-
versely, sociological studies seriously challenge also the as-
sumption that sole custody arrangements serve the best in-
terests of children. 
III. JuDiciAL REsPONSEs TO CHILD CusTODY ADJUDICATION 
Simultaneously with the new research being conducted 
on divorce, the number of custody disputes has risen dra-
matically-increasing the legal profession's discomfort with 
"playing Solomon." In 1960 American courts decided the 
custody of over 400,000 children. In 1970 the number 
doubled to 870,000.1111 While psychologists emphasize the 
damage caused by parental conflict and absence, legal pro-
fessionals point to conditions within the legal system which 
prevent the realization of the best interests of children and 
parents. 
A number of legal commentators see the lack of behav-
ioral science training among judges and attorneys as a 
prime obstacle preventing the courts from making custody 
rulings and recommendations appropriate to· the needs of 
divorcing families. One writer suggests, for example, that 
judges become familiar with Erikson's stages of child devel-
opment and use that framework to decide which parent's 
custody will provide healthier development of the child.116 
Professor Watson advocates the appointment of behavorial 
.. Hetherington, Cox & Cox, supra note 18, at 33. 
•• Gozansky, Court-Ordered Investigation in Child Custody Cases, 12 WiL· 
LAMETTE L.J. 511 passim (1976). 
" Batt, Child Custody Disputes: A Developmental-Psychological Approach 
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•• See Gozansky, supra note and Watson, supra note also L. 
Girdner & B. Sumner, Mother vs. Father: Public Policy Custody 
Disputes (expanded version of pap0r at Annual Meeting, Society for 
Applied Anthropology) (1978); Kubie, Provisions for the Care Children of Di-
vorced Parents: A New Legal Instrument, 73 YALI! L.J. U97-1200 (1964). 
•• Shepherd, supra 58, 176-78; Note, Lawyering Child: Princi· 
ples of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes from Divorce, 
87 YALE L.J. passim (1978). 
" Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody Children Divorce, 12 U. 
CAL. D. L. REv. 523 passim M. Ramey, Stender & G. Dunn, Report of 
the California Women Lawjers' (unpublished paper) 
(San Francisco 1977), at Whose Time 
Has Come, 16 CoNCILIATION CouRTS REv. 23-25 {1978}; Gaddis, Joint Custody of 
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parties. 
Future trends litigation statutes will de-
pend also on the advice to clients by their attorneys. 
Equally important if not more so are the expertise, sensitiv-
ity and creativity of professional dispute processors within 
the court system (in Conciliation Court, example) and in 
the private sector, who are being called upon more fre-
quently to intervene in custody disputes. contin-
ues to show that maintenance of parent-child bonds and 
parental cooperation ease adjustment to divorce, these find-
ings will support attempts to generate joint custody rulings 
and nonadversarial dispute resolution. The successful im-
plementation of a coparenting public policy depends also on 
the extent to which parents themselves resist the tempta-
tion to vent their hostilities in the courtroom-a practice 
which undoubtedly serves to confirm the courts' traditional 
assumption that divorcing parents cannot share childrear-
ing successfully. 
Finally, implementing shared parenting and nonadver-
sarial conflict resolution successfully between divorcing par-
ents will depend upon the existence of adequate legislative 
guidelines and support services. Given our long tradition of 
custody litigation and competition for exclusive custody 
awards, cooperative coparenting will not come about simply 
by telling parents to "do it." In addition, child custody is an 
emotionally charged area in the law and in society. There-
fore we cannot simply trust that parents will remember 
that it would be best if stopped and allowed 
their children continued and equal access to both mother 
and father. 
V. CHANGING THE WAY CHILD CusTODY DETERMINED 
Our structure must what is 
in fact in best interests of and adults, even if 
individual parents must overcome some psychological resis-
tance to doing so. How law can protect children's rela-
tionships to both parents after divorce and encourage par-
-163-
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ents to come to mutual custody agreements rather than 
fighting each other to gain a dubious "victory" is the sub-
ject of the following proposal. 
A. Removing Child Custody from a Win or Lose, All or 
Nothing Presumption 
The first, most basic step to take is to change the start-
ing point or premise for determination of child custody, 
thus changing the nature and course of the process itself. 
Instead of a win or lose, all or nothing presumption, there 
must be a presumption of consensus, equality and the pro-
tection of parent-child bonding. The courts in effect must 
say to parents, "We don't care how you feel about each 
other. As long as there is no clear, convincing evidence that 
either of you is abusive and unfit to be a parent, our as-
sumption is that you are both qualified to continue as par-
ents, albeit under different circumstances." The reader will 
recall that the new California statute on joint custody 
makes it an equal first choice with sole custody. Only when 
both parents agree to shared custody is it presumed to be 
in the child's best interests. 
Presuming joint custody as a first stage in resolving a 
custody dispute eliminates the necessity proving which 
parent should "have" the children; there is no battle be-
cause there is no contest and no prize to win. There is no 
loyalty conflict because children do not have to choose be-
tween parents and one parent does not need to convince the 
child that the other parent is less fit. Thus the kinds of 
problems that exist under the present system-courtroom 
litigation, friends and relatives taking thousands of 
dollars spent on attorney and expert fees 
culty in enforcing the resulting "treaty" would be re-
duced substantially or avoided by this simple, legal 
presumption of equal protection of the status of 
both parties. This parallels our presumption in criminal 
cases that one is innocent until proven guilty. At present, 
however, custody statutes, by stating that children will be 
awarded to either parent, are must 
-164-
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B. Creating a Neutral Mandatory Mediation Process 
The next step is to develop a mechanism whereby the 
delegation may arranged and consensus 
reached on the present and future care of the children. 
Again, the full authority of the law stand behind 
what we know or is best-the development of a cus-
tody arrangement by consent of the parties, not by man-
date of the state. Parents not like each other or inter-
act in order to share the rights responsibilities of 
parenthood. What parents need and after divorce 
is a neutral setting which to work out existing hostilities 
and then develop the terms of their arrangement or at least 
express their differences to a neutral party who can then 
report to the court if necessary. 
In the United States today there is almost no official 
legal pressure brought to bear on to clarify or com-
promise their differences. Even courts hesitate 
to recommend counseling if one parent not agree to 
such an effort. AU a parent need do to prevent compromise 
is to it directly to courtroom where 
present law and custom out the a total 
"victory." The elements which in the 
courtroom are same criteria a counselor would 
use to detemine the interests of a experiencing 
divorce. 
What this second change entails, is the creation 
of a neutral but mandatory llJ.C'UUll"'u'u process responsible 
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to the court rather than to either party, a minimum media-
tion period in which issues can be resolved or compromised 
and a recommendation to the court which reflects the pa-
rental agreement or suggestions of the counselor. One basic 
consideration which should guide both counselor and court 
is which arrangement will have the effect of increasing the 
child(ren)'s chances to receive the most nurturing and in-
volvement possible from both parents. If responsibility can-
not be delegated equally, control should be delegated in 
favor of the parent who is most likely to encourage and re-
spect the child's relationship with the other parent. By con-
trast, under today's custom of choosing between parents, 
control tends t() go to the parent who is most adamant 
about excluding the other, mounts the strongest courtroom 
battle and is least open to the idea of coparenting. 
Whatever the parents' responses to mediation-
whether they reach an agreement or not-neither parent 
should be threatened with the loss of his or her child, just 
as children should not have to face the loss of a parent. As a 
last resort, the precise division of time and delegation of 
responsibilities may need to come under the court's juris-
diction. Even when parties are highly antagonistic, the 
court can still protect each parent's right to be a parent, 
and each parent's obligation not to interfere in the areas 
delegated to the other party. In fact, there is far less reason 
and motivation to interfere if each parent's status and role 
is clearly protected and equitably delegated. 
C. When Joint Custody Might Be Detrimental 
There may be times when a parent believes sincerely 
that joint custody is detrimental to a child or that the other 
parent is unfit. In such cases parties should have the option 
of bringing these issues before the court, but only after pro-
ceeding through a process of neutral investigation or 
mediation. 
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CoNcLusioN 
While traditional assumptions about child custody af-
ter divorce have challenged by psychological research 
and by pressures from within the legal itself, 
shared parenting and joint custody represent new family 
patterns which require further evaluation. studies are 
required to relate differences in custodial arrangements to 
differences in families' short- and long-term adjustment to 
divorce, to the quality of the parent-child relationship, to 
the degree of conflict between divorced parents over time 
and to the functioning of the larger network of individu-
als-school teachers, for example-who participate in the 
nurturing and education of children. Equally important are 
studies of the custody adjudication system-the role of the 
attorney in influencing the outcomes of custody disputes 
should be examined, as well as the impact of nonadversarial 
alternatives to formal litigation. 
It is to be hoped that future changes our and in 
the judicial management of custody disputes will represent 
constructive dialogue and creative compromise between dif-
ferent points of view. Public policy in areas related to fam-
ily life, mental health and child development must be 
guided not by uninformed public opinion or narrow self-in-
terest, but by research which reveals the effects of existing 
laws and services, and their relationship to the needs of 
children and parents. Such studies, as well as contributions 
from dispute processors and legal and mental health practi-
tioners, can play a major role in public and private efforts 





HASTER LIST OF PARENTING RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS* 
Religion 
Parents will be free to take their child to church of their choice when child 
is in their care. 
Educat.on 
Both parents will be free to participate in the child's school activities, 
including teacher conferences & extracurricular activities, & homework. 
Mother will be in charge of school enrollment (choice of school/teacher). 
Medical and Dental 
Each parent will take charge of eaergency medical decisions when child is 
in their care. Regular medical and dental care (choice of doctor/dentist 
and decisions regarding long.term interventions such as allergy treatments 
or orthodontia) will be the responsibility of the father. P~rents will 
immediately inform. each other of emergencies. Costs will be shared accord-
in& to the terms ot the financial settlement. 
Lessons and Cultuml EQricht;~ent 
Parents will be permitted to enroll th& child in lessons and 
activities of their choice, provided that such enrollment does not 
overlap with the time during which the child resides with the other 
parent. Parent assumes cost or his/her planned acitivites. 
Recreation 
Both parents are free to arrange and participate in recreational activities 
with their child, provided that such activities do not interfere with 
activities or plans during the child's stay with the other parent. BY MUTUAL 
DEC IS ION AliD AGREE!v!ENT, PARENTS MAY CHOOSE TO COOPERATE IN PROVIDING LESSONS 
AND ACTIVITIES. 
Life Insurance 
Each parent will choose the type of insurance and insurance benefits 
desired with regard to their ch1ld.(or can be spelled out in financial 
settlement) 
Holidays 
In even-numbered years the mother will have the child on the following 
holidays ; in odd numbered years, the father will have the 
child.(Other more elaborate schemes can be worked out, as they typically 
are in sole-custody orders) 
Child Care 
Each parent will be responsible for providipg child care and babysitting 
when the child is in their care. 
Communication with Child 9f the Other Parent 
Parents will limit their telephorecalls i;o other parent's home to ......... except 
in emergencies. 
Add1 tional issues to be spelled out': Time 
between homes; Vacation vs. 
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DIFFEBRNCES BETWEEN SOLE-CUSTODY AND JOINT-CUSTODY 
Sole Custody 
1. Order must be followed 
to be successful 
2. Must be close enough to 
ORDERS 
both parents• wishes to prevent 
further litigation 
J. Would benefit from a built-
in plan for future conflict 
resolution (e.g. mediation or 
binding arbitration) 
4. No order can anticipate all 
the problems/changes encountered 
during child's 18 years 
5. Sole custody does not require 
any one, particular living 
arrangement (sole custody orders 
vary from family to family) 
6. Parents mnst refrain from 
infringing on each other's 
specified ·"territory" for order 
to be successful 
7. Sole custody orders are often 
brief, concentrating on scheduling 
of time w. child 
8. In a sole custody order, one 
parent has "won" custody and the 
other "lost." 
9. One way to stop a fight is to 
declare one person the winner and 
the other the loser, & hope the 
loser ldll give up {give in). 
Children are better off if their 
parents stop fighting. 
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Joint Custody 
1. Order must be followed to 
be successful 
2. Must be close enough to both 
parents• wishes to prevent 
further litigation 
J. Would benefit from a built-
in plan for conflict resolution 
(mediation; binding arbitration 
4. No order can anticipate all 
the problems/changes encountered 
during a child's life 
5. Joint custody does not require 
one/ particular living arrangement~ 
Can be suited to family's ciroum-
stances 
6. Parents must refrain from 
infringing on each other's 
specified "territory" for order 
to be successful 
7• Joint custody orders require 
specification of responsibilities 
to be carried out by each parent 
8. Netther parent has gained or 
lost custody; both have maintained 
their parental roles 
9. Another way to stop a fight is 
to declare both parents "winners" 
& help them develop a workable 
parenting plan, or give them one to 
follow. Children benefit if 
parents stop fighting and children 
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Members of the Assembly Judiciary Committee 
Lettie Young 
Hearing on Joint Custody and Child Support 
On October 14, 1981, the Assembly Judiciary Committee will 
hold an interim hearing on the family law issues of joint 
custody and child support. The hearing is scheduled to 
begin at 10:00 a.m. in the Sunrise Room of the Town and 
Country Hotel, 500 Hotel Circle North, in San Diego. 
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide background 
information on these topics. In addition, related articles 
have been enclosed in the hearing booklet. 
Joint Custody of Children 
In 1979, legislation which specifically authorizes Cali-
fornia courts to order joint cus of children was en-
acted [AB 1480 (Imbrecht}, Chapter 915, Statutes of 1979]. 
Prior statute had provided that, where custody was dis-
puted, an award could be made to parent according 
to the best interests of the child. Because of that law, 
1
Despite the statutory direc that cus should be 
awarded to either parent, the of In re 
Marriage of Neal, 94 Cal. 834 (1979),held that a 
trial court had jurisdiction to order joint custody on the 





the most prevalent form of child custody was so custody, 
usually awarded to the mother with reasonable visitation 
granted to the father. 
AB 1480 stated the new public policy of assuring that minor 
children have frequent and continuing contact with both 
parents after the parents' separation or marriage dissolu-
tion. It further stated that, to effect this policy, par-
ents should be encouraged to share the rights and responsi-
bilities of child rearing. Consequently, the court, may now 
award, as the first order of preference, custody to both 
parents jointly £E to either parent, according to the child's 
best interests [Civil Code Section 4600{b) (1)]. A rebuttable 
presumption that joint custody is in the child's best in-
terests arises when the parents have agreed to joint custody 
{Civil Code Section 4600.5(a)]. Absent an agreement, either 
parent may request joint custody, and the court may then 
order an investigation to assist in its determination of the 
award [Civil Code Section 4600.5(b)]. If joint custody is 
denied in either instance, the court must state its reasons 
for denying the award. The court, moreover, in awarding 
sole custody must consider, among other factors, which par-
ent is more likely to allow frequent and continuing contact 
with the noncustodial parent. It cannot prefer one parent 
as custodian because of that parent's sex.2 
Consistent with the policy of joint custody, Civil Code 
Section 4607 requires that disputed custody or visitation 
must be mediated, even if the county has no fami concilia-
tion court. A family conciliation court, in addition to 
mediating custody and visitation, may assist parties to form-
ulate a plan for implementing the custody order or to resolve 
arguments that arise over implementation. 
Although the j custody statute has been in effect for 
only a short time, measures to revise the law have already 
been proposed. AB 1706 (Kapiloff} was heard by this Com-
mittee and referred to interim study. AB 2202 (Imbrecht) 
is pending this Committee. The major arguments articu-
lated by proponents of AB 1706 and other persons dissatis-
fied with the joint custody law are sted below. 
1. Critics of the joint custody law claim that many 
judges, family law practitioners, and mental 
health professionals are still predisposed toward 
2civil Code Section 4600 was amended in 1972 to delete 
the provision that "other things being equal, custody should 
be given to the mother if the child is of tender years." 
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sole maternal custody. This preference, it is 
argued, adversely affects all parties in a cus-
tody dispute. Fathers become visitors; mothers 
are burdened with the sole re ibil of 
child rearing; children, in e , lose a parent.3 
Proponents of AB 1706 claim that until joint cus-
tody is clearly made the first preference in 
awarding custody, the policy of AB 1480 will not 
be carried out. 
2. Current law permits an award of joint legal cus-
tody without awarding joint ical custody. 
Critics argue that the court's authority to order 
joint legal custody without physical custody under-
cuts the aim of frequent and continuing contact 
between parent and chi1n.4 
3. Under current law, a rebuttable presumption 
favoring joint custody arises when the parents 
agree to it. Critics believe that the burden 
of proof in a custody dispute should be placed 
instead on the parent who seeks sole costody, as 
provided in AB 1706. 
4. If an application for joint custody is denied by 
the court, reasons must be stated for denying 
the award. Critics assert that in fact reasons 
are not being stated where joint custody 
denied. 
3This argument is the thrust of The Disposable Parent: 
the Case for Joint custody by M. Roman and w. Haddad (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1978). In contrast, 
the conclusions of J. Goldstein, et al. Beyond the Best 
Interests of the Child {New York: Free Press, 1973), favor 
an award of sole custody to the child's "psychological par-
ent." According to Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 
the child's need for stability and continuity in the di-
vorce situation can be satisfied best when a sole custody 
order is final and not subject to modification. Thus, the 
noncustodial parent would have no legally enforceable right 
of visitation. In recent years, several writers have chal-
lenged those conclusions. 
4civil Code Section 4600.5(c) defines the term "joint 
custody." AB 2282 (Imbrecht) would 1ete that definition 
and replace it with definitions of " ical cus ," 




5. Critics believe that the requirement of an 
agreement between parents before joint custody 
is presumed in the child's best interests is 
unrealistic. They argue that in most cases 
parents should be forced to accept a joint 
custody arrangement although they may resist 
it initially. 
At the hearing, family law experts from the bench and bar, 
mental health professionals, and individuals representing 
fathers' and children's rights groups will tes fy on the 
ramifications of child custody awards. In order to faci-
litate the discussion, witnesses have been asked to address 
the following general questions: 
What are the practical problems the implemen-
tation of the current law governing joint custody? 
What are the defects perceived, if any, in the 
joint custody law itself? 
Should joint custody be given the first order 
of preference in awarding child custody? 
What are the effects, psychological and other, 
on children when joint custody has been awarded 
in cases where the parents have not agreed to it? 
Child Support 
In a proceeding where the support of a minor child is at 
issue, the court may order either or both parents to pay 
any amount necessary for the child's support, maintenance, 
and education. The order subject to modification or 
revocation upon a proper showing of a material change in 
circumstances. [Civil Code Section 4700(a)] 
Generally, the setting and enforcement of child support is 
related to the parents' separation or d solution of marriage. 
The court in such proceeding may order the noncustodial par-
ent to make installment payments for support to the custodial 
parent.S 
When a parent is and the custodial parent receives 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the federal 
Child Support Enforcement Program locates the deserting 
Scivil Code Section 4382 provides that the payment of 
child support by a noncustodial parent is not affected by 
the custodial parent's failure or refusal to implement the 
order for custody or visitation. 
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parent, establishes the 
wedlock, and es ishes and 
legal obligation to pay child 
administered locally d 
Recent legislative proposals deal 
orders have addressed the ems 
For example, SB 1351 (Robbins), 
1980, revised the law 
of past-due support. See C 
introduced, SB 1351 would have 
all orders for child support. 
heavily amended during 1 sla 
(Sieroty) of this session would 
make child support orders 
failed in Committee. AB 2284 
in this Committee. It would give 
calendar to cases in which the sole 
support, except as specif I 
preference in cases where the i 
as an issue separate from other 
Discussion has also focused on 
countered in the setting of 
problems are, for example, the 
creases in the cost-of-1 
of child support that may 
seeks additional child 
judicial notice of the r 
ularly if substantial 











6Aid to Families 
program to provide financ 
dependent children 
disabled, or some 
Social Security Act created 
Program and mandated that each 











Should a statewide and/or scale or 
schedule for ing support 
be adopted to set a minimum level of child 
support? 
What changes in the law are needed to collect 
past-due support more expeditiously or to 
























20 person or to awarded 
21 under paragraph (2) or (3) of (b), the court 
22 shall consider and give due weight to nomination of 
23 a guardian of the person of the child by a parent under 
24 Article 1 (commencing with Section 1500) of Chapter 1 
25 of Part 2 of Division 4 of Code. 
26 (b) Custody be awarded following order 


















































































r ASSEMBLY BILL 
March 
An act to amend Section 4600.5 
to child custody. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 1706, as introduced, ... ,.avu•'"'• 
Under existing law, the 
custody award is to both parents 






- 80- 99 40 
AB 1706 -2-
1 have agreed to an award of~ custody to one parent or -.../ 
2 so agree open court at a hearing for the purpose of 
3 determining the custody of the a minor child & ehildFen 
4 of the marriage or (2) the court finds that a parent is 
5 unfit to be a warded cwitody of the child. For the purpose 
6 of assisting the court in making a determination whether 
7 an award of joint custody is appropriate, the court may 
8 direct that an investig:lfion be conducted pursuant to J 
9 Section 4602. 
10 If the court declines to enter an order awarding joint 
11 custody pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall state 
12 in its decision the reasons for denial of an award of joint 
13 custody. 
14 -fbt ~ the application of eitheF paFCnt, jeHtf 
15 custody ffi:ft;' be a' .. ''<>'&rded ffi the discretion of the eeUl'f ffi 
16 ~~~the purpose of assisting the eeUl'f ffi 
17 making a determination whetheF ftft award of jeHtf 
18 custody is appropriate undef thts subdivision, the eettrl 
19 ffi:ft;' diFeet fhftt ftft investigation be conducted pursuant 
20 te the pro•lisions of Section 4~ If the eeUl'f declines ffi 
21 eftfef' ftft ~ a\varding jetnt eustod)' pursuant ffi f.h.ffi 
22 subdivisioH, fh.e eeUl'f sftttH: ~ ffl. ttf.l dt'eision fh.e reatJon~' 
23 fef' deHial of tHt av.·ttrd ef jetnt custody. 
24 w 
..../! 
25 (b) For the purposes of this section, "joint custody" _ 
26 means an order awarding custody of the a minor child & 
27 children to both parents and providing that physical 
28 custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to 
29 assure the child & children of frequent and continuing 
30 contact with both parents; provided, however, that su-eh 
31 the order may award joint . legal custody without 
32 awarding joint physical custody. 
33 w 
34 (c) Any order for joint custody may be modified or -
35 terminated upon the petition of one or both parents or on 
36 the court's own motion if it is shown that the best 
37 interests of the child require modification or termination 
38 of the order. The court shall state in its decision the 
39 reasons for modification or termination of the joint 
40 custody order if either parent opposes the modification or 
...-/ 















BILL: AB 1706 HEARING DATE: 5/13/81 
(As am~nded 81) 
SUBJECT: Child custody 
OBJECTIVE: 
This bill intends to (1) make jo custody the first 
preference in awarding chi custody and (2) change the 
rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of proof, 
that joint custody is in the best interests of the child. 
BILL DESCRIPTION: 
Under existing .law, a court may, as first of 
preference 4 award custody of a minor child to both par-
ents jointly or to either parent, according to the best 
interests of the child. When both parents agree to joint 
custody, a , affecting the burden of 
proof, that joint custody s the child's best interests. 
Joint custody may be awarded in discretion of the court 
in other cases request of either 
This b l 
ests of 
custody 
an award to e 
ence. The 
burden of proving 
child's best 
This bill would change 






not be in the 
st rebuttable presumption 
joint custody is presumed to be 
(CONTINUED) 
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the interests of the minor child. When the 
court appoints counsel to represent the mi-
noJ, counsel shall receive a reasoneble s1 'm 
for compensation and expenses, the amount 
of which shall be determined by the court. 
Such amount shall be paid by the in 
such proportions as the court deems just. 
[1976 ch 588 § 1.] 
§ 4607. [Mediation] (a) Where it ap-
pears on the face of the petition or other 
application for an order or modification of 
an order for the custody or visitation of a 
child or children that either or both such 
issues are contested, as provided in Section 
4600, 4600.1 or 4601, the matter shall be set 
for mediation of the contested issues prior to 
or concurrent with the setting of the matter 
for hearing. The purpose of such mediation 
proceeding shall be to reduce acrimony 
which may exist between the parties and to 
develop an agreement assuring the child or 
children's close and continuing contact with 
both parents after the marriage is dissolved. 
The mediator shall use his or her best efforts 
to effect a settlement of the custody or 
visitation dispute. 
(b) Each superior court shall make avail-
able a mediator. Such mediator may be a 
member of the professional staff of a family 
conciliation court, probation department, or 
mental health services agency, or may be 
any other person or agency designated by 
the court. In order to provide mediation 
services, the court shan not be required to 
institute a family conciliation court. The 
mediator shall meet the minimum I..IU<<~.AuJ<~.:a­
tions required of a counselor of conciliation 
as provided in Section 1745 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. 
(c) Mediation proceedings shall be held in 
private and shall be confidential, and all 
TITLE 5 
~ ..... ,. ..... t of Children 
§ 4 700. Order for child support. 
§ 4701. Order for assignment of wages. 
§ 4 702. Order directing payment to officer of court or 
welfare recipient: Court's authority otherwise, and 
and fees as county charge. 
§ 4 703. Action by parent, or child by his guardian ad 
to provide support, etc. 
§ 4 704. Amendment of child support order without termiJruu.m~ 
§ 4 705. Credit for payments for of child made "'"'""""'"'• 
or Railroad Retirement Act. 
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3. Discouraging the use of child custody for intimi-
dation. 
The most immediately apparent feature of Cali· 
fornia's new child custody law is "the meuase it 
sends in advance to divorcing parents": a power--
play for exclusive child custody, either for pur· 
poses of intimidation or to force subservience in 
negotiation, is less likely to be tolerated by the 
court. Therein. the new Civil Code Section 4600 
and 4600.5 is regarded as one of the most signifi-
cant evolutions of California's family law since the 
advent of "no fault" divorce in 1970, which elimi· 
nated the airing of ·"faults" as justification for 
divorce. Henceforth, the new child custody Statute 
will largely dissolve the recourse to winner--take-all 
custody litigation that has heretofore been sub-
stituted for the catharsis of airing "faults." 
Preference is likely to favor joint custody, or 
sole custodianship for that parent who demon-
strates the most cooperation and tolerance for the 
child's frequent and continuing contact with the 
alternate parent. Consequently, an antagonistic 
and covetous parent is likely to be denied sole 
custody and may jeopardize the opportunity to 
participate equally in joint custody. 
The intentions and consequences of the legi$-
lation, as they evolved during the legislative pro-
cess and as amended into Section 4600 and Sec· 
tion 4600.5 of the Civil Code, are itemized below. 
The itemization is not necessarily in the order of 
importance to petitioners or counselors. For ease 
of reference the items are in the same sequence as 
the issues occur in the new Statute. 
Policy Statement 
Intent 
The intention of the original version of AS 1480 
was to establist a guide, a goal., and a preference 
for divorcina parer.~s. By making sole custody less 
likely to be decreed by the courts, the intent of the 
original as well.as the flna' version of AB 1480 is to 
caution divorcing parents whc w<:-11ld otherwise be 






on the discretion of the ,-~~--­
consideration 
recourse to sole parent """"''"'"''~ 




Folberg of the Lew'.s & Clark '-'-'•• ....... 
Oregon, and Executive Director of the Association 
of Family Conciliation characterized the 
intent succinctly: "We too often that one of 
the most noble functions law to provide a 
model of what 1 believe 
that the a 'prefer-
ence' for best alternative." 
passage, resulted 
these same restraints upon 
the court's discretion. sole and 
joint are in the new 
law, the court its decision to award 
sole in situations. 
The introduces the new 
Statute of the new law, 
despite the court's """''""''"""''"' discretion to award 
sole custody. 
-193-
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Order of preference: To both parents jointly or to 
either parent 
Section l Section 4600. any Drt;,ce~rdir-12" 
where there is at issue tire custody minor 
child, the court may, during the pendency of 
the proceeding or at any time 
make such order for the custody of the child 
during minority as may seem necessf.liY or 
proper. If a child is of sufficient· age and 
capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent 
preference as to custody, the court shall con· 
.rider IUid give due weight to the wishes of the 
child in maldng an award of custody or modi-
ftcation thllreof. Custody should be awarded 
in the following order of preference, accord~ 
tng to the best interests of the child: 
(a) To both pt11'ents Jointly pursuant to 
Section 4600.. 5 or to either parent. 
The new law did not spring full blown without 
attention to previous phraseology. On the con~ 
t:raey, if there was any single phrase in the prior 
Statute that spawned AB 1480's concept, it was 
the long adhered-to directive which is repeated in 
the new law, "Custody should be awarded in the 
following order of preference." · previous 
statute pennitted no other alternatiVes than: (a) 
To either parent, (b) To the penon or persons in 
whose home the child has been (c) To any 
other person or persons deemed sui table. 
Proponents of joint custody assumed that the 
most desirable goal with the least trauma for 
child and parents would be to list custody as 
the ahead of the other alternatives. 
An version of SB 4 77 specified "to either 
parent or to both parents jointly." The word order 
was reversed when adopted from SB 477 into the 
rmal version of AB 1480, so that both parents 
jointly" appears prior to the alternative of "to 
either parent." 
issue within this was more 
vtG~o:rc~us~,v debate .. ' 'han whether "To both parents" 
should be listed separately and unequivocally as 
the first preference, or if there should be equal 
consideration, within the same paragraph, of the 
alternative of sole parent custody. Ultimately, the 
"both parents jointly" was to 
4 
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Responding to the wran&Jes and dissension that 
evolved from the leverage inherent in sole parent 
custody, Dr. Jose Santiago of the University of 
Arizona Department of Psychiatry suggested (dur-
in& a Phoenix, Arizona confezence on May 22, 
at a time when the joint custody concept 
wu still a rarity), "pve t.b.e child to t.b.e parent who 
will tolerate the most the child's relationship with 
the other parent." This proposal became known 
colloquially as •favoring the most tolerant parent' 
as a means of both rewarding and inducing coopera-
tion. 
The opportunity of giving thi$ proposal the 
force of law occur:red during a f"Ulal amending 
session of AB 1480, in August 1979, when Dr. 
Diane Trombetta of Los Gatos, California sug· 
gested this terminology in the version of AB 1480 
that succeeded SB 4 77. This particular provision 
favoring the tolerant and cooperative parent in 
sole custody decisions could become one of the 
most significant and influential c.b.anges in evaluat-
ing the suitability of sole custodians. As. a mini-
mum, it may inspire more guarantees and demon· 
stration of tolerance and cooperation than has. 
been customary of sole custody seekers heretofore. 
At a condudina amendment conference, Judge 
David B. Kin& of the San Francisco Superior 
Court's Domestic Law Coutt cautioned that, al-
though important, he didn't consider the coopera-
tion criterion u overriding. that there were also 
other worthy considemtions. and that demon· 
mated tolerance of t.b.e alternate parent should be 




Section I. Section 4600. In mtlidng an award 
custody to etther parent, the court . . . shall 
not prefer a parent as custodian bect1.Wt! of 
that panmt's ~:x. 
Thil was adopted durin& an early am· 
endment to SB 477 and ultimately included in its 
within AB 1480. 
s 
In the court's <U'!!rft!•nnn 
tion 
..... ,!U.I .. '"III'"ll> and a return to 
neatnniP were often ton:1en.ted 
without such a 
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nor essential to the court's granting of joint cus-
tody. The provisions were $Ugested to enable 
parents to determine the manner of carrying out 
(a) "the child's education," (b) "daily routine," 
(c) "association with friends," (d) "religious train-
ing," {e) "and other activ.ities." Considering the 
differences of opinion that most couples ordi· 
narily experience during divorce, the itemization 
was sardonically characterized as a new selection of 
contr()versial topics that the divorcing couple might 
not have otherwise considered, and sufficiently 
provocative to make joint custody asreement 
virtually unattainable. If consensus on such topics 
is not forthcoming, it may be prudent merely to 
allow most or all of these conside.rations to be 
resolved by each parent for that period of time 
when the child is in the respective parent's care. 
The fact that the plan topics were elim.iriated · 
from SB 477 during its legislative processing and 
were never a requirement of AB 1480 may imply 
to the court that, as such, these topics are not an 
influential determinant of joint custody but that 
divorcin& parents are prudently advised to consider 
these issues voluntarily even though they do not 
influence a decision for or against joint custody. 
Out of state residence not a barrier to joint 
custody. An initial version of SB 477 excluded 
joint custody when one of the parents lives out of 
the state and also provided for termination of joint 
custody if a parent established or was likely to 
establish a residence in another state. Both of those 
provisions were eliminated during the amendment 
process of SB 477. The reasons for their elirnina· 
tion are a useful instruction to individuals adminis· 
tering or adjudicating the new law. 
First, the provision would have provided a per-
verse opportunity for a recalcitrant parent to de· 
feat the implementation of joint custody merely 
by leaving the state. 
Second, a requirement of residence within the 
state for both parents and children could defeat .· 
the availability o. ;oint custody for the numerous 
families living in California border communities 
wherein one parent might be living a short distance 
away in the bordering state. The family would be 
denied the opportunity of joint custody while 
6 
other parents residi.''li hundreds of miles apart with· 
in California could avail themselves of joint cus-
tody. 
of travel 
l"f'.'~~''~'~'rrli!!!'ll"' of state borders, is 
already facilitating an exchange of children be· 
tween parents that should not be denied future 
petitioners of joint 
Section I. Section 4600. (b) (I) The court, 
in its dtscrerton, may the parents to 
submit to the court a the implemen-
£ation of the custody order. 
The version of AB 1480 that was ultimately 
passed was careful not to that, as a con-
dition of granting a custody plan 
must firSt be submitted to and approved by the 
court. 
A requi.rement of a 
sidered as potentially the goal of 
joint custody for at least two reasons: First, plans 
prior to order could tend to the thwarting 
of joint custody if one p]aty or the other took that 
opportunity to insist on implementing provisions 
that would make unfeasible. Second, 
the requirement of a advance might re-
direct the court's the pr.:~ferred puir 
lie policy goal of custody into 
being an arbiter of details - a time-consum-
ing task that might make the court long for the 
expediency of the past wherein a sole parent was 
decreed custodian, the alternate parent was re· 
strained to visitation, and the custodian was given 
the relatively unexamined implementation of a 
plan. 
Thus, in the new the court is pennitted to 
discern whether joint would be in the best 
interests of the ·to so decree, and to require 
a plan from the parents sut~qruel:ltlji 
On the other hand, the fmt several 
months of hearings under this new Code Section, 
courts may be asking for advance as a 
means of determining how the parents 
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I..tter, durln1 the 
sions that led to 
would be suorel"SS~d.Ull 






agreement both parents were required; such a 
requirement would leave the power of decision 
solely within the hands of the least co1:>p~:ra1jve 
parent to the of children and 
alternate 
Altruism rather than antagonism is more 
to "win" for each 
either to The new Act encompasses a 
principle of successful negotiation: an '"'"''"'""''"""' 
for either party propose a solution that re111ults 
in both from a les111 than ideal 
situation. 
Heretofore, the decree of sole custody resulted 
in the appearance of a "winner" and an excluded 
parent who nurtured plans and 
that fueled court appearances. While 
eliminate return engage--
it is likely that most such 
hearings will revolve around modification 
rather than mother round of the zer01Um game 
of "exclusion" Ver!!US "access." 
S(lcfton 2. S«ctton 4600.5 (b) 
post assisttntl the court in rnu:K.Jnuc 
mtnarton whether an awtUd of Joint 
nn1~r~'"~~u under th~ 
party at 
the court to 
mv·es1lg;lttlcm to detennine 
resulted from 
accommodate such u 
are excluded from the former home and 




Sharing physical custody, integral to 'joint custody' 
Sfcrton 2. Section 4600 . .5 (c) For the pu,... 
poses of this section, "Jotnt custody" mtums 
an order award!nr custody of the minor child 
or chtldnn to both panrm and providing that 
physical custody shall be shand by the par-
ents In such a way as to assure the child or 
children of frequent and continuing contact 
with both pannts: 
During drafting. this paragraph became the so-
called "definition" of joint custody that links 
physical custody with the goal of the opening 
policy statement: "assure the child or children 
of frequent and continuing contact with both 
parents." The purpose of the paragraph is pri-
marily aimed at an understanding and considera-
tion of the physical aspect of joint physical cus-
tody. However, the paragraph purposely does not 
elaborate with constraining prerequisites such as 
scrupulously equal contact or conditions of resi-
dence. Instead, the parents are encouraged to 
work out personally the details of sharing physical 
custody as best befits their circumstances, or 
through counselors or other helpful intermediaries 
who will aid the parents in traversing the anta-
gonisms of the just-divorcing period into the 
implementation of joint custody. 
Joint 1epl custOdy for parents UM.VI'Iilable for 
joint phylllk:al custody 
&ctlon 2. Section 4600.5 (c) : . .. provided, 
however, that such order may award joint 
legal custody without awarding joint physical 
custody. 
Of all the provisions of Section 4600 arid 4600.5 
that may be productive of mischief, or antqonil-
tic interpretation or decree, the opportunity for 
the court to award joint legal custody without 
awarding joint physical custody could int:rigue the 
most litigious of counselors and parents. 
Curtailment of the opposite parent's 'access' 
in joint custody to mere legal participation was 
not the intenf of this wording. The opportunity 
for joint legal custody was inserted in response to 
the few requests of divorced parents who wished to 
10 
of custody 
dis:tance, kl!V.I«uvu. circumstances 
a 
continuing contact 
joint leial l¢1.1.l:i•tUIJtY 
Furthermore, 
joint legal cus:toowm 
responsibilities and obiiu:tiorls 
encounten with 
but with none 
physical 






Section 2. Section 4600 . .S order 
may be or termt· 
ruzted upon of one or both par-
ents or on the court's own motion if it is 
shown that the best interests of the child re· 
quire or termination of the 
order. 
Of all the provisions within AB 
few are more to about 
assuring "the best interests of the child" than 
that or termination of 
joint 
One parent, both parents, or the court can move 
for but the nn .... ,.,r;.,.., 
consideration for is a showing of detriment 
to the best interests. Heretofore, an ex· 
eluded parent "gunnysacked .. a :re~~erve 
of about the sole custodial 
presumed violation of the child's best interests, as 
ammunition a reversal of sole cu.~>tol..l!Y 
liberalization At least in 
book on 
!lJid . .,...AU .. I/1' 
pntcticality as each 
each is 
to scrutinize the other par· 




ter.rntttanon, the overall effect may 
mnong the 
survival in a 
Beca·1.use of the incessant 
tl.on about retroacmritv 
cess, an IWC:O!IW,odi&ti<)ft 
~d. 
with the other 
have 
3 
New Jersey, North 
and 
If a parent intends to use the new California 
to achieve decree not awarded in 
another state, the of the UCCJA are 
of the "'"''~'~'"''~'"'" 
On the other the UCCJA will assist in 
protecting a California decree in other UCCJA* 
as the and child 
for California to retain 
Using conciliation to ease the court's burden 
Section 2. 4600.5 In counties 
a conctll4tion court, the court or the 
parties may, at any time, pW'"SU.ant to local 
rules consult with the conctli.aticm 
!U.<T.U;!n" tht 
to resolve rmy controversy 
which hos arisen in the lm:rJll"m~!n 
thw far. 





this conciliation service can be such an important 
assist to jurists, there is now a substantial oppor-
tunity for conciliation courts and counselors to 
achieve a greatly increased appreciation and recog· 
nition. 
Furthennore, the "resolving of controversy" por-
tion of paragraph (f) could shunt to the concilia-
tion court first those requests for modification or 
termination that miaht ordinarily go directly to 
the hearings court. Arrangement for and success 
of joint custody is a highly personal matter for the 
participants. However, skeptics are likely to ques-
tion the efficacy of joint custody, based on the 
statistical reoccum.mce of hearings requests. The 
mqnitude of those statistica may be affected sub-
stantially by how readily joint custodial parents 
can utilize the conciliation courts prior to hearings. 
Access to records by noncustodial:-parenb 
Section 2. Section 4600 . .5 (g) Notwithstand-
ing any other provision of hzw, access to 
records and in{o1'1'1'14tion pertaining to a minor 
child, including but not limited to medical, 
dental, and school records. shall not be denied 
to a parent because such panmt is not the 
child's cu.stodlal parent. 
The statute's concludinl Pataar~Ph reqwnng 
recorcls about the child to be acOMJS.ible to non· 
custodial parents was also one of the last amend· 
ments proposed at a concluding amendment-draft-
ing session. As such, the proposal represented the 





achieve the same 
how-
measure for 
a custodial parent 

lead the public to believe so. At the time AB 1480 
wu submitted and acquired its initial endorsen I 
wu not an active member o! such a group, althoulfi 
u the their support wu crucial. 
1'he earliest supporters were tunons the 
sionals. A number of professionals in the psychia-
trlc, sociological counseling endorned the 
concept of joint custody. A num-
ber of lawym also endom~d th.G of joint 
eu~tody. But the of the need wu most 
vivdly evident in both the ad hoc and the 
groups of divorced fathetS. I was also to 
intensity matched divorced mothm (volun® 
tarlly and Involuntarily) di.d not have custody. The 
divorced mother without custoily hu an intemt in 
joint custody u intense u the divorard fathers 
who have garnered the lion's share of publicity for 
WIU'l'antinl joint cuatody. 
The indignation of the ostracized parent hu the 
intensity of the sel.f rishteous because a tenet of 
"no fault" divorar is that a parent can be divorced 
and deprived of accea to an offsprin;. Hence, 
innumerable fathers' rlshts groups are populated 
by law-abidinl and otherwise circumspect fathers 
who have been deprived of access to their children 
through imposition by the legal system of a "no 
fault" divorce. 
The net effect wu that law abiding fathers 
whose conduct u fathers and husbands wu the~ 
retica.Uy not in question. were nevertheless severed 
tram a normal relationship with their children in 
decrees as severe as if these men had committed a 
crime. The result wu acute disdain for the law u 
practiced from the bench. 
Potitidanl and propapndim seme the 
inherent in ju.~tified .... ,...,.,. ... 
the danprs to a nation when its 
more convenient for ~v,l'!'l"ll"l<f 
serving it. 
A rap from is also 
dedicated. It can also transcend ...,,,., .... u .... 
and self-preservation, as was evident among fathers 
who spoke threateningly. 
Such was the atmosphere within which the 





c:uvernu:m of their 
well not be 
The exte:ru~ive burdem bilb processed by Calif· 
omia that the obliption of 
sponsorina and a new meuu.re is not 
lightly wumed. m!ll~s were introduced 
into the proem durinc 1979, 
of which 1 the 139 days 
the As a oo:ru~equence, 











ml.l.lt r~pect the 
to have nonnal. n:wautJnlll 
A todo 
dealini with adjttStment, 
Mel Roman and 
W'mston, New 
A read 
pa:nnt and of ~u'irl~~t l'!lr~n!lcm!!t!l 
Psyc::hiatry and D!J:'1e:ctc)r 
is one the nation's p10lllet':li1nl PTC''POIU!Irts 
and 
2435 Ocean Avenue, San Francisco, 
the earliest pioneering profes-
Publications to be obtained directly 
AB 
Th~ people of the 
SECTION 
4600. (a) The L.e'ifillliann·!!! 
policy of this state 
continuing contact 
se-parated or dissolved 
share the rights 
this policy. 

DEFINITIONS OF CHILD CUSTODY 
Sole Custody 
Split Custody 




Joint Physical Cus 
& Legal Custody 
As an aid to parents and clients, as well as 
tioners, the following is intended as a layman's 
terminology. Counselors may find this compilation 
to clients so that all parties have a similar 
ease with which many of these terms have been 
conversation, but without definition, has led to 
Furthermore, the lay public has been exposed to a 
tations of custody. Some of the definitions have 
contradictory, often because the omission or 
adjectives alters or restricts the scope of custody. 
E 
Custody 
Confusion also arises because courts, as 
frequently use ~eitain terms interchangeably. 
as media, 
Definition of terms is, primarily, the 
case law precedent. The following definitions 
such sources, but this compilation is intended 
than a legal reference. However, a mutual 
these terms is less likely to stimulate a legal 
assumption about a form of custody or to necess 





on an erroneous 
subsequent litigation 
Since our primary intent is to aid the divorced toward an 
the 
establishing 
operable plan of custody rather than a diversion 
intent of terms, we hope this information will be 
a terminology with which the parties agree. 
The parent or parents particularly interested j custody are 
advised to consider the term in its larger conteKt, that joint physical 
and legal custody. This is the final form of custody described at the 
conclusion of this compilation. The scope and previously 
described custody for.m aids in clarifying the significance of 
joint physical and legal custody. 
Acknowledgment is extended to the following , from whom 
definition information has been derived, although we are refraining from 
indicating specific reference to each authority of our edited 
abbreviations or elaborations of their original comments. Therefore, 
readers will also benefit from the more extensive of: 
H. Jay Folberg & Marva Graham, 'Joint 
Follo~ing Divorce,' Univ of Calif, Davis, 
Summer 1979. 
Robert Mnookin, 'Child Custody Adjudication: 
in the Face of Interminancy,' Law & 
summer 1975. 







- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - -
Source: James A. Cook, 10606 Wilkins Avenue, Los , Calif 90024. 
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Joint Phye cs Cuatod 
The sharing of 
and recognition of the 
of joint physical custody. 
The allocation of significant 
children to be resident exclusively 
consideration of a parent or parents 
Precise equality time allocation 
preoccupation of those parents desiring joint 
once the principal of sharing j has 
of irreparable loss of the child or 
been dispelled, the practical availability 
child-rearing time can become the guideline 
time. 
Hesitancy to accept participation in 
may have assumed the likelihood of 
frequently traceable to (a) an expectation 
income by reason of retaining sole 
quilt that by more frequent 
parent a child may develop a distaste 
if the parent prone to sole custodianship 
the divorce, and (c) opportunities 
that are inherent in retaining sole 
known to place a high value on a 
child or children and longs for 
and parents will need to encourage a 
greed, fear and quilt, and 
a more relaxed allocation of time. 
Ten basic variations for 
custodians can integrate or elaborate 
availability. 
Variations for sharing j 
(l) Freedom of movement between 
(2) School year versus summer 
(3) Divide Fall & Spring semesters 
(4) 2-3 months versus 2-3 months, th 
(5) 1 month versus l month, exchange 
(6) 2 weeks versus 2 & 
(7) l week versus l week, 
(8) 3~ days ve:.sus 3~ days, 
(9) Workday week versus weekends, 
(10) Child remains in 
The meaningful sharing 
relaxed relationship by ld 
impermanence of "visitation" 
custody. 
Financial child support 











one parent who 
custody is 
financial 


















Among the from. which 
of child support 
( l) One_parent assumes 
( 2) Each parent 
to fluctuations 
(3) Each parent 
with the 





( 6) Sharing of costs 
Joint Physic 
The intent 
a condition and expectation 
prevail unless a parent can 
equitable custody 
itemize the reasons 
Joint physical 
itemized above for j 
However, by agreement, 
the provisions 
and those of their 
A statute, 





a • t d 









CALIFORNIA LEG ISLA TURE-1981-82 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 2202 
Introduced by Assemblyman Imbrecht 
April 27, 1981 
An act to amend Section 4600.5 of the Civil Code, relating 
to joint custody. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGF.sT 
AB 2202, as introduced, Imbrecht. Joint custody. 
Existing law provides that custody of a child should be 
awarded in a specified order of preference, according to the 
best interests of the child. The most preferred award is to both 
......__, parents jointly or to either parent. There is a presumption 
that joint custody, as defined, is in the best interests of a child 
where the parents have agreed to an award of joint custody. 
Upon the application of either parent, joint custody may be 
awarded in the discretion of the court in other cases. 
\.......; This bill would delete the existing definition of joint custody 
and instead define "physical custody", "joint physical 
custody", "legal custody", and "joint legal custody". 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
The people of the State of Ca.Jifornia do enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. Section 4600.5 of the Civil Code is 
2 amended to read: 
3 4600.5. (a) There shall be a presumption, affecting 
4 the burden of proof, that joint custody is in the best 
5 interests of a minor child where the parents have agreed 
6 to an award of joint custody or so agree in open court at 
7 a hearing for the purpose of determining the custody of 
8 ~a minor child EW el:tildren of the marriage. 
-223- 99 40 
AB 2202 
1 If the court 
2 custody 
3 in its decision 
4 custody. 
5 (b) Upon 
6 custody may 
7 other cases. 
8 making a 
9 custody is 
10 may direct 
11 to the 
12 enter an order 
13 subdivision, 
14 for denial 




















~~~ ~+R-f' custody" 





1 An award of}oint legal custody 
2 exchange inform:Jtion r>runr>£>rt> 
3 and welfare of 
4 another in 
5 responsibilities and 
6 (d) Any order for 
7 terminated upon the"'"",..'"'''"'""' 
8 the court's own 
9 interests of the child 
10 of the order. The court 
11 reasons for modification 
12 custody order if either 
13 termination order. 
14 (e) Any order for 
15 ehilaPea of a marriage 
16 any other state 
17 requirements set 
18 modified at 
19 accordance 
20 (f) In counties 
21 the parties may, at 
22 court, consult 
23 of assisting the parties to a 
24 implementation of the custody order or to 
25 controversy which has arisen in 
26 plan for custody. 
27 (g) Notwithstanding 
28 to records and 
29 including but not 
30 records, shaH not 
31 parent is not the 
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I EXHIBIT G 
I ATTOANEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTOFlNEY (NAME ANO ADDRESS): 
' 
TELEPHONE NO.: FOR COURT USE ONLY 
' 
ATTORNEY FOR (NAME) 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF 
STREET ADDRESS: 
MAiliNG ADDRESS 






PETITION FOR CASE NUMBER: 
c 
Dissolution of Marriage D And Declaration Under Uniform Child 
Legal Separation Custody Jurisdiction Act 
Nultlty of Marriage 
1. RESIDENCE (Dissolution only) D Petitioner 0Respondent 
has been a resident of this state for at least six months and of this county for at least three months immediately 
preceding the filing of this Petition for Dissolution. 
2. STATISTICAL FACTS a. Date of marriage: c. Period between marriage and separation 
b. Date of separation: Years: Months: 
3. DECLARATION REGARDING MINOR CHILDREN OF THIS MARRIAGE 
a. D There are nQ minor children. 
b. D The minor children are: 
Name Birth date 
c. IF THERE ARE MINOR CHILDREN, COMPLETE EITHER (1) or (2) 
(1) 0 Each child named in 3b is presently living with 0Petitioner ORespondent 
at (address): 
Sex 
and during the last five years has lived in no state other than California and with no person other than 
petitioner or respondent or both. 
Petitioner has not participated in any capacity in any litigation or proceeding in any state concerning custody 
of any minor child of this marriage. 
Pellt1oner has no information of any pending custody proceeding or of any person not a party to this proceeding 
who has physical custody or claims to have custody or visitation rights concerning any minor child ol this 
marriage. 
(2) 0 A completed Declaration Under Uniform Custody of Minors Act is attached. 
(Continued on reverse) 
The declarahon under penalty ol perJury must be signed in California. or In a atate that authorize• uae ol a declaration in place ol an alfldavtl. olherw•se 
an aN•davtl '' requtred 76P307A (REV. 1·801 PS 4-80 1281 
Form Adopled by Rule 1281 PETITION 0 1 
Judtctal Counetl or California AD 1 
AevtsedEifecttveJanuary 1.1980 (FAMILY LAW) CC 4503, 5158; CRC 1215 
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4 DE Cl AHA TION REGARDING COMMUNITY AND QUASI-COMMUNITY 
KNOWN 
a l l l are no such assets or obligalions subject !o disposillon 
b } Ali such assets obllgal!ons have been disposed o! by 
c. such assets and obllga!1ons are listed in lhe property 
d All such assets and obhgations are hslad below: 
5. D Pel1tioner requests confirmation of the 
6. Pet1t1oner requests 
a. D1ssolulion of the mamage based on 
(1) Irreconcilable differences. CC 4506(1) 
(2) mcurable CC 4506(2) 
b. Legal separation of the parties based on 
( ) Irreconcilable differences. CC 4506(1) 
(2) mcurable CC 4506(2) 
c. void mamage based on 
mcestuous mamage. CC 4400 
b1gamous marriage. CC 4401 
as separate 
1 Pel1!1oner requests lhat !he court grant lhe relief or judgment !lln"'"'''""'n 







delerm•ned and ch1ld custody be """"'"'' .. ri 
(spec•fy): 
and 
OBLIGATIONS AS PRESENTL V 
vo1oao1e marriage based on 
petitioner's age at time of 
CC 4425(a) 
and other orders 
I I ATTORN(YTOR(NA_M_E~)------------------~~~~~~--------------------------1 
1 SUPERIOR COURT OF CAliFORNIA, COUNTY OF 
S fREE T ADDRESS 
MAiliNG ADDRESS 





~----------------------------------------------------------+--------------------------1 R ESPONSE 0 Dissolution or Marriage 0 And Declaration Under CASE NUMBER: 
[ J REQUEST FOR legal Separation Uniform Child C ...... .., ... 7 
Nullity of Marriage Jurisdiction Act 
RESIDENCE (Dissolution only) Peliltoner Respondent 
has been a res•dent of lhts state lor at least sex months and of lh1s county lor 
preceding the f1hng ol lhts Petition for Dissolullon. 
least three mon!hs Immediately 
2. STATISTICAL FACTS a. Date of marriage: 
b. Date o! separation: 
3 DECLARATION REGARDING MINOR CHILDREN OF THIS MARRIAGE 
a. C_] There are no minor children. 
b. D The minor children are: 
Name Birthdate 
c. IF THERE ARE MINOA CHILDREN, COMPLETE EITHER (1) or (2) 








and dunng the last five years has lived in no state other than Calilorrua and w1th no person other than 
petitioner or respondent or both. 
Respondent has not participated in any capacity in any 
custody of any minor chtld or this marriage. 
or proceedmg in any stale concerning 
Respondent has no information of any pending custody proceeding or of any person not a party to th1s 
proceeding who has physical custody or claims to have custody or v1sitahon concernmg any minor 
child of this marriage. 
(2) D A completed Declaration Under Un1form Custody of Minors Acl is attached. 
(Contmued on reverse) 
of 11 declarafoon on ollice or an aff•dav•f oth~rw•sa 
RESPONSE 
(FAMILY lAW) -228- A0016 
1/801 PS 4·80 1 
CC 4355. CAC 1215 
4. DECLARATION REGARDING COMMUNITY AND QUASI-COMMUNITY ASSETS AND OBLIGATIONS AS PRESENTLY 
KNOWN 
a. (-::-J There are no such assets or obligations subject to disposition by th~ court in thi!ll proceeding. 
b. C:.J All such assets and obligations have been disposed of written "'"''""''"''"'"'i 
c. All such assets and obligations are listed in the d~laratlon to be filed with this response. 
d. AU such assets and obligations are listed below: 
5. 0 Respondent requests confirmation of the following as separate asseta 
CONFIRM TO 
6. 0 Respondent contends there is a reasonablE~ possibility of r~~eoncmation. 
8. 0 Respondent requests d. of voidable marriage based on 
a. p Dissolution of the marriage based on 
( 1) 0 irreconcilable differences. CC 4506(1) 
(2) D incurable insanity. CC 4506(2) 
b. D Legal separation of the parties based on 
( 1) D irreconcilable differences. CC 4506(1) 
(2) incurable insanity. CC 4506(2) 
c. 0 Nullity of void marriage based on 
( 1) incestuous marriage. CC 4400 
(2) D bigamous marriage. CC 4401 
9. Respondent requests that the court 
orders as may be proper. and that 
a. 0 Visitation rights be determined and child custody be awarded 
0 Peiltioner 0Respondent OOther (specify): .... 
b 0 Child support be awarded OPetitioner 0Respondent 
c. 0 Spousal support be awarded QPetitioner QRespondent 
d. 0 Property rights be determined. 
e. 0 Attorney's fees and costs be awarded 0Petitioner 
t. 0 Wile's former name be restored (specify): ........... . 
Respondent declares under penalty of perjury that the fnr;>~n,nlnn 
and that this declaration Is executed at (place): ............ . 
on (date): ......... . 
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respondent's age at time 
of marriage. CC 4425(a) 
prior existing marriage. 
cc 4425(b) 
0 unsound mind. CC 4425(c) 
(4) fraud. CC 4425(d) 
force. CC 4425(e) 
incapacity. 
in item make injunctive and other 
any attachment is true and correct 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , California, 
EXHIBIT H 
Please help In this vital survey 
• 
Survey of recent court child ·custody ·decrees 
--- . - . --- . . . -
Return to: 
Duplicate this form and also 
distribute to others. We need 
as many responses as possible. 
James A. Cook 
10606 Wilkins Avenue 
Los Angeles, California 90024 
What are the terms of the court's decree, 
as compared with the preferences sought by each party, 
in child custody awards? 
Our assurance to you: We vow not to disseminate 
specific identification of an individual or a 
case unless you grant us permission to do so. 
Answer as many questions as possible; do not 
delay your response for lack of all answers, 
however. Partial information will be helpful. 
Your name, or 
name of party(ies) involved: 
Your, or their, address: 
Telephone (if known}: 
Case identification, 
if available. 
(Number or names): 
Judge, or Commissioner 
making the decree: 
Court location or 
jurisdiction: 
Names of attorneys: 
How many children, by sex & age: 
Custody decision~ 
Did you ask the court for: 
Joint Physical & Legal Custody 
Only Joint Physical Custody 
Only Joint Legal Custody 
Sole parent custody 
What did the other party ask for?: 
Joint Physical & Legal Custody · 
Only Joint Physical Custody 
Only Joint Legal Custody 




Custody decision (conthuutd)' 
What -did the court decree, and to whom? 
Joint Physical & Legal 
Joint Phys 
parent 
What were the special terms, 
court decree?: 
Do you ect to, or 
Date of the decree, if known: 
Did a counselor, mediator, or 




terms of the chi 









to: James . Cook, 
instructions in the 
Comment. 







Survey of cuatody 
fmplementatio f Jo 
(Please continue to 
The initial responses 
experience with the 
ing information. 
Above and beyond 
the respondents are 
as well as 
following the recap 
the responses, we are 
responses. 
(Information 
is being held 
for referral 
attorneys who 















Quoted remarke from r 
necessarily sections 
been fallinq within t~~ 
lUPPORT OF JOINT CUSTODY DECREE 
From a 
to do what'• 
"I am jubilant, but 
custody~~ 
From • mother with 
it would work better in 
he is wanted and loved 
"Joint custody has worked 
concern for welfare of daughter. 
From parent 





The judge has 
with my ute. 
SUPPORT OF SOLE CUSTOQY 
P"rent 
'lilly) bilt in 
too invo lv.,d 










From a d@cree: •The 








entire focus now ia 
dollars to qet. joint 
I think 
knows 
our case due to friend~hip between ex-spouses and 
are vecy 
. ln other words,· 1f 








Vi~ita bi-annually. I wish 
and buys 'toys' and 
legislation, not to 
the intention of the leqisla-
of lawylllrs cooked up just to qet 
name) simply slipped into 
to live with father. 
' and therefore punished 




dnuqhter and r both 
indicated that the custody 
to encourage contact and 
ma~imi~e contact with both 
recommended the children 
clear the parents 
don • t get to be 
unity where the 
real or imaqined, which 
to minimize these 
n~Jponeiblll tie a .• 1'hor•-
child psychologist, 
cu@t~dy of the minor 
follow him own archaic 
the evidence is~• 
' "· 
IHPROVJ::MENTS Nl::EL>l::D IN Til£ 1.1\k' 
•Joint custody and single parent custody need to be separated into separate subdivisions. and 
of different importance. Wh~n combined in the same subdivision it allows the eourts to perpetuate 
the tradition of awarding custody to one parent (whioh is almost always the mother.) The law needs 
to ~ made more specific. The vagueness of the terms allows the judge to make decisions based on 
his per•onal opinion rather than on specific points of law." 
"I had nothing to do with getting AB1480 passed but I feel deeply indebted to you and the hurting 
fathers that wer~ instrumental in getting at least a chance of joint custody. The biggest contribution 
that could be made would be to get family law out of the courts and the adversary system, at least 
initially.• 
"I am turned off by our legal system. This decree took 1~ years. There is no reason for the ease 
with which one party can delay proceedings. We need stronger legislation directing joint legal and 
physical custody, time limits for continuances, and stronger guidelines for pressuring nonworkinq 
spouses to become self supporting.• 
"I feel if either parent wants joint physical ' legal custody it should be given without any question 
whatsoever no matter how the other parent f~~ls." 
"Children are not protecte-d Jn arEta of property rights. If a marrJagc is a contract, then I b~ltevt=" 
that they are intended to be 3rd party donee beneficiaries of that contract and have an interest in 
property of community when divorced." 
From father achieving joint custody: "The area of monetary support needs clarification. My ex gets 
$1200 a month (the same as if she had sole custody.) and l 9et no financial relief when I have the kids 
every weekend." 
"Each parent ahould be required to earn their own income to support child during their custody 
time tor any ehild over the age of 8." 
PERSONAL ADVICE: 
From a father losing request for joint physical and legal custody and not granted overnight 
visitation: "Do everythinq you can to show what a good parent you aref and continue to do so. In the 
end you will survive and be happy with your children.• 
From a father seeking joint physical and legal cust ody but winding up with sole physical custody 
and joint legal custody: "Be a nice guy under any circumstances.• 
Parent losing sole custody fight althou9h decreed joint legal custody: "My experience says that if 
the divorce proceedings become hostile adversary proceedings, first priority must go to adjusting ones 
life and affairs to b~ing with your child. Don't depend on attorneys, or judges, or the state to fix it." 
"Seek joint physicAl and le9al cuatody via mediation court prior to actual court hearing. Determine 
actual child support costa prior to hearing and require r~ceiver of th~ae pay~nts to justify and account 
for expenses. • 
"Retain an attorney willing to go to the mat on this issue, and familiar with issues for joint 
cuatody.• 
"I am fighting for my own daughter's right to be raisod by both parents, and will not give in to 
the tactica used by her mother against that goal and upheld by the local court.• 
DESPAIR 
•x would very much like to have joint custody, but have been told that I have no chance.• 
Father losing request for JC with 2-year old boy, "I wanted joint custody. My son has not stayed 
overnight with me for six months now.• 
From parent losing joint physical custody request: "Nothing was resolved; conditions have gotten 
worse. Equal physical custody should be awarded unless not wanted or dangerous to the child." 
•nave you ever tried to squeeze two weeks of missed love into 20 hours and part of that on the rolld?" 
"My faith and understanding in tho legal system concer~ing divorce is at an extreme all time low.• 
Joint custody requestor losing sole custody to opposite spouse: "My wife refused counseling. 
wasn't even asked if I wanted counseling." 




uked lor .................. x 
lobther 
asked for ............................................................ x 
Court decree ............................................ x (physical custody to father) 
boys 14,9 mother 
girl 12 pays no 
support 
Father 
asked for ................................ x 
Mother 
asked for ............................................................. x 
boy s $150 
per mo. 
Court decree ........................................... x 
Father 
girl 5 $150 
per me. 
asked for .................... x 
lobther 
asked for ............................................................ x 




asked for .................... x 
Mother 
asked for ............................................................ ~ 




: asked for .................... x U 
' Mother · 7 
I asked for ••.. ,. •.......•..•. ·" 
Court decree ................... x 
Father .. 
asked for ........................................... x bay 4 
Mother 
asked for ................... :>< 
Court decree ............................................................ ;< (to m'ther) 
Father 
asked for ., ................. x 
Mother 
asked for .... ......................... ................ .•. . ., ..... x 




asked for .......................................................... x boy 8 
Mother 
asked for ............................................................. x 






asked for .................... x 
M:>ther 
9 to mother 
12 to father 
asked for .................... x 
Court decree ................... x (split) 
FatheT 
asked for ............................................................. x 6 $150 per 
Mother 3 child. 
asked for .......................................................... .. 
Court decree........ .. . .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. . .. • • .. • .. ................ .. mther) 
Father 
uked for .......................................... x s $150 per 
M:>ther 10 child 
asked for...................................... . .......... .. per mo. 
Court decree ........................................... ·l< 
Father 
asked for ................... x boy 41, Sl90 
llbther 
asiOOc! foT ........................................................... x 
per mo. 
Court <le<:ree................................. . .. .. .. .. . . . . .. .. . ....... x (to mother) 
Father 
asked for .................... x 
girl 23 mo. 
Mother 
asked for , ......................... ., .. . • . ........ . 
Court decree ..................................... . 
~x none 
.. ............. x (to mother) 
Father 
asl<ed for .......................................... . 
M:>ther 
asked for ................... x 
Cou'!'t decree .................................... . 
................... x 









······················~·······~~·~· •.•• x. 
....................................... x (l'hy•ical to 
................ ~.......... . . . . . . . . ..... $..... . ~ ....... x 
......................................................... l( 
........ x (to 
" x (to 
to 
asked for................................... .... ... .. . . . • ...... x 
Moth<lr 
asked for............................ ...... .... ...... . ....... x 




11 ""' $150 
n 
13 









~~ .. . ..., .... o'"1> ~il.·v ., ..... 
"" ... 1. .,..,~% 
~ ... "¢ -:s-~ 
"'q_"?,. "t.,"~ ((.";, ... {' .. ~ .. .. .,. " ((..,. ..... .. c;;_ ... If' 
(%. %. ' ' 
fa tho-r 
asked for ............................................................ X 
Mother 
asked for ............................................................. x 
Court decree. • . • . . . . .. . .. .. . . • . • .. • .. • • • .. . . • .. • .. .. .. • • • . . .. .... · · · · · x 
Father 
asked for ............................................................ x 
Mother 
asked for ............................................................ x 
Court decree ................................................. · •• • .. •·· .• x 
Father 
asked for ................................ x 
Mother 
asked for ................................ x 
Court decree ........................................................... x 
Father 
asked for ................... x 
Mother 
asked for ........................................................... x 
Court d~cree ................................................ - · ·. · .. · · · .. x 
Father 
asked for ..................... x 
Mother 
asked for .................... x 
Court decree ................... x 
Fnher 
asked for ................... x 
Mother 
asked for ............................................................. x 
Court decree ............... : ................................. · ........ · .x 
Father 
asked for •...••••...••.•...•• x 
Mother 
asked for 
Court decree ••••.•.•••.•••••.••••••••. • ......... • ..... • • x 
Father 
asked for ............................................. x 
Mother 
uked for ............................................................. x 
































asked for ............................................................ x 
Mother 
2~ yr. old 
$1SO 
asked for ........................................................... x 
Court decree ................... x 
per mo. 
Father 
asked for .................. x 
Mother 
boys 18, 12 
airl 16 
asked for ............................................................ x 
Court decree ........................................... x (Physical custody to mother) 
Father 
asked for ............................................................ x girl 10 
Mother gir 1 1.4 
asked for .......................................................... x 
Court decree ........................... , ............... x 
Father 
asked for ................... x boy 31! 
Mother 
asked for ............................................................ :< 
Court decree ........................................................... x (to mother) 
Father 
asked for ................... x girl 10 
Mother girl 2 
asked for ................... x 
Court decree ................... x 
Father 
asked for girl 2'1 
Mother 
asked for ............................................................ x 
Court decree ........................................................... x (to mother) 
Father 
asked for ............................................................ x 
Moth~r 











Court d~cree .......................................................... x 
Father 
(shift to father ~·hen 
mother left state with 
children.) 
asked for ............................................................ x 
Mother 
asked for ........................................................... x 
girl 8 
bo)• s 
Court decree ........................................................... x(to r..other) 
Father 
asked for .................. x 
Mother 
asked for ....................................................... ..... x 












· .. .; ~"' ~-- ~ ..... ~· ... ,A '(~ .. r~ --- ~/ ... .;<:: ~1. ~.o,... ~~;;'"6 .... \," .. ~ ,. 
~·.O,· " ..... ~ .. ....~t" :J.~ .. ..., 
.. ~ ... ¢' ~ .. ·~ .. 't.: 
t! 
' 
,~ ( i 
I Father 
asked for girl !0 SlSO 
Mother girl S per 1:'.0. 
asked for ............................................................ x · . per ch. 
Court decree ........................................................... x (to milther) 
Father 
asked for ............................... x 10 
M:lther 
asked for ............................................................. x 
Court decree ........................................................... x (to mother) 
Father 
asked for .................... x 
Mother 
strl s 
asked for .................... x 
Court decree •.•••••••••••••••• x (11 days a month for child with father) 
Father 
asked for ............................................................. x girl 12 
libther ~tirl 16 
asked for ....................................................... ;,. .. x 
Court decree ............................................................ x (to fllther) 
Father 
uked for girl 12 
Mother boy 4 
asked for .......................... ; ................................ x 
Court decree ........................................................... x (to 1110ther) 
Father 
. asked for ................... x girl 6 
Mother 
asked for ............................................................ x 















~lo~ for .................... i boy 11 none 
boyH 
asked for ............................................................. x 
Court decree .................. x 
Father 
asked for .................... x girl 8 
Mother 
asked for ............................................. x 
Court decree ........................... ; ............... x (Physical custody to mother) 
Father 
asked for ................... x boy 5 
Mother girl l 
asked for ............................................................ x 
Court decree ••••••••••••••••.• x (father bas childml ~0\ of tlme) 
Father 
asked for ................... x boy 12 
Mother 








Court decree .................. x (Mother: S ~~ Sun. to S I'M !led; Father: S PM Wed. to S I'M Sun.) 
Father 
asked for boys S, 9 $600 
Mothar girl 7 per mo. 
asked for ............................................................ x 
Court decree ............................... , ........................... x (to mother) 
Father 
asked for girl Z 
Mother 
asked for 
Court decree ........................................................... x(to mother) 
Father 
asked for ................... x girl 5 $225 
Mother per mo. 
asked for ............................................. . 
O:>urt decree .......................................... x 
• .•. x 
Cl.llltody to mther) 
Fathar girl ' Sl7S 
asked for ........................................................... x per mo. 
Mother 
asked for ........................................................... x 
Court decree ......................................................... • ·" 
Fathar 
asked for ................... x 
!ot>tlv:r 
s ,14 $400 
~ per mo. 
eked J91' ................... x 
Coun d€ctee ........... " ..... x 
Father child 29 ::o. asked for ................... x 
Mol:har 
uked for ........................................................... x 
O:>urt decree 
l'at)l.er 
a,sked for ........................... , ................ x boy 11 $200 
M)~r per 1110. 
ul<ei! for .............................. · • ...... · • .. • .. • .. • · · .. · .... • .x , 
Court decree . .. • ... ... . . .. .. .. • ........ .... .. • ........ ... ... .. ... • .x (to mot .. er) 
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EXHIBIT I 
ASSE~ffiLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
Interim Hearings on Assembly Bill 1706 
October 14, 1981 San Diego. CA. 
STATENENT OF JOHN R. ALEXANDER, 
Commissioner of the Superior Court 
Of che State of California for the County of Los Angeles 
October 6, 1981 
Feasibility of Joint Custody: A Case S~udy Comparing the 
Frequency of Later Contested Court Proceedings Arising Out of 
Av.•ards of Exclusive vs. Joint Custody. 
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1. BACKGF.OUND 
1 cus of r children Do awards ,>f joi.~t 1 
in domestic relations cases 
later flareups of controversy 
custody? 
te a percentage of 
awards of exc sive 
If the answer is aff 
should be cautious in making or s 
, court counsel 
of joint 
ils to consent. custody, especially when one parent 
But ii the frequency of 
custody cases is significantly less 
increasing use of joint custody is 
now that we have almost two 
1979 Joint Custody Act: Cal. 
§ 4600.5 (added 1979). 
In searching for the answer to 
the undersigned began in the ter 
data for a first hand study of custo 
Department West J (Santa f 
Superior Court~ The study s 
covering a period of about two s, 
controver joint 
in exc ive cases, 
ecially 
ce under the 
e § 4600 as amended, 
question, 
t of 1978 collecting 
cases calendared in 
s les County 
er 30, 1980, thus 
t n months 
of which were after the January 1, 1980 ef 
the new legislation. 
ctive date of 
-2 
2. CONDUCT AND ~lliTHODOLOGY OF CASE STUDY 
For every case which, during the period of the study, 
went to what was presumably a "permanent" award of custody, 
usually by interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage, 
but sometimes by post-judgment order of modification, or 
further judgment upon reserved issues after entry of interlocu-
tory judgment, an index card was set up. Each card was marked 
"E" or "J" followed by a number -- "1" indicating an a'tvard 
based on agreement or stipulation of both parents, and "2" 
indicating an award made without consent of at least one 
parent. Class "2" cases were of two kinds: (a) True defaults, 
in which one parent remained totally passive and failed to 
participate in any way in the proceedings; and (b) contested 
hearings resulting in an award of custody over the express 
objection and active opposition of one party. Thus, a typical 
default dissolution with a written marital settlement agreement 
providing for exclusive custody was coded and filed under the 
heading "El," while an unconsented av1ard of joint c·ustody 
(made by this writer in December 1978) was coded "J2-l," the 
number 1 there indicating that it was the first J2 case picked 
up by the study. (The J2 cases numbered 18 out of a total of 
138, as will be seen shortly.) 
Similarly, when disputes appeared on the Dept .. J 
contested calendar involving requested changes of custody, 
schedules or conditions of visitation, or alleged wilful 
2. 
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disobedience of judgments or s re 
tion, the cards fer those cases were co 
after the letter '-"or "J," depending on 
pute arose out of d prior award exc 
custody. F~r exam?le, if a st 
custody had been ~ade in 1975 --
tion of the study -- and a contested 
for change of custody to the o 
calendar during the two-year per 
card was coded "E3." However, 
within the period of the study and 
appeared on the calendar within 
the same case had two cards, an 
referencing the other. In order to avo 
same case twice, adjustments were 
totals avoided duplication. 
Let us suppose fur 
study, the controversy in that 
stipulated award of joint cus 
new card was and in 
inclusion of the same case 
not result duplication, 
acquired a dual character. 
By time the s 
the index cards made a le sl 
high, representing 414 e fi 
cal have a pi 

























Of the total of 414 cases studied, 276 involved awards 
of exclusive custody. Eighty-seven of those generated later 
controversy serious enough to bring the case on to the con-
tested calendar in Dept. J, resulting in a percentage of contro-
versy or failure rate of 31.5% 
In the same period, 138 joint custody awards came before 
the court. Only 22 of these flared up in later contested court 
proceedings, resulting in a percentage of 15.9%. 
It is therefore accurate to state that joint custody 
works twice as well as exclusive custody; or one could state 
that the failure rate in joint custody cases is only one-half 
that of exclusive cases. 
Details appear in TABLE 1, attached hereto and incorp-
orated by reference herein. Note that in addition to the 
final totals, interim figures are given for three dates during 
the pendency of the study, showing a reasonable range of varia-
tion in the percentages. Note also that throughout the study, 
about 30% of the total cases involved awards of joint custody. 
Analysis of the 138 joint custody cases vABLE 1, line 5) 
is shown in the breakdown appearing in TABLE 2, indicating a 
raw preliminary total of 151, but after adjustment for overlap 
(see P.3, supra), containing a net total of 138. Similar data 
exists for the exclusive cases, showing adjustment from a raw 
preliminary total of 284 dotvn to a net total of 276, but details 
are omitted in the int:erest of brevity. 
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LJ. 
Returning to 1: Is cases ----
(line 3) arti c lly h cause 
number of such proceedings r exclu-
sive custody to joint? No, as of se E3 cases 
shows (time, personnel, and avai li 0 f it 
impossible to check the rema 8 e s out of 
those 69 E3 proceedings, or 8. 7%, j custody. 
remainder asked to exc one 
parent to the other, or involved over s tion. 
For all practical purposes, j is the only 
alternative to exclusive cus A alter-
native -- placement of chil justified 
only in those rare cases when s t; 
and t a domest re le cause 
that this unfortunate situa tment 
of the court most like j 
diction as a juvenile court, se made 
in any dissolution or paternity se 
look at the joint custody 
Consider that 
the e ective date of the Jo be that 
a sproportionately were made 
wi that per If so, :.t e 
has bePn too short a t e for controver f e that 
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the joint custody r:·ercentages herein stated are unrealistically 
low. 
The facts :oint in the op?osite direction: Although 
more than one-ha 1 i of the joint a~.vards v1ere made in or after 
January 1980, the inflmv was still fairly even, as reflected 
in TABLE 3: Note particularly hm.; those comparatively rare 
cases -- unconsented joint awards (J2) -- were spread out: 
4 in the latter part of 1978, 8 in 1979, and 6 in the first 
nine months of 1980. 
This data points up a proposition that is often over-
looked: Joint custody as a decisional technique should not 
be characterized by the apparent novelty which its recent 
statutory recognition might imply, because joint custody 
awards have been recognized by California case law since the 
early 1950s, if not before. See BURGE V. CITY & COUNTY OF 
SAN FR1u~CISCO, 41 Cal. 2d 608 (1953) and MARRIAGE OF NEAL, 
92 Cal. App. 3d 834, at 839-40 (1979). The truth seems to be 
that joint custody has been badly neglected, despite its solid 
legal basis. Thus, in one sense the Joint Custody Act was 
superfluous and unnecessary; but in another sense that statute 
served a useful purpose by publicizing the concept and encourag-
ing its increased use. 
If one compares lines 1, 2, and 3 of TABLE 2 (joint 
custody breakdown), it is readily apparent that the vast major-
ity of joint awards resulted from the agreement of both parents 
(Jl). From this it might be argued that most, if not all, of 
the 22 J3 controversies must have originated in the 18 uncon-
sented awards (J2). If substantially more than one-half of 
-244-
6. 
the J2 awards did generate later controver 
failure rate would cast t on 
decisional technique, because court 
to decide cases which will s ize 
create more litigation. As 
NEAL, supr~. 92 Cal. App. 3d 
court a d 
t 
"In all events, there i 
among the legal writers 
an award of 'joint cus 
unless the parents agree to it. 
Let us test the accur 
alization by closely scrutini 
those 18 J2 cases. Results 
that the conclusionary asser 
cited in NEAL, not backed 
this one, are seriously error. 
The truth is that 12 
NO later controversy. 0 
this kind of joint custody award 
have so confidently procla as 
only 1.8% higher the rate 
(31. Si~; see TABLE 1, 
advocate as the eferab 
Analogizing for a moment to 
joint custody ' team can 
exclusive opposition's st team, 














t tory of 
show 
ted experts 
case studies like 
2 cas s generated 








A similar tabulation (details omitted in the interest 
of brevity) was made as a follow up of 23 E3 controversies 
which were settled by joint awards-- 14 by agreement (Jl), 
and 9 by unconsented joint award (J2): How stable were 
those joint awards? Answer: Extremely stable; only 3 out 
of 23 flared up later on the contested calendar during the 
period of the study. 
C, Time Lapse Factor 
Some astute readers who have followed the unconsented 
atvards in TABLE 3 into their later history in TABLE 4 may 
have observed that all four of the J2 awards made in 1978 
reappeared on the contested calendar before September 30, 
1980, but that only two of the remaining J2 awards revealed 
later controversy. If we put aside case J2-16, J3-22, in 
which an appeal was filed immediately after the court made 
its unconsented award in August 1980, there 'l.vas only one 
other such case: J2-3, decided in April 1979. 
Do these numbers mean that so many joint custody 
awards came in so late in this study that there has not yet 
been time for disputes to grow into the kind of controversy 
which vwuld bring them in tv court again? If so, it might 
be argued that the number of contested proceedings arising 
out of joint custody awards (J3) is unrealistically low and 
the smaller percentage of controversy here derived for joint 
awards is not accu:rate. 
-246- 8. 
Based on a detailed ana 
TABLE 2, line 3, the period of 
inal joint custody award to 
on the contested calendar was tota 
13. 18 months. However, t>vo cases 




were eliminated, the average .2 
Scientific soundness 
of all cases in the ~tudy 
after the closing date of S 
seem 
doubts that such a reviev1 would cause 
in the percentages already ca 
recollection of the cases 
ember 1980. Nevertheless, it 
tions based on the data col c 
weight when up-dated and r s 
ficient time s elaps 
reappear in court. Plans are 
a review of the data at 
s 
1 2 cases, 
or 















4. EVALUATION AND FINDINGS 
It is submitted that the data tabulated and discussed 
above sustain these findings: 
1. The percentage of later contested court proceed-
ings generated by joint custody ~wards is only half that of 
exclusive custody cases. In other words, the failure rate 
of exclusive custody as a decisional technique is twice as 
high as that of joint custody. 
2. When we isolate unconsented awards of joint 
custody (J2), the percentage of controversy, even in this 
high-risk sub-sample of cases, is not significantly higher 
than in exclusive custody cases as a whole. See TABLE 4 
and discussion, pp. 7-8 supra. 
3. If an uncnnsented award of joint custody were 
as unworkable as its critics claim, ~ ~. the contention 
in the NEAL opinion, p. 7 supra, one would expect that the 
J2 cases (a) would have a percentage of controversy ranging 
from 60 to 80% or perhaps 90%, instead of 33.3%, as shown 
by data sustaining finding 2, and (b) would all reappear on 
the court's contested calendar within not more than six months. 
Neither of the above expectations is true. 
4. Consequently, pessimistic predictions by critics 
of joint custody that its widespread use would invite squab-
bling parents to bury the courts under an avalanche of petty 




5. The emotional e 
parent as a jo t custodian 
"Disneyland Dad" or "Marine 
good happen in the mind of 











case of an exclusive award; even if se a 
contested issue before the court, t custo 1 parents 
have a 30 to 40% chance of reso e f ences by 
agreement. TABLE 4. 
6. A trend in the direc 
joint custody awards may r 
of increased use of 
e t , so that 
instead of about one-third of the awar 
custody, TABLE l, line 8, p s f to 
all custodial awards 11 jo 19 
7. Exclusive cus as a 
becoming obsolete, and it s 
in cases where the parties are so 
length or where one parent's 
or cannot dealt on 
basis. 
8. A comprehensive 
cases luded this study 
ter the close of the s , i.e. 
1 so 
s been 




















1. Total number of cases 108 
2. AHards of exclusive custody 76 
3. Contested proceedings 
arising out of 
exclusive custody awards 22 
4. Percentage of controversy 
(line 3 + line 2) 0.2895 
5. Awards of joint custody 32 
6. Contested proceedings 
ar1s1ng out of joint 
custody awards 5 
7. Percentage of controversy 
(line 6 + line 5) 0.1563 
8. Proportion of joint awards 
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Nay 31, Septenber 









TABLE 2: Breakdown of Joint Custo Controversies 






or stipulation (J-1) -------------------------- 111 
Same: Based on court decision W:L 
consent of one or both parents (J-2) ---------- 18 
Contested cases involving con trover arising 
out of or based on joint award - - ------ 22 
Preliminary total (lines ) ---- --- --- - 151 
Adjustment for overlap 
--(a) Contested cases (J-3 , 
also included in 1 






--(c) Total adjustment ------------- --------- 13 
Adjusted total (line 4 - 1 5 138 
(carried back to table 1, 1 5 








































































































Contested Part Still 
e t ested Pending 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) 
1 X 
2 X X 
3 X 
4 X X 
- 5 X X 
6 X 3 -
7 X X 
8 X 
9 X X 





-15 X X 
- 6 X J3 - 22* 
J2 -17 X X 
J2 - X 
Totals: 3 15 0 1 





Custody; Court's Authority to "Grant" Joint Custody and Criteria To Be Considered 
Amends CivB COde sections 4600, 4600.1, 4606.2, and e,.600 • .5 to provide for the "grant" of 
custody rather than the "award" of custody, to set forth to be by the court 
in granting custody, and to permit court to to parties on its own 
motion. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
RESOLUTIONS COMMITTEE REPORT 
Recommend DISAPPROVE 
Reasons: 
Civil Code section 4600 presently provides that 
awarding custody of children is to both 
Consequently, courts presently have authority to award 
whether the parties ask for joint custody. 




Changing terminology from "award" to "grant" may be some psychological help to 
parties involved in a custody dispute, but does not appear to be of sufficient 
magnitude to require amending current law. 
There is a significant body of law in factors to be determined 
in making a decision as to what is in best interests of in terms of 
custody. (See Marriage of Carney 0 24 Ca1.3d [!57 Cal. Rptr • .383].) This 
resolution proposes amending section 4600 to set forth various criteria to be 
considered by the court in awarding custody, which criteria are not binding on the 
court, and the court need not make findings on each In essence, the 
resolution seeks to bring to the attention of courts various factors that may or may 
not be considered by the courts in what best interests of 
children when there is a custody dispute. amendment the law 
any more precise ln the area of child .._..,.,,."""' 
courts to give more to the nine i terns 
factors which may be even more material in a 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
SECTION/COMMITTEE REPORT 
FAMILY LAW SECTION 
Recommend DISAPPROVE 
Reasons: 
The section is greatly bothered the 
(9) are especially troublesome. The Section 
Code Section 4600., is 
TEXT OF RESOLUTION 
RESOLVED that the Conference of Delegates 
legislation be sponsored to amend Sections 
4600.2 and 4600.5 of the C 1 Code and 
Section 4600.5 of the Civil Code to read as 
1981 CONFERENCE 
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Criteria (1 ), (.5), and 


























































































































178 .purpose of assi a 
179 •hether an-awapd ~grant of joint is appropriate under 
180 this subd , the court an investiga-
181 tion be conducted pursuant to prov Section 
182 4602. If court to enter an order ewe~d~e9 
183 granting j pursuant to this subdivision, the 
184 court shall state in ts decision the reasons for denial 
185 of en-award a of oint custody. 
186 (c) For the-purposes this section, •j 
187 means an order granting of the minor child or 
188 children to both parents and provid physical 
189 custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as 
190 to assure the child or children of f and continuing 
191 contact with both parents; provided, , that such 
192 order may ewePd grant joint legal custody without ewa~e~n~ 
193 granting joint physical custody. 
194 (d) Any order for joint custody may be modified or ter-
195 minated upon the petition of one or both parents or on 
196 the court's own if it shown that the best 
197 interests of the child require or termina-
198 tion of the order. The court shall state in its decision 
199 the reasons for mod ication or terminat of the joint 
200 custody order if either parent opposes the modification 
201 or termination order. 
202 {e) Any order for the custody of the minor child or 
203 children of a marriage entered by a court th state or 
204 any other state may, subject to the jurisd re-
205 quirements set forth in Sections 5152 5163, be 
206 modified at to an order of custody in 
207 accordance wi the provisions of section. 
208 (f) In counties having a conciliation court, the court or 
209 the par es , at rsuant to rules of 
210 court, consul tion court for the pur-
211 pose of assist parties to ate a for 
212 implementation cus order to 
213 controversy which 
214 plan for cus 
215 (g) Notwithstand ion of law, access to 
216 records and i to a minor child, 
217 including but not , dental, and school 
218 records, shall not because 
219 parent is not t. 
(Proposed new 
stricken) 
PROPONENT San Diego 
1981 CONFERENCE 
Bar Assoc tion 
7-lle-81 
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age to deleted 
STA'l'I:M!NT OP UASONS 
1. Presently the tera ~best 
and its meaning is defined 
advoc:atEHI aocil that of the tr 
is needed. Attorneys will be 
effectively in custody matters 
guides judges in arriving at their 
uniformity and predictability 
neys who may not be acquainted 
enc:es and track record of each 
disadvantaged. Judges will 9 
reviewed without resorting to total 
section does not, however 1 t the 
the criteria as he sees f or to 
2. The custody provisions 
custody of children should be " 
the children. Semantics and word 
lives of parties/clients as well as 
leaves a subjective or mental 
connotes a more neutral decision 
used by courts and lawyers and the 
for the •non-prevailing• parent can 
on the manner in which parents and 
order. 
3. Civil Code Section 4600 
fusion among attorneys and 
of joint custody. Within our own 
whether joint cus may be ra 
pursuant to the under ing mandate 
in "the child's best ts"; 
issue of "j eus e 
amendment clarifies is matter 
issue of joint the 
finds joint cus in the 
4. Two ver of Sect 
has resulted, particularly s 
several of the code books. Al 
should control, specific act 
able. The proposal the 
changes in Section 
for clarity 










Amn. J. OrthopHclliul . . HI3i. Julv 19/'1/ 
DIVORCE AND PARENTING 
THE EXPERIENCE OF CHILDREN 
IN A JOINT -CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT: 
A Report of a Study 
Susan Steinman, D.S.W. 
Director, Joint Custody Study Project, Jewish Family and Children's Services. San Francisco 
The psychological experience of 32 children living in a joint-custody ar-
rangement with their parents is examined. This report is part of a larger 
study, begun in 1978, of 24 families in which parents have shared child-
rearing responsibilities and physical custody of their children following 
marital separation. Findings .mgge$1 that joint custody is not a simple 
solution, and that the reaction of children is hiKhly indil'idual. The need for 
further study is emphasized. 
D uring the last several years, joint custody of children has emerged as 
one of the m(\jor changes in family law 
concepts and is currently a controver-
sial issue among legal and mental health 
professionals. The increased attention 
to joint custody is related to several 
m(\jor social trends. First, the changing 
status of men and women in society and 
within the family. stimulated by the 
women's movement, has meant that 
more women are pursuing careers while 
men are assuming what was tradi-
tionally considered a .. mothering'' role 
with their children. This trend has 
affected custody decisions within the 
courts, as well as experimentation with 
alternative postdivorce living ar-
rangements. Secondly, the spiraling di-
vorce rate has produced a rapidly in-
creasing population of divorced parents 
and children. Current statistics show 
that, since 1973, one million children 
under the age of 18 each year newly 
experience the disruption of their family 
due to divorce. 2 Divorce is considered 
to be a major life stress. 1 The impact of 
divorce on children is gaining particular 
Submilled to the Joum11i in Julr 19RIJ. Re 1earcl1 "'" 1 .\1/fJfJOr/ed h1· The Stitt Fmnci.1co Fmmdation. a/ 
.ft·~t·i,/1 /·om ill' ami Children'' .\enke1. San Frmwi11·o. and cr11ponwred ht· Culifi)l'nia Women l.tllt'-
ren. 
0002-94321811030403-12$00.75 'c.·1981 American Orthopsychiatric Assocration, Inc. 403 
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04 
recognition. Further, the dissemination 
of research findings on the effects 
divorce on children has underscored 
postdivorce family 
key factor in the children's 
from the divorce trauma. 
most vulnerable are those 
whose relationship with their father 
disrupted following the divorce. 
additional stress on these children 
continued conflict between their 
ents. 7 These findings, combined 
other social factors, have led 
movement to challenge the traditional 
court practice of awarding 
the mother and limited visitation to the 
father, as well as to challenge the 
adversary approach to 
tody and visitation conflicts. This 
created a favorable social climate 
consideration of joint 
ternative. 
JOINT CUSTODY LITERATURE 
While joint custody has become 
increasingly popular 
versial concept, and several 
enacted legislation 
tion, we still know very little 
it works in actual 
chological effects upon the 
available literature has been 
personal and professional 
rather than on systematic 
While these writings have 
subject of joint CUStody for nrr\tP<O<: 
and public 
need to look at this 
passionately, and to assess 
ence of the children. In a 
divorced fathers, selected 
venience sample in New York 










The families in this study were re-
cruited by personal referral and by ad-
vertisements in local newspapers. In 
selecting the sample from among the 
parents who responded, the following 
three criteria were used to define joint 
custody: I) that the parents share au-
thority and responsibility for making 
decisions about the children;2) that the 
parents view themselves as equally sig-
nificant to the children and joint I y re-
sponsible for their physical, emotional, 
intellectual, and moral development: 
and 3) that the children live in two 
homes. 
For inclusion in the study, the di-
vision of time the child spends with each 
parent had to fall between 50/50 and 
67/33. (A division of time was specified 
for the purpose of assessing the chil-
dren's experience of living a significant 
period in each parental home. However, 
a broader view of joint custody-
defined by the attitudes and behavior of 
the parents-is recommended.) The 
parents also had to have been separated 
and living in ajoint-custody situation for 
a minimum of six months. 
Each parent and child was inter-
viewed by one of two clinicians* with 
specific training and experience in work 
with children. All members of the fam-
ily were interviewed separately in order 
to assure the freest expression of their 
individual viewpoints. The same clin-
ician interviewed all members of the 
family. 
Two individual clinical, semistruc-
tured interviews were conducted with 
each mother and father. Information 
gathered in the parent interviews in-
• Joyce Lindenbaum. M.S.W. or the author. 
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eluded:/) parent's personal history: 2) 
the predivorce marital and parent-child 
relationships; 3) factors in the divorce 
decision and events and duration of the 
divorcing period; 4) the divorce experi-
ence for the children-including chil-
dren's involvement in marital conflict, 
communication to the children about the 
parents' separation, and the child's re-
sponses; 5) the decision and arrange-
ment of joint custody; 6) description of 
the joint-custody arrangement: 7) ad-
vantages and disadvantages of joint 
custody for parents; 8) parent's evalua-
tion of advantages and disadvantages 
for children: and 9) parent's perception 
of child's adjustment. 
Two semistructured clinical inter-
views were conducted with each child, 
using a combination of discussion and 
play with miniature house toys and fam-
ily dolls to assess the child's feelings, 
attitudes, and modes of coping with liv-
ing in two homes and with the divorce. 
All children completed a Family Draw-
ing, providing a projective measure of 
their feelings about themselves in rela-
tion to their family. The children were 
also administered the Coopersmith 
Self-Esteem Inventory. Interviews 
were conducted with teachers to assess 
the children's adjustment and gather im-
pressions about the specific impact of 
joint custody in the school setting. Most 
of the parent and child interviews were 
conducted at home. This allowed the 
interviewer an additional view of the 
two home environments, and an op-
portunity for informal observation oft he 
child's sense of each home and relation-
ship with each parent. The interview 
data were supplemented by information 
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from a specially developed 
naire, self-administered by the 
which tapped into information 
coparenting arrangements, the relation-
ship between the 
parent-child relationship. 
SUBJECTS 
The 24 families and their 32 
resided throughout five counties in 
greater San Francisco Area. 
cause the main concern of the 
to explore the psychological 
of joint custody, the sample 
limited to legally divorced 
Seventeen of the .. ex-couples" were 
vorced at the time ofthe interviews, four 
were separated, and three had never 
married. Two-thirds of the 
been separated and maintained 
custody arrangement for four years or 
more, the range being two to nine years. 
The average length of 
eight years, with a range of two 
teen years. The average number of 
dren was 1.33, with a range 
three. The parents ranged in age 
to 50, most being in their mid 
thirties. Economically. 
erately comfortable but not 
Their incomes ranged from 
$40,000 annually, with the average 
about $16,000. All parents were 
except one who was black. 
highly educated group; 
had not attended or finished 
31 of the 48 parents had either 
degree or some A. 
the point of 
had remarried and 
living w;th a 
Significantly, these parents 
the general 
cnts in that 
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were characterized by the capacity to 
tolerate differences in e'ach other. In 
most cases, the differences in child-
rearing values and behavior were not 
ml\ior. Where tension and residual anger 
remained in the relationships, the anger 
was muted. For these couples, the hos-
tility during the marriage and divorce 
had been relatively controlled. Rather 
than making the children a battleground 
for the marital or divorce-engendered 
conflict, joint custody for these parents 
seemed to be an affirmation of the posi-
tive aspect of their marriage. Most had 
shared parenting during the marriage to 
a great extent; the children had been a 
source of mutual gratification and only 
rarely of conflict. 
Interestingly, many of these couples 
had lengthy separations. Eighteen of the 
21 legally married couples remained 
separated for two to four years without a 
final divorce, during which time they 
established an extrcijudicial joint-
custody arrangement. For some, this 
period served as a transition phase in the 
emotional divorce process: the co-
parenting helped to mute their sense of 
loss and disruption, and allowed them 
gradually to reorganize their lives. 
The educational level of the men and 
women in the sample was similar. All 
but one of the women were currently 
working, and most had been during the 
marriage. Thus, the mother's motivation 
for joint custody included their desire 
for relief from full-time child-rearing re-
sponsibilities. Most had developed a 
role other than that of parent as a source 
of self-esteem. This was an important 
factor in their ability to relinquish the 
full-time parent role. Most of the fathers 
had some flexibility in their jobs. which 
allowed them to assume daily child-
rearing responsibilities. Most fathers 
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had been actively involved with their 
children during the marriage, and had 
made parenting a priorit~ in their lives. 
The Arran}(ement.~ 
The children's fischedules and ar-
rangements for living in two houses 
were worked out in various ways by 
their parents. In half of the families, the 
children alternated homes frequently 
with a split-week schedule. A typical 
example of such an arrangement is that 
of Judy, age eight, whose parents lived 
three miles apart in Oakland: 
On Saturday, Judy was picked up by her father at 
her mother's house and stayed with her father until 
the following Tuesday morning when she went to 
school. Tuesday afternoon. Judy was picked up at 
her after-~chool day care program by her mother, 
with whom she remained until the following 
Saturday. Like most of the other children in the 
study, Judy allended the same school and day care 
program. regardless of which parent she was 
staying with. 
Twenty-five per cent of the families 
arranged a week-to-week schedule: 
Ten-year·old Steven lived one week in San Fran-
cisco with his father. and one week in Marin 
County with his mother. He attended school in 
Marin County.just a few blocks from his mother's 
home. Both parents had agreed that he should 
attend school in Marin because it was a better 
'chool 'ystem. Steven·~ father. who worked full 
time in San Francisco, drove him to school each 
morning of "his week" and picked him up in the 
evening after work. He also drove Steven to 
weekend soccer league activities. in which Steven 
was very involved. 
The remaining families had different ar-
rangements, including alternating 
homes every day, every two weeks, and 
every three months: in one family, the 
children lived a year with each parent. 
Most of the parents lived within five 
miles of one another. but some Jived in 
different counties, which required a 
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major drive or bus trip. The who 
had a year-to-year schedule lived 120 
miles apart-in a suburban town 
and a rural Northern California commu-
nity. 
Finances 
provised arrangements for 
penses. The typical system was 
each parent assumed 
day-to-day costs of food, 
entertainment when the child was with 
them, while sharing 
penses. In several cases where 
enfs income was higher, that 
took on more of the extra expenses 
as private school tuition or care. 
One set of parents pooled their income 
and divided it evenly between 
Another pair maintained a 
checking account into which 
posited equal sums of money 
for special expenses such 
lessons, gifb, etc Tax dedm:tion'> 
alternated yearly, and the 
had medical coverage 
ment would cover the child' 
care. 
Overall, the arrangements 
cooperative and 
mothers felt they had the best 
worlds in being able to pursue 
and be a part-time parent The 
very much valued their 
maintain an active involvement 
their children. Thu~ 
generally satisfying 
these parents. It 
SUSAN STEINMAN 
relationship with each parent, separate 
in their minds, and did not feel they 
confused one parent with the other. 
(Several, however, did complain that 
they called their Mom .. Dad" and vice 
versa when they switched houses; they 
found this frustrating and confusing.) 
Most were able to distinguish between 
their parents' personalities, behavior, 
and values, and seemed to accept the 
differences. While the children some-
times wished for changes in one or both 
parental homes, most appeared able to 
adapt to each household with a mini-
mum of conflict and confusion: 
Patty, age nine, who switched homes every day, 
exemplifies this adaptation to minor differences 
between parents. Patty thought her Mom was 
stricter than her Dad, and said." At my Dad's,l get 
my way a little better ... If I'm ~ick I get a little 
more attention ... I kind of change my attitude of 
where I can get to ... My Dad's more into health 
food and wheat germ stuff. My Dad will only get 
me chocolate drink with Tiger's Milk which I don't 
really want ... but the differences aren't really big 
things." 
The differences in child-rearing styles 
and values were not major in most 
families. Equally as important, the par-
ents were clear about their differences 
and able to tolerate them. But where the 
parents were in conflict over child-
rearing values or had major philosoph-
ical differences that involved the chil-
dren, the children were greatly troubled 
by it. Abo, where several of the children 
were aware of differences in emotional 
well-being or financial security between 
their parents, they worried about the 
parent who was alone or less materially 
secure and wished for that parent to 
have what the other parent had. 
Loyalty 
Loyalty conflicts are a major concern 
in assessing the psychological well-
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beingofchildrenofdivorce. Overall, the 
children in this group were not torn by 
crippling loyalty conflicts often seen in 
children whose parents are fighting over 
them or about them. This is an ex-
tremely important component of the 
joint or cooperative parenting approach 
-whether or not the children live 
in two houses. The children in this 
study, whose parents supported their 
having a positive relationship with the 
other parent, generally felt free to love 
and be with both parents. 
However, the idea that loyalty con-
flicts are nonexistent for joint-custody 
children was not borne out by this study. 
The conflicts do not disappear. Rather, 
in the absence of overt conflict, some 
children take it upon themselves, and go 
to great lengths, to be fair. Loyalty con-
cerns for about one-third of these chil-
dren manifested themselves in a 
"hyper-loyalty." These children were 
hyper-alert to their parents' feelings and 
concerned about being fair to both. This 
worry about maintaining equality is il-
lustrated by the case of Steven: 
Ten-year-old Steven, who lived alternate weeko; 
with each parent since the marital separation at 
age four, was especially sen~itive to the emotional 
up~ and downs his parents have had with the di-
vorce. He was acutely aware of their effort' and 
personal o;acrifice' in maintaining the joint-
cu,tody arrangement for him. Becau'e of this. 
Steven felt it wa' hh re,pon,ihility to divide him-
'elfevenly between them. When he wa' 'ick or on 
vacation. and 'pent more than the regular one-
week period with one parent, he was religiou' 
about arranging compen~ation of time in hi' 
'chedule for the parent he felt had been "short-
changed." Thi~ responsibility was comtricting and 
emotionally burdensome for him. 
Patty, age nine, who ~witched home' every day, 
had similar concerns about being even-handed and 
loyal to both her parent'i. But she wa; more con-
scious of this concern with equality and less bur-
dened by it than was Steven. This in~ightful young 
lady described her problem, "I'm always really 
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equal about things. When I was 
think if I kissed my Mom I 
Dad and i slill have !hal 
much. Now I feel like if . 
to my Mom when my Dad is 
exact same thing with him. 
and he ;,n·l there. I'll go 
house." 
While Pauy's concem about 
around evenly was partly due !o 
she was important and wanted 
sometimes posed problem for 
that children of divorced 
sides and say who is belter. 
things ... it worries you a lot 
something. I don't think fd have that 
parents weren't divorced." 
the joint-custody situation "'"",.,,,.<1 
issue. "II may not work out," 
you've only got seven days for 
there should be eight days a week-it 
even. I could have three days 
three days with the other parent, 
days could divide-it would 
As these 
characteristic of 
children is their 
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Geot.:mphical Oislance 
The geographical distance between 
the parents' homes may be a practical 
issue in determining the feasibility of 
joint custody. Distance is also a psy-
chological factor from the children's 
point of view. Not only did the distance 
between homes affect their daily lives in 
different ways, it had different psycho-
logical meaning to the children in this 
study. What an adult might consider to 
be geographical proximity may be expe-
rienced very differently by a particular 
child. 
Many of the children who knew the 
geography well, had confidence in their 
ability to negotiate the distance between 
homes, and had a sense that their par-
ents were accessible, considered the 
travel between homes a routine part of 
their lives: 
Nine-year-old Henry lived one week with his 
mother and one week with his father, often 
traveling by bicycle the two miles from school to 
each parent's home. When asked about the loca-
tion of his homes, he volunteered that his mother·~ 
house "was just a few blocks away" and proceeded 
confidently to instruct the interviewer as to the 
address and precise directions to his other home. 
He evidenced a sense of freedom and access in the 
arrangement. When Henry is at his mother's and 
misses his father. he said, "I would just call him 
and start talking because he's easy to get a hold of' 
and the same with his mother. 
In contrast to the children who, like 
Henry, were confident about traveling 
between homes, there were several who 
found negotiating the distance a fright-
ening experience: 
Nine-year-old Roy, whme parenh lived two miles 
apart, -.pent three days a week at hi' mother·, and 
the remaining day' with hi\ father. taking the bu~ 
from school to each home. This child, who did not 
have a clear sense of his schedule or the location of 
his parents' homes. worried about his personal 
,afety and was frightened of getting lost or going to 
the wrong house. The distance between home,, a-; 
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he experienced it p'ychololtlically. was of gre111 
~on.;crn to him. When Roy Wti' usked whul he 
would say to another hoy whose parents were 
getting a divorce. he advised, "Tell him that his 
mother and father might live close together and 
then he could go and live with the other person and 
get to see them. That never happened to me." In 
reality Roy did gel to see both parents, but rather 
than feeling that he had access to both--as the 
adults would hope--Roy experienced a lack of 
understanding and control over his life. 
Another eight-year-old boy, who openly missed 
his mother and preferred living at her house, wor-
ried that the distance between his parents' 
homes-particularly access to his mother's-
would become problematic as the price of gasoline 
rose. 
There was a third group of children for 
whom the geographical distance was a 
stress, but who were able to master it: 
For 11-year-old Jim. the geographical distance 
wa\ not a source of insecurity but rather an incon-
venience. which he resented but was quite able to 
manage. Jim took several buses from Berkeley to 
San Francisco on Friday afternoons to be with hi\ 
father until Monday morning. He continually 
complained that his parents' hou,es were "so far 
apart." But unlike Roy, Jim felt he had some 
choice and that the gratifications outweighed the 
inconvenience. Jim explained, "I pay the price of 
going across the Bay but it's well worth it 'cause I 
see both my Mom and my Dad." 
Jim ardently wished his father would move closer 
to his mother·~ house where his school and friends 
were. He wanted to spend time with his father but 
felt the disruption in his social life. and resented 
the long bus trips. A generally mature and realistic 
11-year-old. Jim allowed himself a fantasy re-,olu-
tion to his problem. When asked about hi-, three 
wi'>hcs, he admitled that he wanted to he able to 
fly--then he would he able to fly ucrt'" the Hay 
and stop in at his Dmf s house every day after 
".:hool. 
For ten-year-old Hobbie. the 120 miles between 
his parent•,' homes created a mqjor disruption in 
his life. Bobbie ha-. lived one year with ht~ mother 
and one year with hi;, father since the separation at 
age 5\12. When both parents lived in the ;,ame 
neighborhood. he wa;, able to ride a bike over to 
the other parent'' house to have dinner or just 
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try, Bobbie says, "h won't be 
2112 hour drive .. it makes a 
the houses are so far npar! " 
hb schedule, the of 
attempt to avoid the feelings of 
ness at leaving the school, friends, 
hood where he'd lived for most of 
to live with his mother for the year. 
ically discussed his scheduie,"We!l, 
year we switch off ifs not really 
you make friends in one 
switch over to the other one, as 
reallystable.lt'skindofhardto 




divorce and did not indicate that they 
felt responsible for it. 
Reconciliation Fantasies 
Four out of five of these children 
wanted their parents to live together, 
and wished for their family to be re-
united. They did not think that their par-
ents would in fact reconcile, yet the wish 
for the family to be together remained an 
important emotional issue: 
Annie, age eight, demonstrated thi~ ability to ap-
praise the family situation realistically while at the 
same time maintaining the wish that everyone be 
together. Annie switched houses every two weeks 
and had been injoint custody since age three. Both 
of her parents were living with other partners. 
When asked if children could make their parents 
get back together, Annie asserted, .. Hardly ever!" 
She then proceeded to describe a joint-custody 
situation that would magically turn into a recon-
ciliation. She envisioned a child who would switch 
houses with increasing frequency, going "one 
week-one week, then two days-two days, then one 
day-one day, then no days and the parents would 
be together because they'd see their son or 
daughter wanted that." 
MichaeL was nearly five when his parents sepa-
rated. When interviewed at age seven. he under-
stood that his parents divorced because" Mom and 
Dad were in a lot of arguments." His mother had 
remarried and his father had lived with a new 
partner for a significant period of time. He 
doubted his parents would get back together, but 
when asked what he didn't like about living in two 
houses, Michael shared his wish that everyone 
live together in one big house-that father and hi~ 
live-in partner would move to his mother's hou~e 
(the original family's home). Michael ~olved the 
problem of his mother's remarriage and father's 
new relationship by proposing that father and his 
new partner move to mother's downstairs, which 
had been converted into a rental unit. 
Nine-year-old Patty was among the children who 
used their capacities to understand and adapt well 
to the divorce. She was very cognizant of the 
realities of her parents' relationship, but acknowl-
edged her wish to "check out'" life in her original 
family. ··My crazy great-aunt think~ my parent~ 
will get married again. I don't but if, a wish of 
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mine ... I'd like to know what it's like with par-
ents who are together. . 'cause I didn't know it.! 
was two years old. I always wonder what ifs like 
living with your mother and your father and maybe 
a sister or brother-a real sister or brother-and 
now I cannot have an official sister or brother." 
While these children were impressive 
in their ability to appraise realistically 
the problems in their parents' relation-
ship, and most had achieved an age-
appropriate understanding of their par-
ents' divorce, the wish for reconciliation 
remained underground. Joint custody 
provides children an opportunity to wit-
ness ongoing cooperation between their 
parents on their behalf. While giving 
them a sense of their continuing im-
portance in their parents' lives, it may 
also keep alive the wish for the reunited 
family. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although the topic of joint custody 
has generated a great deal of recent 
interest among legal and mental health 
professionals, much of the available 
information-both pro and con-has 
been based on opinion and personal or 
professional values. This report is the 
first of a study that attempts to take a 
more dispassionate look at the problems 
of joint custody, and to help take the 
arguments out of the abstract. A sub-
sequent paper will focus in greater depth 
on the parents, explore the issue of re-
marriage and joint custody, and contain 
a follow-up report on the families_ 
The present findings indicate that, in 
general,· the parents who chose joint 
custody found the arrangement satis-
factory despite some difficulties; they 
felt it to be congruent with their value 
system, life-style, and relationship with 
their children. Their children's experi-
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Abstract of the Dissertation 
EMOTIONAL ADJUS'fMENT OF BOYS IN SOLE CUSTODY AND JOINT 
--
CUSTODY DIVORCES COMPARED WITH ADJUSTfi!ENT OF 
BOYS IN HAPPY AND UNHAPPY MARRIAGES 
Presented to the Faculty of the 
CALIFORNIA GR~DUATE INSTITUTE 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
by 
Everett Quentin Pojman 
July 1981 
Leo Weisbender, PhD, Dissertation Chairman 
Introduction 
Recently, joint custody of children has been tried by some 
divorcing parents as an alternative to the traditional sole 
custody. Theorists have conflicting opinions in terms of 
sharing custody. Some theorists believe tha~ sole custody 
is the only healthy approach to child rearing following a 
divorce, whereas other theorists believe that joint custody 
is preferred. This research was an attempt to compare the 
emotional adjustment of boys in these two groups. Two other 
groups were used as controls to determine how these boys of 
divorce differed from boys living in families where marriages 
remained intact. These groups were happily married and un-
happily married. The questions explored were: Is joint 
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matched on demographic variables. Three diffe 
tools were used to assess the boys: the Lou 
Checklist (parents' rating), the Inferred Se 
measurement( 
Scale 
(teachers' rating), and the California Test of Pers ty 
(child's rating). The results of the rating s were 




Results supported the hypothesis that boys of happily married 
parents were significantly better adjusted on the 
Test of Personality and the Louisville Behavior Che t, 
respectively, than were boys of sole custody (J2.< .Ol)(J2.< .01), 
and boys of unhappily married parents (J2. < • 01) ( < • ) • How-
ever, no significant difference was reported 
Self-Concept Scale. Boys of happily married o 
demonstrated significantly better adjustment on 
Adjustment part of the California Test of Personality ( .01), 
and on 4 of 12 subtests within the same test when c to 
boys of joint custody. No significant differences were reported 
on the other two instruments. It was demonstrated that of 
joint custody were significantly better emotionally sted 
than boys of sole custody and the unhappily married group on 
both the Louisville Behavior Checklist (Q< .01) rred 
Self-Concept Scale (J2.< .01). There were no significant differences 
on any total test or subtest between boys of s cu and 
boys of unhappily married parents. 
Conclusions 
Hypothesis 1 was partially accepted while 
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ses 2, J, 
and 4, were fully confirmed. The results th indicate 
that boys of joint custody are tter of sole 
'• 
custody and boys of parents who are unhappily The re-
search also demonstrated that sole custody d has no more 
adverse emotional effects on a child a home where 
the parents are unhappily married. Converse , the results 
support the possibility that a si cou improve with a 
change from an unhappy marital situat to a jo custodial 
divorce situation. 
Recommendations 
While the findings confirm the advantages 
thereby supporting the theorists who 
is a ferred approach to child rear 
more research is needed on similar subje 
areas to see these results can be ne 
of the country. A randomized sample would 
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Elihu H. Harris 
Ch<1irman 
May ll, 1981 
Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
11th <1nd "L" BuilcHng, Room 820 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Dear Assemblyman Harris: 
I am writing to express the strongest pass opposition 
to AB 1706 currently schedulc~d for hearing before your Committee 
on \'Jednc~sday, May 13, 1981. I h.1ve been the Domestic ntions 
Judge for the San Francisco P>upe1ior Court for more than four 
years. In th<1t capacity and on behalf of the CaliFornia Judges 
Association, I testified on behalf of legislation amending Civil 
Code Section 4600 to provide joint custody as an equal alterna-
tive to sole custody, and I :~trongly support t concept. 
However, I am strongly opposed to AB 1706 whi 
that there be joint custody unlc·~s one of the parent 
to be unfit to have custody. This concept tota 
primary concept of the best jnteLest of on 
looks to whether or not a pa.·ent is unfit. A parent can be a 
fit parent, but this does not medn that joint cus would be 
successful for the child or the Darents. I fact, unles the 
parent is a 900d candidate for joint cus , wil be a dis-
as t:er for the child c:v(~n thongh i he parent is a fit paront. 
As a practical matter, we have had almost no 
joint custody in Si:ln Francisco, since Civil Code Sect 
was amended effective J<1nuary l, 1980. A st all of 
custody. <1rrangements ch we have arranged since t 
c<1ses in which our court counselors recommended to 
that they try joint custody. This shows two 
s s for 
4600 
shows that in many places in the state there is no great interest 
from any large number of parents to have joint cus Second-
ly, it shows that joint custody can only work in circumstances 
where the parents <1re good c.1ndirl<1tes for joint cus and such 
an arranqcment would be benericirtl to the child. 
T\T3 1.706 tot-c:dly i<JilOH's fh,, b0st interest of the child :1nd 
JrJand<~tes ! hat l:h(~rc be joint en~;! ody unless the col r finds one 
of the parents to be unfit. This will promote chi custody 
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Elilu1 M. Hdcris 
i·L y ll 1981 
Two 
lit yat , where one paren 1s 
to he: unfit and, in effect 1 
ch California eliminated 
vorce. 
I urge your Conuni ttee to dn 
not pa s t out of Committe<'. 
DBK/jrs 
cc: Charles Imbrecht, Vice 
Howard Berman 
Gary Hart 
Walter M. Ingalls 
lliam Leonard 
lister McAlister 





l'v1Zlx ne Waters 
Ph 11 D. Wyman 
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Honorable Elihu Harris 
Chairperson, Assembly Judiciary 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Assemblyman Harris: 
May 7 19 1 
. 
l 
I am writing to express my strong oppos ion to Assembly 
Bill 1706, which you and members of the Assembly Judie 
Committee are presently consider 
Let me say at the outset that I have been since 
1970 in a study of the effects of d on children . 
My work has been done largely in California but has been 
published widely in professional lega journals, 
and in a book entitled How Children 
and Parents Cope with , ished in May, 
1980. The work which my colleagues have pursued has 
been nationally and internationally zed as the major 
body of knowledge that exists the e feet of 
divorce on children. I was also a member of the Family 
Law Advisory Commission to the Senate 
Administration of Justice, as well as a 
Commission on Law and Mental Health of the State Bar of 
California. I speak, therefore, on the basi of many years 
of work and a very special cornrnittment to children and 
parents in divorcing families. 
My concerns are the following: There is no research 
evidence anywhere that joint cu is better arrange-
ment for all children in divorc own 
work, which has indeed stressed of continu-
ity with both parents, has been this 
presumption of joint custody. I want to say unequivo-
cally that this is an unwarranted concl from my work. 
Joint custody is a complex arrangement within post-divorce 
families which requires very special and extraordi-
nary cooperation and committment from It is, 
in my view, a viable option which should be made available 
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I have one other con 
I would l to note 
again an issue which 
consideration of 
in custody del 
mud slinging contests 
into the courts. I am 
at defaming the other 
interests of the child 
ship in the post 
For all these 
Committee not 
able to testi 
in any other 
the Judiciary 
reasons, I would 
to pass AB 1706. 
personally, but wou 
Thank you very much. 
JW/mg 
cc: Ms. Lette 
Consultant to 
















bor Code compensa· 
§ 4703 DEERING'S CIVIL 598 
litem, may bring an action in the superior 
court against the errant parent for the sup-
port, maintenance, or education of the child. 
[1969 ch 1608 § &.} Cal Jur 3d Family Law 
§§ 306, 31 J; Witkin Procedure pp 2358, 
2372; Witkin Summary (8th ed) pp 1015, 
4639, 4653. 
§ 4704. [Amendment of child support or· 
der without terminating support at age of 
majority.] (a) Any order issued prior to 
March 4, 1972, providing for support for a 
child may be amended or modified by the 
court having jurisdiction to increase or de-
crease the amount of such award without 
terminating such award at the age of major-
ity based on 18 years of age. 
(b) This section does not constitute a 
change in, but is declaratory of, the existing 
law. [1974 ch 81 § 1.] Cal Jur Jd Family 
Law §327. 
§ 4705, [Credit for payments for support 
of child made pursuant to the Social Secu· 
rity Act or Railroad Retirement Act.] In 
any case in which the court has ordered a 
noncustodial parent to pay for the support, 
maintenance, and education of a child, pay-
ments for the support of such child made by 
the federal government pursuant to the So-
cial Security Act or Railroad Retirement 
Act because of the retirement or disability of 
the noncustodial parent and transmitted to 
the custodial parent each month shall be 
credited toward the amount ordered by the 
court to be paid for that month by the 
noncustodial parent for support of the child 
unless the payments made by the federal 
government were taken into consideration by 
the court in determining the amount of 
support to be paid by the noncustodial par-
ent [1979 ch 69 § 1.] 
TITLE 6 
Property Rights of the Parties 
Court's equal division of community and quasi-community roperty, and award of 
particular asset or additional award or offset: 1gnment of "community 
property personal injury damages." 
urisdiction of spouse's community and quasi-comm 1ty real property by virtue of 
service of summons. 
§ 4800.6. Not e by attorney of community property liabil~ . 
§ 4801. Circu tances considered in marking supp " order: Findings with respect to 
c umstances: Modification or revoc Ion of order: Termination of liability. 
§ 480L5. Presump · of decreased need and m ·fic.ation of support payment of party 
coha ting with person of op tte sex. 
§ 4801.6. Enforcement of usa! support order.tf>y assignment of wages. 
§ 4801.7. Payment of spousa upport to cou~ officer. 
§ 4802. Contract altering s ses' legaytelations: Restriction to property or to support 
during separat on)'harriage's dissolution: Consideration. 
§ 4803. "Quasi-community propert "· ersonal property constituting. 
§ 4804. Same: Exclusion from "sep a property." 
§ 4805. Enforcement of decree, j)tdgmen or order: Order in resorting to kinds of property 
of spouse(s). / 
§ 4806. Withholding of allowance to one pa out of separate property of other party: 
When pe~ted. 
§ 4807. Court's discretiop: as to proportions of pro y subjected to child support. 
§ 4809. Service of noti¢' prerequisite to validity of su uent order: Service on attorney. 
§ 4810. Revision of lfoperty disposition, on appeal. 
§ 4811. Severabilit of agreement's provisions from other ovisions as to property and/or 
s port: Orders for child support or for port of either party, and 
odific.ation or revocation 'thereof: Time statute e 
§ 4812. Orde for support of spouse on discharge in bankruptcy. 
§ 4813. Ju · diction over property of spouse when service by publication. 
§ 480 [Court's equal division of com-
muni and quasi-community property, and 
award of particular asset or additional 
a1vard or offset: Assignment of "community 
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EXHIBIT P 
lOS ANGElES COUNTY SUPERIOR 
FAMILY lAW DEPARTMENT 
GUIDELINES FOR INITIAl ORDER TO SHOW 
The schedule set forth below represents 
amounts which counsel may care to use in 
with clients on temporary support matters. 
binding upon the court or the parties. 
a consensus of suggested 
and in consultation 
figures and text are not 
SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT 
The following support schedule is based total net monthly income 
after the usual standard mandatory deductions. 
SPOUSE 
NET ONE CHILD ALONE SPOUSE AND 3 OR 
MONTHLY SPOUSE (MORE THAN ONE, NOT AND MORE 
INCOME AlONE OVER AMOUNT IN COLUMN e· 1 2 CHiLDREN CHilDREN 
$ 400 $100 $ 8U $100 $100 $100 
500 150 100 150 150 150 
600 200 150 250 250 250 
700 250 175 350 350 350 
800 250 225 375 400 400 
900 300 225 400 425 450 
1000 325 250 450 475 500 
1200 400 275 500 550 600 
1400 460 300 560 630 700 
1600 530 325 640 720 800 
1800 600 350 720 8!0 900 
2000 650 400 800 900 1000 
Above 
2000 33VJ 40% 45% 50% 
Tn order that employment not be discouraged, if petitioning spouse 
is employed, approximately one-half that spouse's net earnings will be 
deducted from the indicated spousal support and will be in 
setting child support. Other benefits or compensation from whatever source 
will be considered. Child care costs for the parent will be 
deducted from gross income in calculating the custodial ·s net 
earnings. 
Car, furniture, credit union payments, 
similar payments and financial requirements 
tion ar:d may affec£ the: schedule, as will the 
*Support amounts per child 
Dated: January 28, 1981 
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estate taxes, and other 
be taken into con-;idera-
?.sset~ m~ct !;"'!_:,!!ities. 
child may be less. 
Monthly 
RELATIONS RULES FOR SACRAMENTO 
COUNTY SFPERIOR COURT 
fective 0) 
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October , 198 
ASSEMBLY COMMITTE ON JUDICIARY 
Hon. Elihu M.&arris, Chairman :· 
1127 11th Street 
Room 820 
Sacramento, CA 11 
He: AB 1706 




I would like to enter into the record the fol remarks and obser-
vations in tion to the extemporaneous remarks I was honored to 
be allowed to make at the hearing yest on the above referenced 
bill. Let me ace these remarks by stat that I am an attorney, 
practicing prim~ri y in the field of family law, mostly in Orange 
County, but also in the surrounding counties of Los Angeles, 
Riverside, San Bernardino and San Diego. These remarks are based 
on my own experience, as well as my observations in court, and 
conversations with litigants involved in cust matters, other 
attorneys, and court and Conciliation Court personnel. 
To begin with, I bnlieve that Mr. Stirl 's concern, as 
apparent "Ba kaniz.ation" or the California court , as wel 
Chairman's concern, as t the pracitce of the courts in i g, 
or at least l to lement the law as i now stands, is based 
V9ry much on reality. These concerns are well It seems 
that each sets it's own standards for the ementation or 
non- lementation of the custody law. In fact, each branch court 
of counties such as Los Angeles, which has several, has it's own 
procedures standards, usually set either by the presiding judge 
or the commiss handl most OSCs in Fami Law departments. 
This is how the situation appears to the fami law Practitioners 
in those court . The on constant in these courts seems to be 
a reluctance, or an refusal, to joint custody except 
in those rare cases wherein Loth ies agree to such an order, 
usually at the of the Conciliation Court. As you are aware, 
the courts have had the power to do just that, and, in this 
respect, AB 1408, now CC 4600 et seq., has had no impact. In some 
extreme cases, the pres judicial officer has even refused to 
award joint cust when both parties, and their at , have 
joined in such a request. ~his is admittedly a rare situation, and 
has J.y once, to my certain knowl , when Commissioner 
Jules Barnet , now retired, who then presided over the OSC department 
in the Beach branch court of Los An es, refused to a 1 low a 
joint cust because he did not "believe in joint custody". 
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such denial of meaningful relationships with a parent, on the children. 
I believe there is no argument that such denial is harmful. The 
Legislature has already determined that frequent and continuing 
contact with both parents is in the best interests of children. 
The corollary then, is that denial of such contacts is detrimental 
to ~uch best interests. Therefore, we must look for a way to 
increase the contacts, as by joint physical custody arrangements, 
and, if necessary, such arrangements being imposed by the courts, 
rather than left to the wishful hope of agreement by angry, vengeful 
non-cooperative parents. 
Please note that I am speaking of joint physical custody arrangements, 
wherein both parents share in responsibility, as well as the right, 
of actual custody of the children. For many years, awards of some-
thing called joint legal custody have been made by the courts, as 
a cosmetic cover-up of the fact that the parent without physical 
custody has no meaningful access to the children, nor any possibility 
of influencing their behavior, or, in fact, any real hope of a family 
relafionship. Joint legal custody without physical custody is a 
cruel hoax, perpetrated on one of the parents and on the children. 
Tho concept should be eliminated from our statutes, and tho only 
joint custody should be physical, tho only meaningful arrangement. 
As to whatever rights parents may think joint legal custody gives 
them, they are an illusion. Usually, these are the rights guaranteed 
to any non-custodial parent under the provisions of CC 4600.5 (g). 
In an arrangement whereby children see one parent only four days 
per month, there can be no real decision sharing. 
I believe that orders for real joint physical custody would decrease, 
not increase, further litigation. It is my experience and observation 
that most custody modification attempts and contempt cases arise out 
of unsatisfactory sole custody orders. This contention is clearly 
supported by Commissioner Alexander's reasearch. And, of course, 
Commissioner Alexander is uniqtwly qualtfied to speak to this issue, 
as he is the only judicial officer of whom I have knowledge that has 
consistently, for years, made joint custody orders. Generally, a 
parent who has been deprived of a meaningful relationship with his 
children will, sometimes many times, seek to increase his time with 
them, leading to battles for expanded visitation, changed sole custody, 
attempted joint custody, contempt actions for denial of visitation, 
attempts to pressure the custodial parent by withholding support 
payments, and so on ad nauseum. Simple logic would indicate that 
a mean~ngful joint custody order would eliminate much of this 
wrangling. 
What then, would be the solution to these problems? In my opinion, 
a valuable first step would be the adoption of the Kapiloff bill, 
with some revisions, and one more change. The most important 
revision I see is the one Mr. Kapiloff has already promised, the 
deletion of the unfitness phrase. Note that virtually all of the 
opposition to the bill focussed on this issue. At present, the issue 
of parental fitness is the central one in most custody fights, which 
usually involve sole custody battles. I would recommend borrowing 
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the language of CC 4601, the visitation statute, and, in ace of 
the phrase concerning fitness, substitute the wording, "unless it 
is shown that such an order would be detrimental to the best interests 
of the child". This statement, combined with the other exception, 
unless the parties agree to another , would prevent 
this type of order from being imposed in ate cases. There 
would then be two circumstances where joint not be 
awarded, first, where the parents didn't want it, and second, where 
the court determined, based on evi it shouldn't be vrdered. 
The second changer would make in the law would be to make 
it mandatory that a party or parties joint custody 
would submit a plan for the implementation such an order, rather 
than discretionary on the court. The court would, of course, be 
free to reject the plan and substitute one of it's own, if it felt 
it would be more appropriate in the case. I would certainly 
retain the language in the present law that an order for joint custody 
might be modified or terminated if it is shown that the best interests 
of the children require it. See CC 4600.5 d). I woul absolutely 
eliminate ~he language in CC 4600.5 (c) that the court 
could order joint legal custody without joint ical 
custody, for reasons outlined at len above. 
May I say here, parenthetically, that the elimination of the facade 
of joint would make Assemb 
b 11, A.B. 2202 unnecessary. I great admire Mr. 
attempts to protect children of divorce an insure 
divorcing , but in this case, I believe 
directed. 
present 
Imbrecht for his 
to 
efforts are mis-
Now, as to the icality of on 
non-consent parents: First, may I lawsuits, 
the resu t is an order that one, somet not 
like, and sometimes violent1y disagree wi However, I have never 
s n court fail to send a convicted cr to inement because 
he didn' agree with the order, nor to t aren that he would 
not have to pay support because he didn't agree with the order. As I 
stated yesterday, the court has the power to enforce it' orders, both 
by the contempt power, and by tak cus from non-cooper-
ative parent and giving sole custody to the other. This would 
certain be an incentive to agree with pr. 
Trombetta's statement that most , and would 
with the orders of the court. 
In summary then, I believe that AB 1706 is necessary to ensure the 
best interests of children of p s, that 
the le fiction of joint le should 
be eliminated, and that joint 
bo made ical and enforceable. 
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Once again, I thank this committee for the opportunity to present 
my views, and again would like to take the opportunity to express 
my admiration for the professional ~nJ intelligent conduct of the 
hearing in San Diego, and for the searching and cogent questions 
and comments of the members of the committee. 
Sincerely, 
ALLEN R. McMAHON, Attorney at Law 
ARM:hs 
cc: Assemblyman Lawrence Kapiloff 
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JAMES A. MALKUS 
JUOGI! OF THE SUPERIOR COURT 
FAMILY COU 
PLEASE RESPOND TO: 
325 SO. MELROSE DRIVE 
ISTA, CA ll%083 
7!16•66:!11 
October 15 
Assemblyman Elihu M. Harris, Chai 
California Legislature Ass 
Committee on Judiciary 
1127 11th St., Room 820 
Sacramento, Ca. 95814 
Dear Assemblyman Harris and Hon. 
ITEM B 




Thank you for the opportuni I had yesterday speak 
Having 
e yesterday, 
before your Committee on Assembly B lls 1706 
heard the input from so many knowl 
I am even more strongly convinced that 
intentioned, Assembly Bill 1706 should 
Shared parental responsibilit es 
dissolved is extremely important for the we 
Our mediation efforts in Conciliation Courts 
state in concert with the efforts of 
this red parenting is working ve y 
a j , I was somewhat offended the 
that j s were not ordering sha 
l) routinely because of their 
go nto this court and ot r cour 
studied in my position as presiden 
Chapter of the International Associa 
Cour , I can attest to fact tha 
evaluated court staff and 
this manner the best interes s 
As Bill 1706 would promote 
the benefits of joint cus ins 
we have now bui t toward shared c s 
29 
ve y we 1 
marriage is 
e of ldren. 
oughout this 
s to promote 
am not 
heard 
s to disprove 
r t efforts 
California Legislature Assembly 
Committee on Judiciary 
October 15, 1981 
Page 2 
Please consider the necessity of keeping these cases 
out of the courtroom, something which we have accomplished 
in the past few years, and consider that the passage of 1706 
will only bring such cases back into the battlefield again. 
Very truly yours, 
~~ 
MB: im 
cc: Hon. Charles Imbrecht 
Hon. Howard Berman 
Hon. Gary Hart 
Hon. Walter Ingalls 
Hon. William Leonard 
Hon. Alister McAlister 
Hon. Jean Moorhead 
Hon. Richard Robinson 
Hon. DAve Stirling 
Hon. Larry Stirling 
Hon. Art Torres 
Hon. Maxine Waters 
Hon. Phillip Wyman 
Hon. Donald King, Judge 
Hon. Michael I. Greer, Judge 
Hon. William L. Todd, Jr., Judge 
Mr. Hugh I1cisaac 
- 2 -
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AMembf.umcm E£ihu H~ 
Frederic W. Ilfeld 
PSYCHIATRY 
Alhambra Psychotherapy Center 
718 ALHAMBRA BOULEVARD 
SACRAMENTO, CA 95816 
(916)441-1925 
C haAAinan., AM embly JucUuMy Camm...{;t;te.e. 
S.ta;te. Capilal Bu.ilcUng 
Sa.cJLame.nta, Ca.£. 95814 
Ve.alt AJ.J.oemblyman H~. 
In my Oe.tabett 14 te..oti.monCJ be.fio!1..e. the. AM embR.y 
e.vwu.gh :time. to .ope.ak about that paf1...t.,Lan. ofi A .• B. 1106 
CouJI-t to aWMd j ain,t le.ga.£ cu.J.Jtady wilhout a.waJuiing 
I w.i..;.,h :the. 6oilawing .otateme.nt to be adde.d :to the. 
ITEM 
21 981 
1 did nat have. 
option {)011.. a 
c.u.J.J:tody. Can.oe.que.n,tly, 
o11..al :te..o:tima n.y. 
I .6uppott:t 11..emaving .the. di.otinc;tion be;twee.n and joi.nt .t'egat c_u.otody 
a.o ptwvide.d in A.B. 1706 6of1.. .oe.vettal fl..eMan.J.J. mu own cLi.vuc.a.t ob.oe.11..vation.o a.o we..U 
a.o fi!1..om o.theM' te..oti.mony, I 6ind that :the. CaUf1..:t i-6 clAcumven:tl.ng wha.t i-6 c.on.oide.11..ed by 
mo.o:t paJu? .. n:t..o :the mo.o:t: impof1...tant p11..ovi.oion o 6 "joint c.u.J.Jtody" (e.. g. fi!1..e.quent and c.ontinuJ.ng 
c.on:tae.t with bo:th pMent.oJ by g11..awng "joint le.gal c.u.o:tody." Su.c.h a.n aWMd .ouggu.t6 
tha;t .the.lte. i-6 a joint c.u.o:tody .oilua.:tion, whe.11..e.a.o 6ac..t :thi.o i-6 no:t M, be.c.au.oe. :the.f1..e. 
i-6 no:t built in;to :thi-6 aMang eme.nt 6f1..e.que.nt c.on;tac..t be;twe.e.n c.hil..d and both patte.nt.o. 
(Pa.tte.nthetic.aUy, I might me.ntion .tha;t p.oyc.hologic.al fl..e.OeMch hall demon.o:tf1..ate.d c.onvinc.ingly 
:that il 1.6 p!1..e.we..ty :thi,.o 6f1..e.que.n:t and c.ontinuing c.on:tac..t with bo:th pa.tte.nt.o :that i-6 M 
emotionally be.ne.6-{.Ua.£ :to :the. c.hil.d.J Fuf1..:thettmotte., legal cu.otody without jo-Lnt 
phy.oic..a.t c.u.o:tOdy i-6 fiaittly me.aninglu.o be.c.au.oe. mMt afi{)e.c..ting :the. he.a.t:th, 
e.duc.atio n, and we.lfia.tte o 6 the. c.hil..d a.tte. made. by (Oft patte.nt.o) wilh whom :the. 
chitd tte,.oidu on a day-:to-dalj ba.oi-6. The pa.tte.nt phy,oic..al i-6 (a.tte) 
the one. Cc.) with de. 6ado le.ga.£ c..u.otody. 
so many othe!! w .. Ltrt<?..Of..>e.-6 be {\aile. rcht' '-' bi.fl', 
A.B. ZZOZ, wottf.d ai.oo Rl.ke. to add my :thought.o c.onc.Mn6. Thi,.o 
bill d e.fihlu j oin;t "le.gal" and "phy.oic.al" c.u.otody. I no :the de.6ini-
Uon.o give.n by A.B. ZZOZ (aUhough I .oe.e. no tte.Mon. to .oe.patta.:te_ :the. c.onc..e..p:t.6 'o6 phy.oi_c.al 
and legal c.u6tody 6ott tteMon.o given in the. above. pa.ttag11..aph). 1 obje..c..t f.:J:tf1..e.nuou.oly 
to a loophole. :that :thi-6 bill pttavidu, .oinc.e. il aUowo fiatt CoU!1..t go on a.waJuiing 
joint le.gal c.u.o:tady without ade.qua.:te. phy.oic.a.t wilh Be.c.au.oe. :the. bill 
11..epe.ate.d.ty u.ou the. phlla..oe.. "joint c.u.otody" without phyJ.Jic.al, le.gal, 
OIL bo:th, a CoUf1..:t c..ou.td te.c.hnic.aUy .oa.:tMfiy :the. wlihout giving 
a fl..e.Mon fiatt no:t a.wa.ttdin.g joint phy.oic.a.t . :tu:timony on Oc;tobelt 14, 
j udg eo in. many di.o:tf1..iw a.tte. a.wa.ttdin.g 6 e.w c.a.o u a Thi-6 bill 
would 6uf1..:the.f1.. e.nc.oMag e. .o uc.h pttac.tic..e., .oinc.e. :the. le.ga.£ cu.otody, 
the11..e.by avoicUng the. majott pWtpo.oe.. o{l oWt joint and c.oi'itinuing c..on:tac..t) 
wdhout ha.ving :to .o:ta.:te. :the. tte,a.oon.o 6ott de.nia.£ a cu.o:tady. 
In we. mu6:t maki.ng a di.o:tin.c..tion be;twee.n I .o:ttwngly Wtge. 
that the. Imbfte.c.ht bill. be modifiie.d .oo M to u.oe. and lega.£ 
ew!>tod1J 11 in.o teiUl a 6 "Joint c.u.o:tody" in R1.ne.o 4 e. 2 tit line.o 1, 






SCHAPIRO AND THORN, INC. 
1242 Market Street, Fifth Floor' 
San Francisco, California 94102 
(415) 431-5772 
October 23, 1981 
California Legislature Assembly 
Committee On Judiciary 
1127 - 11th Street, Room 820 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Attn: Elihu M. Harris, Chairman 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
Suzie S. Thorn 
Susan L Keel 
Pamela E. Pierson 
I am writing to urge passage of AB 2202 and ection of AB 1706. 
I have been the chairperson of the State Bar Family Law Section 
Standing Committee on Custody and Visitation (North) for 1980-81. 
I am currently a member of the Family Law Section Executive 
Comrni ·t tee . 
In my role as chairperson of Custody and Visitation, I have become 
very familiar with the legislation which is presently pending in 
the Assembly. In my role as a fmily law lawyer, I have been 
involved in a large number of custody and visitation disputes. 
My reactions to AB 2202 and AB 1706 stem from those two experiences. 
My interpretation of AB 2202 is that it emphasizes the role of 
mediation and encourages the spirit of cooperation and compromise 
between parents in resolving the issues surrounding the custody 
of their children. It goes very far in defining the possible 
awards of custody a cour~ might make which is very useful to 
the parents, the attorneys and the courts in that it lets them 
all understand the terminology of custody orders. A major 
source of concern that many parents have is what it means when 
they agree or are subject to orders for "joint custody" or 
"physical custody" or "legal custody". Up until now, there has 
been nothing that provided any assistance in explaining the terms. 
AB 1706, however, would encourage litigation. It would put the 
issue of fitness back into custody disputes. By making joint 
custody the preferred award and placing the burden of proof on 
the objecting parent to prove that joint custody is not in the 
best interests of the child, the bill forces the objecting parent 
into court to present evidence of the bad qualities of the other 
parent. In my experience, such hearings turn into "mud slinging" 
matches and can have long-term deleterious effects on the entire 
family. Consider the problems that would have to be dealt with 
in a family where such a hearing took place and the trial judge 
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found that the objecting parent had not met his or her burden of 
proof and then made an award of joint custody. By that point, 
neither parent would be speaking to the other--a fact which would 
make joint custody nearly impossible. 
It is my experience in representing clients on custody matters 
that most parents are very concerned about the welfare of their 
children--more concerned than they are about going to court to 
tell the judge what an awful parent or person their spouse is. 
They respond well and eagerly to counseling and mediation. They 
want an opportunity to talk to the counselors and are willing 
to change their position if they are shown that it will benefit 
the child. AB 2202 encourages such behavior. AB 170~ however, 
provides no such encouragement. Because of the presumption .in 
favor of joint custody, the parent who wants the joint custody has 
no reason to modify his or her position--it ·will be awarded by the 
court unless he or she is shown to be unfit (which is usually very 
unlikely) • 
Another point which cannot be overemphasized is that joint custody 
can work only if the parents are willing to cooperate and have 
respect for one another's parenting skills. They do not have 
to like each other or even like the way in which the other acts 
as a parent, but they do have to be able to communicate. AB 2202 
facilitates that process, AB 1706 inter with it. 




By James A. Cook 
REGARDING CHILD SUPPORT LEGISLATION 8 REFORMS 
For Assembly Judiciary Committee 
October 14, 1981 
San Diego, California 
ITEM E 
Based on a survey of support-paying parents and observations of 
support collection, following is a summary of the issues discussed on the 
ensuing pages: 
* The support obligation upon the paying parent is lengthy (in 
terms of years) because of the extreme youth of California's 
children of divorce. 
* Support-paying parents are encumbered with an obligation for a 
substantially longer number of years than they were permitted 
to enjoy the at-home companionship of the children now being 
supported in-absentia. 
* The dollar size of those obligations is unusually large, over-
whelming to many, and an unremunerative burden that bears almost 
no relationship to the costs of raising a child under 18 years of 
age. 
* Overwhelmingly, the excluded, non-custodial, support-paying 
parent did not desire divorce, did not initiate divorce, and 
sought rectification following service of divorce summons. 
* In the vast majority of cases, the custodial parent is not con-
tributing financially to the support of the child although the 
custodial parents enjoy separate sources of income. 
* Rigid support legislation tends to have an "aura" of punishment, 
to the potentially remunerative advantage of custodial parents 
who were able to "leave the marriage" because of the convenience 
of "no fault" divorce. 
* Because of the likely sex of most support paying parents, child 
support legislation tends to put the sexes in opposition. 
* Child support levying or collection proposals are sometimes predi-
cated on a persecution complex ("somebody else is responsible for 
my plight and somebody else should be paying me") rather than a 
constructiVe and cooperative rectification of the problems of 
generating income. 
* Contrary to a state policy of protection of the family and 
support of domestic tranquility, child support enforcement legis-
l.ation tends to make divorce more attractive and secure than con-
ventional, nuclear family marriage. 
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* CPI index is an innacurate baror.eter 
costs because of its major influence: 
rates. 
f i fla ion an~ riSing livi 
monthly mortgage interest 
* Arbitrary dollar-amount decree exceed or do on rm with 
the authoritative "Cost of Ra sin a Child" surve s 
Department of Agriculture. 
f the U.S. 
* While support paying parents are subject to cant t cita ion, 
there is no contempt or obligation upon the recipient to vouch 
for, or account for the expenditure of child support funds 
they receive. 
*Joint custody encourages support felxibili t leads to, 
resolution of the individual problems encountere by each parent. 
* Visitation enforcement; the 
of child support. 
id pro quo of pr t, full payment 
* Overcoming the purposeful obscuring of a child's residence 
location as a means of fru5trat e r -p ng parent. 
* The necessity of in-kind-services or qu d p o quo o t to 
rationalize the dollar amounts of ild s o t 
* Loan application erosion which punishes t s o t p i 
divorced parent but does not affect t convent onal nuclear 
family parent. 
* Subterfuge tax-deduction and capitalization of 
monies by recipient parents and the neces 
deductions to the parent _paying support. 
rt 
ough" 
With the exception of the following, s solely with 
the age of California children at the time o ing 
observations, recommendations, and suggested ts were 
derived for the comprehensive intervie~ and sti 70 ild support 
paying divorced parents geographically widespre t t California 
and representative of a wide range of dif rent conomic circumstances. 
EXTREME YOUTH TYPIFIES CALIFORNIA CHILDREN AT 
LENGTHY DEPRIVATION OF CHILDREN FROM NO~-CUSTODI 
A statistical survey o over 10,000 Cali 
approximately equally divided between s and 
those children had been subjected to divorce 
those young children encountered divorce by t 
of a~e. 
PARENTS. 
chil en of divorce, 
s, ndicated that ~ of 
a s of age. And, ~ of 
they Kere 3~ years 
The net effect is that children and non-custodial s crt-paying 
cia ob igation 
they enjoyed 
parents are separated from each other, but with a 
upon the paying parent, for a period of t longer 
each others' companionship within a nuclear home. 
DIVORCE, THE COSTLIEST EXPENDITURE OF ~~RRIAGE. 
EXAMPLES: OBLIGATIONS OF ILD SUPPORT-PAYING IAL PARENTS. 
Divorce has become the single largest e enditure of marr age. 
-303-
page 3 ... 
(Unlike the equity in the other purchases of marriage, debts of 
divorce must be paid in full with seldc~ any ui or investment resulting.) 
Following is a sample extracted f~om our 36 examples of 
individual child support-paying non-custod al parents with an obligation 
to av $1,636,283 of which thev had aid thus far, a little over 26% 
( 432,760). This expenditure does not :ncl tto nor 
spousal support, both of which frequen:ly mar t child 
support expenditure. 
This obligation is until the chile is 18 years of e. 
Hence, these obligations do not i~cl college e ation costs, 
which most of these support-paying non-custodial parents will be unable 
to assume. 
The obligation levied upon each of se ents exceeded the 
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THE CONSCIENTIOUS ARE PUNISHED. 
SUPPORT DECREES DON 1 T CORRELATE WITH DIVORCE DESIRE. 
76% of support-paying, non-custodial parents did not initiate nor 
want divorce. 
Over 72% preferred to preserve the marriage at the time and a er 
divorce was initiated. 
Decisively, non-custodial (and no~ support-p 
not, and do not, want to break-up their families 
their offspring's childhood. Most excluded parents 
victims of divorce now saddled with the humiliation 
providing despite their willingness to preserve t 
i ) parents did 




There is no correlation between the des re r divorce and the 
obligation of child support and/or the evidence of e excluded parent's 
preference to reta a close relationship with t chil 
WHO PAYS? 
85% of all excluded and divorced non-custodi parents are paying 
all the child support, by decree, without obligation by custodial 
parent to contribute to child support. 
UNTAPPED INCOME BY CUSTODIAL PARENTS 
85% of the custodial (but non-support p 
parents are known to have a separate income 
could be contributed. (Of 61 cases examined, 
of other income by the custodial, non-support 
or contri ting) 
ich child support 
52 r ort the existence 
paying parent.) 
Of such costodial parents not sharing in chil 
attorney, another is a "professional", one is known 
additional incomes, and another has earned over t e 
personal income as the support-paying parent is earni 
one is an 
three 
times as much 
11% of those surveyed have arrangements wherein e custodial 
parent does contribute a portion to the total ld support income. 
RIGID SUPPORT DECREES ARE UNRESPONSIVE TO ECONOMIC I TIES 
38% of the child support-paying non-custodial parents have had 
income losses or reversals, job changes, or economic level reductions 
since the date of the support decree. 
62% have not had an erosion of income since the support decree. 
·On-going support decrees do not reflect the economic realities of 
1/3 of the support-paying parents who, upon suf ring an economic loss, 
are wary of or cannot afford the expenditures of seeking a modification 
which is uncertain in its achievement despite the costs of appealing. 
DECREES AT A PEAK OF EARNING POWER FAIL TO COMPENSATE FOR 
SUBSEQUENT FLUCTUATIONS 
The method and rigidity with which California crt decrees are 
determined subtly induces the parent plotting divorce, and who 
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antic ates being successfully declared 
the probable support recipient, to strateg 
that economic moment t victim-par t 
t ir li 1 earning power. 
s, ile a divorce-cant 
attorney not to work and reby 
support the evaluation of the court, i 
is also to select the moment for legal 
coincide th a presumed peak in earnin -
parent will be paying child suppo t. 
h strategic plotting of divorc 
fluctuating income. When and if 
s sequently falls 
MAKING DIVORCE MORE APPEALING 
DI OF CONSCIENTIOUS 
"No lt" divorce ilitates 
vorce .. the divorce 
demonstrating 
to obtain a 
necessi 
re is no 
parent fa 
family 
d of conduct, n 
t ir ly can 
To overl the assurance of 
enforced 














ublic policy of 
child support tends 




I NAPPROPRI INDI 
The major failing of 
measuri lati and c 
rma heavily weig 
current age e est rate 
utiliz current erest rate 
custodia parent is un 1 ly to 
each month, and the incidence of var 
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ARBITRARY DOLLAR-AMOUNT DECREES EXCEED=~G OFFICIAL 
COST-OF-CHILD-RAISING SURVEYS 
Heretofore, child support dollar amoun:s decreed in California have 
varied widely and in disregard of the ~ighly detailed ''Cost of Raising 
A Child" survey which is published and updated by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Agricultural Research Ser~ice, Consumer and Food Economics 
Research Division. 
The Department of Agriculture sur~ey is so detailed and so sensitive 
to influential variables that it consi~ers the dollar cost differences: 
1. Geographically 
Western region, North Central, South Northeast 
2. By age of child 
Individual years from 1 through 17 years 
3. By residence area 
Urban; farm; rural non-farm 
4. Within cost brackets 
Moderate cost, economy, low cost 
5. Numbers within a family 
Up to 5 children 
6. Estimated expenditures for: 






Other (personal care, recreation, reading 
and other expenditures) 
7. Cost-of-living and inflation allowances 
As a general rule, child support dollar amounts decreed by Calif-
ornia courts are higher than the actual, probable, expenditure as 
evaluated by the survey. Thus, in California, child support "income" 
is recognized as a means of "making a li\·ing" from possession of sole 
custody (albeit the dollar residue is modest, but achieved without the 
necessity of courtesy toward, justifying of, or "reporting" to the parent 
paying child support dollars.) 
Furthermore, child support dollar amounts, at present, are responsive 
to litigation that is remunerative to attorneys, as well. 
Clients who are recipients of child support are encouraged to 
increase the child support dollar amount estimate, which is non-tax-
reportable and is received and spent without tax liability. 
·Clients are also encouraged to "pad" itemizations of projected 
child support expenses, based on previous experience, with no requirement 
to justify in the future the veracity of those estimates. 
Hence, the method of determining child support le\·els in California 
encourages subterfuge. 
AMENDMENT PROPOSAL 
Henceforth, child support dollar leYels in child support decrees 
will be in con~ormity with, and correspond to, the dollar amounts 
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determined in the U.S. Department icul 
,JOINT CUSTODY ENCOURAGES FLEX I 
California's new joint 
participation in ing 
tion that ously led to 
snatching. 
There are at least six 
assumption of child support 
1. Percentage sharing of 
different incomes of 
2. Equal split between 
(a) based on pre 
(b) based on actual 
3. Each parent assumes 
resident with c 
4. sharing of costs bas 
to pay. 
5. Each parent alternates 
response to tuat 
parent's income. 
6. One parent assumes all 
rat in Joint Custo 
rati settlement of child 
NO ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EXPENDI 
OBLIGATION; CONTEMPT-FREE FOR 
At resent, 
verify child 
contributes to abuse. 
support, particular 








t dollar figures are 
a custodial at 
The decree-amount does not re 
ld, many of whom become partial or c 
with years when ld t is 
Almost universal a 
the custodial parent s 
rernunerat work until 
AMENDMENT 
The parent is rec ient of 
a verifiable monthly account of 
as an accounting of all rece 
chi children. 
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sm for the 
the 
tical amounts 
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VISITATION ENFORCEMENT 
Enforceable visitation is a counterpart and the quid pro quo to 
prompt, full payment of child support. 
If the legislature enacts punitive child support payment legislation 
without assurance of enforceable child visitation, the affected public 
will certainly assume that the policy of this legislature is approval of 
financial extortion at the expense of and in disregard of family contact 
and companionship. 
AMENDMENT PROPOSAL 
Visitation will occur regularly. frequently and continuing as a 
pre-requisite to payment of child support. A failure to provide 
visitation for a noncustodial parent will serve as an automatic bar to 
payment of child support, and vice versa. 
OVERCOMING THE PURPOSEFUL OBSCURING OF A CHILD'S RESIDENCE LOCATION 
Child support-paying fathers, including those now delinquent, are 
known to have been required to make oayment to post office boxes, to 
drop-off points, to court clerks, and to third parties for the purpose 
of obstructing from the support-paying parent the physical location of the 
child and of thwarting any ability of the child support-paying person to 
participate in "visitation." 
AMENDMENT PROPOSAL 
Child support payments will be made to address locations where the 
child or children are physically resident. Physical residence address 
will be made known to a child support-paying parent as a prerequisite 
of child support payment. 
SUPPORT DECREES DETERMINE SOLELY DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS WITH NO QUID PRO QUO 
FOR THE SUBSTITUTION OF IN-KIND SERVICES OR SUPPORT 
Invariably, although support decrees award to the recipient parent 
th e total monies presumably necessary for the support of a child, almost 
every divorce situation results in the support-paying parent also imposed-
upon and obligated to provide the child with additional clothing, housing, 
food, entertainment, supplemental medical aid and other costs above and 
beyond the dollar amount decreed. This obligation is often voluntary but 
it also becomes essential during times of visitation, vacation, or 
emergency with no "credit" accruing to the support-paying parent. 
Furthermore, support-paying parents, whose occupation or work may have 
inherent financial advantages that could reduce the actual dollar level 
(such as the wholesale recuctions inherent in being a grover, a clothier, 
"in transportation", sporting goods, bookstore operator, educator, etc), are 
nevertheless obligated to pay dollar amounts predicated on full 'retail' 
expenditures presumably to be incurred by the recipient. 
Consequently, there needs to be 'credit' or logical, rational, and 
convenient services or support 'in kind' as proposed in the following 
amendment. 
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AMENDMENT PROPOSAL 
A support-paying parent may deduct, in dollar equivalent, that part 
given directly to the child, or for the ld, or to d parties in 
payment for services rendered to the child. 
LOAN APPLICATION EROSION 
Parents within convenitional nuclear families, who are not divorced, 
assume their child support payments with no jeopardy of loan application 
status. (A divorced parent paying child support must list support payments 
as~.an income loss. A conventional parent who is applying for a loan is not 
required to list such deductions from income on loan lications.) 
Therefore, an offsetting amendment is requi 
AMENDMENT PROPOSAL 
It shall no longer be required to deduct from income the payment of 
child support for purposes of satisfying loan applications. 
SUBTERFUGE TAX-DEDUCTION AND CAPITALIZATION OF CHILD SUPPORT MONIES 
BY RECIPIENT PARENTS 
At present, the child support-paying parent receives no tax deduction 
or credit (beyond a minimum standard deduction) for t end-use of child 
support payments. Conversely, however, recipient arent can shunt that 
income into payments which do not minimize or je ar ze the recipient 
parent's tax advantage and increases the e t o income solely for 
the recipient parent and not necessarily to child's financial benefit. 
For instance, under the guise of a cost that s a support 
decree, the recipient parent can shunt such money though: housing payments 
which are primarily tax deductible interest, lies or purchases that 
can be typified as "medical", transportation certain circumstances 
where transit is by a mode the custodial parent is tax-deducting by reason 
of their form of business, etc. 
In the case of the housing "shunting", 
child support which provides hous , when 
that are primarily interest, results in an 
interest to the advantage of the recip-ient 
parent's equity and potential capital ga , 
benefit to the child whose support is being 
for instance,that portion of 
used to make housing payments 
and capitalized with no equivalent "pass throug 
support-paying parent. 
tax ion of that 
ile increasing the 
no assured or equival~nt 
, tax-deducted, 
' tax advantage to the 
The present system can provide a three-way "win" for the recipient: 
(1) The money is received without a tax obli ation to report it. (2) The 
money can be used by the recipient to pay est on purchases, and 
the interest is tax-deductible by the recip . (3) recipient can put 
the money into equity and income producing purchases f eventual profit 
to the recipient without advantage to child or payee. 
AMENDMENT PROPOSAL 
All income tax credits and tions r from s by a 
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support=paying parent to a recipient will "pass through" to the benefit 
of the parent ·paying child support. The child support-paying parent will 
receive tax deductible credit for monies paid, including interest on 
housing and other purchases. 
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SHAIN B. HAUG 
DUNCAN S. WERTH II 
MARCIA L. NOLAN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
SUITE 2020 CHAMBER BUILDING 
110 WEST "C. STREET 
SAN DIEGO. CALIFORNIA 92101 
October 26, 1981 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 
Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
1127 11th Street, Room 820 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Attention: Lettie Young, Counsel 
Re: Interim Hearings on Assembly Bill 1706; 2202 
Dear .r.1s. Young: 
ITEM F 
(714). 239-2396 
Enclosed please find my Testimony as to 
the above-entitled Hearings of October 14, 1981 held in 
San Diego, California. 
Your allowing me to testi on 
subject is appreciated. I only wish there 
all that needs to be said, both as to "cus 
obligations. 
For your additional information, 
be of value, I have enclosed a 
given at the American Bar Associ in 
most mportant 
was time to say 
" and support 
(or may not) 
cuss ion 
1980. 
Please feel free to contact me if I can be of any 
further assistance whatsoever. 
MLN/jen 
encls. 
'I'hank-you for your continued he and 
yours, 
Harcia L. Nolan 




FAMILY LAW SECTION of the 
San Bar Association 
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OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
Interim Hearings on Assembly Bill 1706; 2202 
· October 14, 19 81 San Diego, CA. 
Subsequent Testimony of: 
MARCIAL. NOLAN, Attorney at Law 
Chair 
FAMILY LAW SECTION 
of 
SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION 
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My appearance and testimony at these Interim Hearings 
is very definitively in two separate capacities; as a 
private attorney and expressing my own personal concerns and 
ideology, and (2) I speak generally on behalf of the Family Law 
Section of the San Diego County Bar Association. As Chait of the 
Family Law Section, I must advise that the Section as well as the 
Board of Directors of the County Bar Association and members of 
the Legislation Sub-Committee on Family Law are opposed to AB-1706 
as presently proposed. The thrust of the concerns being the 
requirement of a finding of "unfitness" of one parent in order to 
preclude the Court from ordering "joint-custody." Additionally, 
it is our general position that it would be inappropriate to 
delete the present provision "that the order may award joint-
legal custody without awarding joint-physical custody. 11 Further, 
we generally oppose the presumption that joint-custody is in the 
best interests of the minor child unless by prior agreement of the 
parents or the finding of unfitness. All of the reasons and 
ramifications of these particular items have been cussed at 
length by prior witnesses before this Committee and there is no 
need to repeat same. I would like to address most of my remarks 
to the Committee from a more personal level. I have been a 
practising attorney in San Diego County for approximately eight 
years with primary emphasis in the fields of domestic, juvenile 
and criminal law. Within the last two years my emphasis has been 
more and more in the family law area with particular thrust 
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towards child custody and visitation matters. I have been an 
ardent activist and responsible for promoting the concept and 
implementation of continued co-parenting since approximately 
1975. I am one of the very few attorneys this County who has 
been approved by our Courts to represent children in custody 
and visitation matters when necessary. In that capacity I have 
represented between and twenty and thirty children. The majority 
of my retained clients happen to be men. For the last three and 
one half years I have been married to a "non-custodial" father 
who lives with a great deal of emotional pain over the separation 
from his two daughters. Although his former wife lives within 
the San Diego area, she has made her home at least ten miles from 
our home which is a substantial distance for children who are 
now aged ten and twelve. At the time of my husband's 11 divorce 11 
he was never advised by his attorney regarding joint-custody or 
shared parenting. In fact, he was told that as a litary 
officer a challenge to his wife's request for custody was both 
expensive and fruitless. This was approximately five years ago 
and fortunately this kind of situation is probably very different 
today, but - so much of it depends on the attorney's representing 
the clients. 
Additionally, I might add that my husband and I have been 
foster parents of a sixteen year old child whom I represented 
in a juvenile matter who also came from a broken home. 
In regard to some of the issues raised in the Committee's 
correspondence, my remarks regarding support issues should be 
considered in light of my substantial experience in representing 
-2-
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criminal and civil defendants/respondents 
criminal failure to provide, 
District Attorney's Family 
years I have probably represented some 
My first comment would 
testimony should be discussing 
homes. The parents invoked their own 
when they had their children and when 
or 
The children had absolutely nothing to say 
however, after these children 1 s 
ranged without their consent, it is 
recognize the children's rights to 
people with whom they have deve 
all of such people, including 
and 
AB-l706 as presently written cannot 
than add acrimony and allow 
in our Courts allegedly over 
and marked as Exhibit "A" is a of a newspaper 
in the San Diego on October 13, 19 
commentary which is detrimental to all 
their children and which further serves 
between attorneys and their 
to the article and Mr. Grider, 
if I wanted to become wealthy 
urge you to vote for this bill as 
parent who has or for 























per hour in all of my cases whether or not I am in or out of 
Court. Frankly, it takes me more time to mediate and be 
creative in devising a custody agreement that meets the needs 
of a.particular family than it does to ask a busy, overworked 
Judge.· to make that decision for me and my client. 
Regarding Mr. Grider's comments that attorneys and Judges 
undermine the Court counselors - my experience tells me otherwise. 
While many attorneys did not initally like the use of Court 
counselors (I suspect mostly because it was not their own idea) 
they now are overwhelmingly happy to have these counselors 
available both in the Court and in the Family Counselling Services 
section of the Superior Court. It takes the monkey off of our 
packs! It gives a second powerful person to tell our hurting and 
obstinate clients that tr·.ey must continue to share the parenting 
responsibilities. The Lt.igation and airing of dirty linen is 
s.ubstantially reduced at least in a Courtroom environment. There 
are extremely few lawyers in domestic practice who want or like 
custody litigation. If we, as lawyers, as Mr. Grider calls it, 
"lobby" the mediator in the Court hallway to change their joint-
custody agreement, it is most often for one of two reasons: 
.1. Because we as the attorney have spent far more 
hours in learning about the particular case and 
its uniqueness than the half-hour or less that 
the Court counselors can possibly do. 
or 2. Our client is feeling forced into a quickly 




Believe me, no experienced 
he or she earns their money in a Courtroom; 
the contrary. 
1 1 you that 
quite 
It is essential to the ''best " our children 
that the policymak.ers :and enforcers of our State be dedicated to 
the principal philosophy that post-divorced parents need to 
continue in their parenting roles on a maximum level. 
Clearly, this cannot be accomplished in the same form 
and manner as existed during the time the parents and children 
resided together in the same household. Once the parents have 
split, the children cannot sleep under both roofs at the same 
time. 
Parents suffering the painful and temporarily 
neurotic (or worse) traumas of t'divorce" all too frequently find 
the children to be the most available and viable weapon to injure 
the perceived agg:rieVC~r. The system which parents find 
themselves must not tolerate these abuses 
consistent in its philosophical demands 
to share the parenting roles in a 
means legislators, Judges, lawyers, 
and social peers. 
A philosophical presumption that 





parenting is in the best interests of the is mandatory. 
The 1979 enactment of Civil Code 4600 and Civil Code 
Section 4600.5 (AB-1480) was a 
-5-
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courts and litigants. Unfortunately and expectantly there are 
flaws which need correction in order to implement the 
spirit and intent of that legislation. Mr. Kapiloff's AB-1706 
and Mr. Imbrecht's AB-2202 each attempt to improve upon the 
original statute. Unfortunately, neither bill encompasses all 
the necessary changes nor eliminates the ambiguities. 
A. No one seems to have noticed the obvious 
impropriety of the continued use of the term 
"award" in discussing custody and visitation~ 
The word itself - award - is promotive of a 
win/lose philosophy. It implies ownership as 
in property. The far preferrable and less 
offensive term is ''grant." 
This may appear trivial, but the substitution 
of the word "grant" vs. "award" more clearly 
expresses the spirit intended in the statute. 
The continued use of the term "award" is, in a 
legislative discussion of human lives, indeed 
dichotomous with a concept of shared parenting. 
B, It is imperative that "joint-custody" be 
statutorily defined if we are to statutorily 
demand that parents accept and abide by Court 
orders that grant same. 
C. We must expand our definitions beyond legal 
and physical custody to include the more 




1. Joint-legal custody is a aring 
major decision ... making functions and 
without a sharing of physical res 
2. Joint-physical custody is a 
physical residences thus a sharing of 
ties 
as well as: major decisions e the lives 
of the children. 
3. Divided-custody is a situation in which a 
child lives with each parent for an 
time period with reciprocal "vis 
privileges1 i.e. it is a "sole-custody" transfer 
for periods of time between 
4. Split-custody is a situation 
are residing separately with f 




D. "Custodyu arrangements, parents' intentions 
and a plan for its implementation 
mandatorily provided to the Court. 
I suspect that of and 
frustration expressed 
is imputed to the presently lation is 
in reality less a product of 
interpretation and more a of the litigants 
and their attorney's failure to 







a shared custodial arrangement should be 
required to provide his/her philosophical and 
practical ideology and implementation of 
such request to the Court. 
E. The Court must have some objective 
guideline in the framing of its orders. As it 
presently exists, joint-legal and joint-physical 
custody is totally subjective and abstract. 
Its individual interpretation is known only to 
the particular individual propounding same. 
AB-l706, in its present form, invites litigation and 
acrimony by suggesting that less than equal time is less than 
legal and presumptively not in a child's best interests. How is 
this equality to be defined? Should it be equal hours in a day; 
a week; a month; a year? Do we count sleeping time, school time, 
time away from the parents? What about the child's right to 
spend time with his peers or more importantly with himself alone? 
Equality as measured time cannot be th.e central issue.. The closer 
to adulthood the more the child should be encouraged to wean 
him/herself from the parental f.old. Quality of time is the 
essence of continued parenting. 
The only method to provide essentially equal time is 
to require the separated parents to live within the same 
neighborhood to insure the children of their primary rights to 
retain their peer groups, uninterrupted education and extra-
cur:ri.cular activities. Without this imposition upon the parents 
-8-
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it is impos.sible to share equal 
disrupting the child's life. Such may 
parent with equal time, but most 




F. The presently existing law s 
the Judiciary's authority to 
agreement which 
Neruther Mr. Kapiloff's 
pending bill speaks to 
been open to various 
Judges. The ambiguity 
believe that a Judge 
into such "sole..-cus 
presented to him and 
on its own motion where a 
G. Responsibility s a 
all of our statutory 
have made their 
decision to divide the 
to assume and perhaps 
responsibilities. 
or indeed begin to 
help with homework, 
pay for the orthodontia 













and activities regardless of which parent's 
home they sleep in. They should not be precluded 
from their normal activities because they are at 
the "out1' parent's home. 
H. Conciliation Court, also known as the Family 
Counselling Services of the Superior Court, needs 
more funds for more staff to provide increased time 
with clients mediating and negotiating co-parenting 
arrangements which meets the needs of the newly 
altered family and especially the children. In 
the alternative, we need to devise a program to 
train attorneys and/or mental health professionals 
in the theory and ability to act as independent 
mediators in custody and visitation difficulties. 
Mediati.on of a good viable and longterm agreement 
J 
often takes much longer than a few hours and often 
needs to be reviewed on several occasions and 
altered until it "fits" a particular family. 
I. We need to discontinue the obnoxious and 
offensive use of the words "custody" and "visitiation." 
We need to talk of continued parenting, co-parenting, 
shared parenting, change in primary parenting 
responsibilities. No one likes to be a non 
anything - particularly a "non .... custodial parent.'' 
But it is impossible to invoke the Wisdom of Solomon 
without cutting the baby in half. 
-lO-
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Mr. Griber states, " 
parents to 
arrangements," but 
each parent 50% of the 
parent is proven unfi 
some other 
the child's best 
My husband, who 
his to be a ful 
will not subject them to the 
such legislation would 
should he or 
statute as suggested. 
J. Criteria for the 




furcated life which 
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attorneys to be aware of 
on a more form bas 
guidelines is set 
This Committe and 
must understand that 
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t "B. II 
family bas a considerable period 
of time and counse 
it must also be zed that economics 
do indeed play an extreme, if not overwhelming, 
role in~some parents' request for co-parenting. 
There are many who are opposed to 
any shared because of their 
fear of loss of income and and there are 
many fathers who are not particularly interested 
in assuming the responsibi the children 
but wish to have an impetus for a lower support 
order. The Court and counselors making 
their determinations regarding the custody orders 
must be to rret the real of the 
parties in order to determine in the best 




• . Divorce American-style and 'Ule 
> .. aystem that provides for it,.·1;u; 
· 'GeOrge Grider sees it, is "rigged'' 
against fatberb_ood and tbe 
'' healthy of <:hlldren from 
:·'·&plit homes. 
That is why Grider and others will 
li ticket tbe San Diego Superior Courts 
. "downtown this morning at IUO to 
. '4raw public attention to their viewt> · 
.. We want the public to know bow · 
' the present lega I system promotes 
•-·battles iri the courtroom, rather than 
~~eeking a peaceful solution between, 
·caring parents," Grider said yester· 
iJ.ay at II news conference called a' 
group be beads called Fathers Aid. I( 
' has about 15 members working fm: 
~ .increased fathers' rights in custody' 
· •cases. •.: 











to Fathers . .Atd. 
may not .be 
mothers "-
- have more ef-
. fective skills in raising children,,;Irid 
. that cannot adjust to li~g 
homes alternately. , l1..v . 
a San Diego a'tfortiey in 
.... ,,tt,,.. who propQ$ed 
she will be among pro-
testif · at the hearing to-
morrow. Dr. ld A. Silver of Los 
"'-"''~''""'"• m-esu1e1n of Father's Rights 
and 'the author ·ota 
Fathers," al$<> 
wm the measure at tbe bear-· 
proponent will · b~ 
James Cook of Los Angeles, prest-
of the Joint Custody Association 
· ·oL 
the bill who, ..-re 
Hicks sai4, !in-
reores4~nUttiV~ilS of the callforc 
~10Ct1U.1Cfll, the Calif9~ia 
Association, state branch 
of Organizatioq· for 
Women and family ,law Presi.~g 
Mills of Los Angel~. • 
"'1· 
cour , in its 
ring on this 
54600.1 
In any pr ing u r T tle (comrnenci 
4400) or Title 3 (comme cing with Section 
wi Section 
4500) where , 
there are nor il 
for exclus ve cust 
temporary cult 
by Section 5158 may 
of the pet tion or 
in any action 
3, a petition for a 
ta ement required 
initial filing 
d t any time 
to or reached an 
custody of their 




children, a copy 
their understandi 
action. As pr t si e fter su iling, the 
court shall, e 
order awat'«H 
with the agreemen 
any stipulation 
ment, understandi or s i 
jurisdiction is approp iate, 
set a hearing date within 20 
show cause on the 




ional circumstances, enter an 
a st in accordance 
n accordance with 
a ence of an agree-
court may, if 
ex parte order, 
s and issue an order to 
If responding 
in e t set, the 
, nding 
Any ~rder awa i cust e who 
is receiving or n nion court s likely to 
receive, assistance to the Burton-Miller Act 
(Chapter 2 (commenci with Section 11200) of Fart 3 of 
Division 9 of the Wel are a Institutions Code) for the 
maintenance child all include an order pursuant 
to Section 4700 or 4702 direct noncustodial parent 
to pay any amount necess for t of the child, 
to the extent of ability to 
I 
I . 
JOLJ'l' "CuSTODY" - CREATIVE. PARl:.:N'riNG l:'OS'l'-DIVORCE 




When I first started practicing in the area of 
domestic law, I was aware of only l,::·-· kind of custody and 
visitation order. Hy knowledge was gll~aned from reviewiny 
uozens of court orders found in my mentor's files. 
Virtually all of them used ti12 following language. 
"Care, Custody and Control of the mino'r 
child(ren) of the parties shall be awarde~ 
to the Petitioner (Respondent) mother, herein, 
with rights of reasonable visitation awarded 
to the Respondent (Petitioner) father." 
Some orcers were expanded. 
i.e., "Said rights of reasonable visita-
tion shall include: 
1. Visitation with the minor children 
every other weekend beg innirg at o: 1) 0 p.m. on 
Friday until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. 
2. The Resp0nJent (Petitioner) father 




c. , etc. 
3. Respondent (Petitioner) father shall 
have the right to visitation with the minor 
children for 2 weeks each sun~~r, provided he 
sive Petitioner (Respondent} mother a minimum of 
30 cays notice uf i1i3 intent: t.o exercise saLt•O:." ... 
:1:; curiosity as t·..) ,;L" ..;uch br· . it.' ir. ;,;._~me 'v'<.::rsus 
intricate detail in others '"a~.:; met with p_l:~r·)nl . .:illtJ toleranco. 
"Bec"'US0 'w'hen people get divo.tceu, tht:: c.' .• nIt c:Jl.'c!t:.' on anjt:lil11:) 
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and the less d1ey agree the more explicit you have to be 
regarding visitation. If you don't spell out every detail 
of visitation, yo~'ll get phone calls every aay wanting 
you to tell them who should have the kids and co complain 
about the father not being tnere on time.~ 
Armed with that profound understanding of domest~c 
in tranquility, I joinecl tne other "fellows" and preparea all 
settlement agreements according to that standard. In fact, 
it never really occurred to me to query my clie.ro.ts as to 
which parent would "have the kids" ana which parent' WJUld 
"visit". 
Fortunately for myself, my client:, and especially 
for the children of the clients, in 197S I had the wisdom 
to attena a seminar sponsored by d10 Association of Family 
Conciliation Courts. A presenter on the subject of custody 
was a pediatrician who shared with the audience his bwn 
aivorce experience. He was intelligent, warm, articulate 
and concerned. One co1nrnen t he made had enormous imJ?act on 
me ana was t.ne catalyst in n:y exploration. of joint custody 
as an alternative . 
... "I might not have been a good husband, and 
maybe I made a lot of mistakes, but I was a good facher and 
shared a deep relationship with my children. When we got 
divorced I suddenly found out that I wasn't a father anymore 
-- I was a NON-custodial parent with controlled rights to 
visit. All I could hear and feel were NON- ... parent, 
•IJOi~- ... person. Nobody_ likes to be a NON." 
II. JOINT CUSTOCY DEFINED 
A. Joint Custody is a term, ambiguous at best, 
the particular meaning of which is generally known only to 
the user. 
B. Joint Custody is: A philosophy of a continuation 
of the ~ual parenting role upon alteration of the family 
structure ("divorce") which best meets the needs of all the 
.raernbers of that particular and unique family.l 
L. Stepnen M. Gaddis, hJoint Custodv of Children: 
h. Decision !·laking Al!:ernative", Conciliation Courts Review/ 
Vol. 16, lfl/June 1978. J:,t pa'::le 18; '·,li1il~ some practioners 
feel joint custody necEssarily inplies alLernating ~G;s~cal 
custody, there is no f~xeci definition of whac joint custody 
must include. In fact, one of the praccical advantages of 
joint custody is that the term represents a philosophy of tr~st 
and cooperation wherein the nonexclusive rights of the par~ies 





l. Joint custody can best be defined in terms of 
what it is not. 
a. It is not a decree of ownership of the 
children to a particula~ parent. 
b. It is not isolation of the chi~dren from 
the "non-custodial'' parent. 
c. It is not inflexible. 
d. It is not a divorce between the p~rents 
and the children. 
e. It is not a choice or determination of 
fitness of parenting. 
f. It is not a "win/ lose·· situation or 
decision. 
g. It definitely is not boilerplate language 
progranuned on a floppy disk. 
~. Good legal definitions and their essen~e are 
found in Miller's article "Joint Custody~.~ 
a. "Joint ' l~gal ' custodv ... consists 
exclusively of the shared deci sion-raaking 
function ... " 
b. "Joint 'physical' custody ... has the 
additional component of shared residence .... 
Thus ... minor as well as major decisions are 
made by Loth f)arents ... " 
c. d'Divided' custodv is a situation ~here 
each parent·l~ves w1th the child for a part of 
the year with reciprocal visitation ~riviley~s; 
divided custody ~nvolves none of the JOint 
ciecision-making of custody." 
d. "'Split' custod_y is ... a sole custodv 
a~rangement w1th---oi-otl1ers and sisters divlded; 
edch parent is yiven complete, full-time custody 
of at. least one child.'' 
vJHAT IS Ii.IJ A WORD?. 
A. Speech is the primary mode of communication 
between humans. As lawyers earn thc::ir living by words -
\ "r,1outhpieces") all humans cornr.mnica te ide: as throuyn words. 
"2 • David J. i·liller, ''Joint Custodv", Fani1y Law 
Juarterly, Vol. XIII, Nov. 3, Fall ~9;9, pa~~ 3GO, 361 partial1; 
~uoting A. Lindey, 1. Separation A0reements ana Antenupti~l 




B. Marital settlement agreements and Orders of 
the Court can inculcate iaeas and influence behavior through 
select~on of words. 
C. Suggestions for implanting philosopy of continued 
dual parenting through use of words. 
IV. 
1. Shared parenting ~Joint Custody 
2. Primary residential care = ?hysicel Custody 
3. Primary residential parent ~ Custodial Parent 
4. Change in residential care -Visitation 
5. Grant, i.e; '·The Court grants" =Award, 
as in 11 The Court awards" 
6. "The parents agree'· = "rfhe parties agree" 
(never Petitioner and Respondent or 
Plaintiff anu Defendant) 
7. The minor child shall have the right to 
"visit'' = The mother/father shall nave 
the right to "visit". 
8. The right of a parent to "visit" s.hould 
also include the responsibili!Z to' visit 
and to promote "visitation". 
WHY II SHARED p ,';RENTING .• 
A. ~he reasons not to employ joint custocy or shared 
parenting have been espoused by courts, lawyers, and parents 
as ~ell as some mental health professionals for many, many years. 
There is no necessity to discourse on the reasons for sole 
custody as such "reasons" have been a part of our social 
idealogy for a long time. i.e., (if the parents can't agree 
during their marriage, how could they be expected to agree after 
a divorce?) 
B. Query?: How many divorces has any lawyer nancled 
wherein the significant grie~ance has been the other parent's 
detrimental effect on the children? 
C. Advantages 
1. Farents who are fully involved with the 
negotiation of their own "custody" arrar.gemencs can bette!' 
resolve later disputes. 
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2. Recognition of parents' mutual rights 
to continued parenting encourages cooperation, discourages 
power plays and neutralizes the power of the cus&oaial parent. 
" ... one must distinguish between the concepts of aut.hori ty, 
responsibility and power. Authority and responsibility 
aescribe the legitiwacy and nature of one person's parental 
decision-making, while power describes the manner in wnich 
it can be enforced to the detriment of the other parent. 
Power tends to be e~clusive and to leave those persons with-
out it in a position of being taken advantage of-- , 
always desirous of acquiring it for themselves to use in 
retaliation. Therefore, it fosters continued resentment: 
and litiqation in an attempt to wrestle the power back to 
the perscn who has 'lost' it in a prior proceeaing."3 
3. Reinforces, fc•r the children, their belief 
that both parents love and care for them. 
4. Alleviates the pain of the children 'from 
feeling they must "choose'' a parent - less diviaed loyal t 
5. I1inimizes the child's distortion (p~sitive 





Children are not guests in the "non-
We. a.vol.cl "disneyland daddys" and :;snow 
Goldstein and Freud make a similar observa-
7. A continued (sometimeF-1 ne\v) shared burden 
of chila-rearing and caring. 
8. Less opportunity for children to '·play" , 
i.e., manipulate parents. 
9. Reduces stereotyping and enlaryes the 
child's perceptions. 
10. Alleviates guilt of all family mPmbe'rs. 
11. Provides continued support system for 
;_Jr ix.1ary i_Jaren t. 
3. See supra Note 1. 
~. J. Goldstein, A. Freud and A. Solnit, Bevcnd 
tl1e Bes'.: Interest.::; of the Child, 33, (1973). Althoush 
drawing an opposite conclusion reyarain~ access and visitation,t~~ 
"a 'visiting' or 'visited' t?arent has l~ttle chance to serve 
as a true object of love, trust, ana iaentification sinc,~ this 




a. It is often overlooked that a major strength 
of a ttvo parent home is the presence of two adult members who 
aid in decision-makins, responsibility, relief during illness, 
e~c. There is a sharing of the burden. ~ot only aoes the sole 
custodial parent fulfill all family functions, but there is no 
relief from the burden. 
12. More opp0rtunity to continue in extended family 
relationships, e.g., granaparents, other relatives, family 
friends, etc. 
v. HOW TO HBLP Trli.: CLIE:~'L' 
A. Begin dealing with concept and philosophy of 
shared parenting at the initial stages of the proceedings. 
1. Try to <.letermine the clients' "hidden ayenda" 
when meeting. Sometimes resolviny the 
"real" issue resolves tne custody issue. 
2. Often directing focus on the matter of 
"custody/visitation" alone before the other issues of,divorce 
helps to keep the issues from becoming muddied. 
3. Focus dialogue on the children's needs and 
rights rather than the other parent's rights. 
4. Discuss the responsibility of each parent 
within the role of parenting. 
5. Explain the advantages of a shared pare~ting 
relationship, applying the adva~tages to the particular 
client's needs and lifestyie.' 
6. Ask the client to assume the role of the 
"non-custodial" parent. Have him/her write down his 
feelings in that role; what rights and responsibilities 
he/she would desire; how he/she would want those desires 
ir:1p lemen ted. 
7. Ask the client to assume the role of the 
chilJ(ren) and have him/her write down his feelings about 
sharing i1is parents, how he woula want to implement continuec.: 
involvement with each parent. 
8. Explain honestly to the client the emotional 
and economic expense of ''full-fledged" custody litigation. 
9. Provide the client with support in his/her 




10. Strongly encourage the clients' participation 
in a Conciliation Court conference or other available counsel-
ing service designed to mediate and explore alternatives to 
litigation as well as work through the an9er and "emotional 
divorce". 
a. "If the parties no longer hate or repuciiat.2 
each other as people, if they have learned (even if only unoer 
pressure of losing their child othen,rise) to accept difference 
as simply 'different' (rather than as intolerable and awful), 
it becomes less important with whom the child is 'placed'. 
He or she will under normal ci~cumstances vis~t baci and forth 
a~icably (or at least relatively freely}. The child can draw 
from bo':h parental worlds, from two varying models. 'l'hus, 
the chances of his or her becoming ri9idly fixed are less 
likely. The single parent die-stamp of one set of values, 
attitudes and beliefs is uniquely Amer~can, but not a cultural 
value we need to take in or preserve.~~ 
VI. SU!-INA':CION 
Literature and studies on the impact of divorce upon 
cnildl-en and families are becollling more prevalent. 
See, e.g., vvallerstein and Kelly, "Divorce Counselin~: 
A Community Service for Families in the I1idst of LJi vorce" , 
47 A.mer.J. Orthopsychiat. 4(1977); Hetherington, Cox, and Cox, 
"Divorced Fathers", 25r Fam. Coordinator 417 (197(,) .' One 
very valuable reference source for persons interested in 
reviewing other studies and statistics can be found in an 
article entitled "Children of Divorce, A Review or the 
?sycholog ical Literature'· , Deborah A. Luepni tz, "Law anc 
Human Behavior", Vol 2, No. 2, (1978), Plenum Press, ·New York. 
'l'o date, there has been li tt:_e research on tht: e ~ l·ects 
of "joint custody" upon chilaren ana families, prllllaril} oecause 
the widespread functional concept is still in its infanCJ'. 
lfowever, more and more state legislators are beginning to at 
least mention the theory in revised statutes and to rec9gnize 
the validity of continued dual parenting after divorce. 0 
Perhaps the most significant statute being California's 
Virginia Anne Church, 
Child Custod?", 
"A Rational J~fproacn to 
G. Oreaon Statute, Section 2 ORS 
... "whenever- tne court grants a ciecree o an annu :nen 
C:.issolution of marriage or of se?aration, it has tJOHer furtiJ>21~ 
to aecree as follO\vS: (a) F'or tne future care anu cus tO(•.:· c.; 
minor children of the marriage by one party or jointly as it 




amendment to the Civil Code relat!ng to chila custody which 
became effective January 1, 1980. 1 
It is this author's observation both in the 
representation of parents of both sexes and substantial 
experience in the representation of minor cnildren in ~ustodJ 
~isputes, that ~joint custody/shared parenting" does work and 
it works with parents who can't get along. Causing parents--
to think about the concepts of shared parenting and their 
• children's needs often is the catalyst towards ending the open 
hostility -warfare. Frequently it has increased the father's 
participation in the chila-re~ring process, ~he lack of 
·.Nhich c~:n be a major grievance :::;f tn0 mother. I have seen raa:~y 
desponcient and withdrawn children sigh with relief and smile 
brightly with '!:he question answered - "You me.an I can keep 
both my parents?" 
Undoubtedly, the major stumbling block in achievinc; 
viable shared parenting ayreements, isattorneys and other 
"credible" professionals who are not f ar,ti liar wi tn the conce;_Jts 
and are afraia of change from the "normal"; and unfortunately, 
all too often, those professionals \vho are too lazy to use tlle 
creative eneryies required to produce an ayreement which is 
tailorea to that one. unique family and its individual needs. 
The only answer is to continue to softly, but 
diligently, teach and '-~r1t'rus·t our clients, the courts and 
opposing counsel in the many alternatives open to divorcing 
parents which does not also create a divorce from the haple3s 
children. I have supplied our courts with innumerable articles 
on ''joint custody/shared parenting" with sig~ificant results. 
Pet-haps more iLlportantly, in terms of conf 1 i ct resol u t:ion, 1 
have submitted these sante treatises to "unc1l ightec.i" opposing 
couns~l, advising that I hive su~plied the same to my client, 
accompanied by tne request that their clients be given an 
opportunity to read these same articles. 'l'he results llave 
been delightfully amazing and I spend almost no time in custody 
trials . 
"Yes, Mary, you can keep both of your parents! n· 




DOHESTIC LA\-J AllD Ic!OTIO!.J DEPAR'lHL'l'l' 
PP£LCDE TO ORDEH TO ShO'./ CAuSE P.tlD i•10TIOI'>l CALEHDAR 
The people in this courtroom today are here because 
you have made a present decision to terminate your mqrriage. 
Most of you have minor children are go to be affect~d 
by the decisions made here 
I am sure you are aware that it is usually the 
children who are most vulner3ble to the pains of this decision 
ana the ones who usually have the least power to control those 
decisions. This Court can and will make certain orders that 
will affect your lives at the present time and usually those 
oraers are offensive to everyone in one way or another. 
Concerning cus ana visitation, it is this 
Court's ppinion that the parents are the best aLle persons 
to make the appropriate decisions regarding these issues. 
This Court strongly encourages parents to meet with each other 
and to work out and determine for themselves what is in the best 
interests of their children. Listen to your attorneys, who have 
substantial experience in handling these matters ahd seek 
counseling through tne services of the Conciliation Court 
counselor (or other serv ce) in order to reacn a mutually 
acceptable agreemen in the best nteres of you chi'aren. 
In this light the Court offers to you the, followinq 
thoughts for your considera~ion. 
Shared cus is any method that permits the 
chi loren to grmv up knowi and i t racting with each ~:;arent 
in an every day situation, whether that co,[les by split t 
the time on a f fif basis each week or by transferring 
the care to the lternate parent for several years, or 
alternative in between. The overal esult is tne same -
the youngsters have a con nu for a real stic, 
noroal relationsh p witn each parent. ddition, it allows 
each parent to know ti1at nt;;; an ne s h tile opportuni 
to 2ass on to the cnildren the own un ness, skills, 
thoughts, and values. 
Remerr~er - It is not necessary to 
as S?Ouses, or even be frienc:is, to still 
parents. 
each otller 
each ther as 
In a shared cus arrangement:. there is more flexi-
bility available to arrange within each amily, custoay/ 
visic:.ation" which meets tl1e neec:is of the fami as new 
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organized subsequent to the parents' separation. 
This Court hopes that you will carefully cons1aer 
the varied options and alternatives open to you as parents 
that shared parenting can offer and that in conside~ing the 
rigllts and needs of your children, as well as your 6wn riynts 
and responsibilities to continue parenting, you will discuss 
these ideas carefully with your attorney and each other.* 
*HON. JAHES A. HALKUS 
Supervising Judge, Domestic Law & Motion 
Superior Court of California 
Conciliation Court Judge 
San Diego, California 
HARCIA L. NOLAJ.'J-NALSACK, Attorney 
San Diego, California 
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